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Overweight vehicles exceed the federal and/or state statutory limits for either the gross 
vehicle weight (GVW) or the weight of individual axles or axle groups.  National and 
state limits on vehicle weights were established to preserve the highway infrastructure.  
Past research has shown that overweight operations, while causing significant damage to 
roads and bridges, can enhance the trucking industry productivity, and thus yield 
economic benefits both regionally and nationally. 
In the United States, individual states administer oversize and overweight vehicle 
permit programs to regulate and collect revenues from overweight operations.  
Differences in the truck size and weight limits and overweight permit programs across 
the states inhibit seamless and efficient truck travel across the country.  Agencies 
responsible for maintaining the highway infrastructure realize that the cost of 
consumption of the infrastructure far exceeds the collected revenues. 
The current study examines four options to improve overweight vehicle permitting 
systems:  multiobjective optimization of traditional mechanisms, incentives for 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles, application of an auction-based quota for overweight 
xvii 
 
vehicle operations, and opportunities for harmonizing the regulations covering 
overweight vehicle operations that differ across the states. 
The first three options are qualitatively and quantitatively applied to a case study 
involving Indiana’s newly-established overweight commodity permits for vehicles 
carrying metal (up to 120,000 lbs), and agricultural (up to 97,000 lbs) goods.  An 
incremental approach to harmonization of truck size and weight regulations and 
overweight vehicle permitting systems is qualitatively described, including available 
tools and data needs to promote harmonization. 
The four options are not mutually exclusive; collectively, they provide 
opportunities for transportation decision makers to improve overweight vehicle 
permitting.  Each option contributes to the ongoing discussion about how to address the 
issue of uncompensated consumption of highway infrastructure assets attributable to 
overweight vehicles.  The multiobjective optimization formulated herein better reflects 
actual decisions made by both the agency and carriers than limited previous quantitative 
research.  The quantification of willingness to pay for investment informs state agencies 
about the extent to which incentives for infrastructure-friendly vehicles can be adopted.  
The quota framework contained herein is an extension of strategies used previously to 
mitigate demand into a tool for controlling the amount of allowable infrastructure damage 
while collecting necessary revenues to protect infrastructure from undue damage.  Finally, 
the harmonization of overweight vehicle permitting programs can streamline interstate 
overweight operations for both state agencies and carriers.  The combination of several 
options can result in greater improvements to both the trucking industry’s productivity 
and the preservation of highway infrastructure than any option alone. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Overweight trucks are those that exceed the federal and/or state statutory limits for 
either the gross vehicle weight (GVW) or the weight of individual vehicle axles or axle 
groups.  Both national and state limits were established to preserve the nation and state’s 
highway infrastructure assets against undue deterioration.  Extensive previous research 
has established that overweight vehicles cause damage to roads and bridges beyond the 
damage occasioned by vehicles within the statutory limits.  At the same time, the trucking 
industry provides enormous socioeconomic benefits to the state.  Permitted weights in 
excess of the statutory limits allow trucking companies to operate more productively; this, 
in turn, spurs economic development. 
The balance between economic gains and increased asset preservation costs due to 
overweight vehicles is perhaps best viewed through the lens of the “Tragedy of the 
Commons” (Hardin, 1968).  In Hardin’s original framework, the commons is a shared 
pasture where herdsmen collectively raise their cattle.  One rational herdsman realizes 
that increasing his herd by one more animal will increase his personal utility when he can 
sell that additional animal.  The negative impact, whether realized or not by the herdsman, 
is that this additional cow will require some of the resources from the common; however,  
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the cost of one additional animal is small compared to the economic gain experienced by 
the herdsman.  Additionally, the small cost is shared among all herdsmen while the large 
financial benefit is realized by the one herdsman who sells the additional cow.  
Unfortunately, each herdsman makes decisions independently.  In Hardin’s postulation, 
when all of the herdsmen, acting rationally, increase their fold, the effects of overgrazing 
increase to the point that the commons can no longer support any of the cattle.  Unless 
addressed by some intervening entity, the commons is not sustainable. 
The tragedy of the commons can be applied to overweight vehicle operations using 
highway infrastructure.  Adding one overweight vehicle leads to a small amount of 
damage to the “common” highway network; however, too many overweight vehicles 
cause an excessive amount of damage that cannot be recovered.  Additionally, the benefit 
of operating overweight is exclusive to the carrier, while the costs are shared by all road 
users.  As with the original tragedy, the common network of highway infrastructure 
assets is not sustainable unless undue consumption is moderated and/or the commons is 
maintained, repaired or replaced through external intervention. 
In this modern-day example of the tragedy of the commons, additional traffic 
loading from overweight vehicles has a direct impact on the costs of pavement and bridge 
reconstruction, rehabilitation, and routine maintenance.  Although there are economies of 
scale at play, the total cost of reconstruction increases for higher anticipated loads which 
require thicker pavements and bridges designed to accommodate higher loads.  Also, 
when greater loads use highway assets, the rehabilitation and routine maintenance costs 
are also higher because they are more frequent.  The present value of rehabilitation and 
maintenance expenditures increases when funds must be obligated sooner rather than 
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later, due to the time value of money.  The magnitude of the increase in routine 
maintenance and rehabilitation costs depends on the schedule:  if maintenance is not 
carried out to accommodate additional loadings, the rehabilitation costs can increase 
substantially due to increased deterioration in the time between rehabilitation activities.  
The costs of inaction or deferred rehabilitation are borne not only by the agency but also 
by all users (not only those traveling overweight) through higher vehicle operating costs, 
additional delays that result from lower speeds, and higher crash risks associated with 
infrastructure in poor condition. 
The economic benefits of using overweight vehicles have resulted in widespread 
use of permitting to allow vehicles to exceed federal and state truck size and weight 
(TS&W) limits.  Permit revenues are important to transportation agencies to offset a 
fraction of such use; however, in most cases, the revenues collected from overweight 
vehicle permits fall far short of the cost of the additional consumption due to overweight 
operations.  Additional consumption is defined as the usage beyond that which would 
have occurred from a non-overweight vehicle.  Efficient permit fees need only recover 
additional usage to maintain common highway infrastructure assets because other 
funding and revenue collection mechanisms, i.e., registration fees, licensing fees, and fuel 
taxes, are all collected for all vehicles both non-overweight and overweight.  For 
purposes of this research, efficient revenue collection refers to the full recovery of the 
cost of consumption while equitable revenue collection refers to the cost recovery that is 




At an aggregate level, limited surface transportation funds are already insufficient 
to maintain the existing infrastructure.  When the revenues collected from permit fees do 
not recover the full cost of additional consumption from overweight vehicles, the 
difference must be somehow supplemented to prevent premature physical degradation of 
infrastructure.  Traditionally, states have offset such inefficiencies through transfers from 
general funds, special sales taxes, and increased state fuel taxes (infrequently in recent 
years).  In addition to the consideration of limited funds, states must consider the 
economic impacts of permit policies.  If the overweight vehicle permit fees are too high, 
industries that rely on heavy trucking may suffer.  As a result, individual states have 
independently grappled with the issue of establishing and enforcing regulations and 
policies designed to enhance highway safety, mobility, and asset preservation without 
placing an undue burden on the trucking industry’s operations. 
 
1.2 History of Truck Size and Weight Regulation 
Originally, the sizes and weights of vehicles were regulated by state and local laws 
in accordance with the state and local governments that provided transportation 
infrastructure.  Federal TS&W laws were established and continue to exist for two basic 
reasons.  First, large-scale federal investment allowed for the construction of the nation’s 
vast Interstate System.  Second, there is an ongoing need for national uniformity and 
funding for network preservation and expansion.  The result is a complex system of both 





1.2.1 Evolution of Policy on National Truck Size and Weight Limits 
Prior to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, truck weights and sizes were 
regulated by individual states.  Federal TS&W limits were established in the Act to 
protect investments in the new Interstate and Defense Highway System (Interstate 
System) as follows:  maximum width limit of 96 inches; single-axle weight limit of 
18,000 pounds; tandem-axle weight limit of 32,000 pounds; and gross vehicle weight 
(GVW) limit of 73,280 pounds. 
The 1956 regulations applied to travel on the Interstate System only.  Furthermore, 
trucks in excess of federal limits could continue operation on the new system if legally 
allowed according to state regulations prior to July 1, 1956.  This exception was the first 
“grandfather clause.” 
Subsequent to research studies in the 1950s and 1960s, the federal TS&W limits 
were increased in the Federal-aid Highway Amendments of 1974 as follows:  single-axle 
weight limit increased to 20,000 pounds; tandem-axle weight limit increased to 34,000 
pounds; and GVW limit increased to 80,000 pounds. 
The 1974 Amendments also legally established the use of Bridge Formula B, a 
look-up table of allowable weights based on the number of axles and length of the vehicle, 
which was proposed in 1964 by the American Association of State Highway Officials 
(AASHO, renamed the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials, AASHTO, in 1973).  The 1974 Amendments also included a grandfather clause.  
The limits established in 1974 are essentially the same as those presently in use, with the 




The 1974 Amendments and subsequent 1976 Federal-Aid Highway Act did not 
prohibit states from establishing lower limits on Interstate highways within their borders.  
As a result, six states (all in the Mississippi Valley) refused to allow trucks to operate at 
80,000 lbs, inadvertently creating an institutional barrier to efficient cross-country 
trucking operations.  The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) 
rectified the situation by establishing the National Network for which the federal limits 
serve as minimums.  The National Network includes the Interstate System and other 
federal-aid highways critical to the trucking industry.  As previously noted, the 1982 
STAA increased the maximum width limit to 102 inches.  As with previous legislation, 
the 1982 STAA contained language that effectively extended the grandfather clause. 
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 restricted 
the size, weight, and routes used by longer combination vehicles (LCVs) but did not 
make other changes to national TS&W limits for non-LCVs.  LCVs are tractor-trailer 
combinations with two or more trailers.  The “LCV freeze,” as it is commonly referred to, 
also contained grandfather provisions for state regulations applicable to LCVs prior to 
June 1, 1991. 
Recent surface transportation authorization legislation—Transportation Equity Act 
for the 21st Century (TEA-21) of 1998; Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) of 2005; and Moving 
Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21) of 2012—did not change the federal 
TS&W regulations.  Due to widespread interest in TS&W limits, the Transportation 
Research Board (TRB) and the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) 
conducted comprehensive national TS&W studies in 1990 and 2000 (USDOT, 2000; 
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TRB, 1990a).  MAP-21 mandated that another Comprehensive TS&W Limits Study 
should examine safety risks, infrastructure impacts, and enforcement issues related to 
trucks operating in excess of federal limits.  The MAP-21 mandated study was due to be 
submitted to Congress in November 2014 but is yet to be released because of the 
complexity of TS&W issues. 
 
1.2.2 Current Practices in Oversize/Overweight Truck Permitting 
The provisions grandfathered in 1956, 1974, and 1982 surface transportation 
authorization legislation allow individual states to permit trucking operations in excess of 
federal limits if lawfully permitted prior to July 1, 1956.  Initially, there was no formal 
approval process in place for the application of grandfather rights; however, an 
amendment in the 1982 STAA (often referred to as the “Symms Amendment” for Idaho’s 
Senator Steven Symms) allows states to determine which vehicles could lawfully operate 
prior to July 1, 1956.  This permissive amendment has been used by many states to claim 
grandfather rights to permit the operation of larger and heavier trucks, even if the weights 
allowed today are higher than any used in practice in the 1940s and 1950s.  Similarly the 
grandfather rights included in ISTEA apply to state LCV regulations in effect prior to 
June 1, 1991 as determined by the individual states. 
Non-divisible loads or vehicles are defined as any load or vehicle exceeding TS&W 
limits which, if separated into smaller loads or vehicles would:  compromise the intended 
use of the vehicle; destroy the value of the load or vehicle; or, require more than 8 hours 
work to dismantle using appropriate equipment.  Divisible loads or vehicles are any load 
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or vehicle which can be separated into units of legal size and weight without 
compromising the integrity of the load. 
All fifty states have provisions for non-divisible load permits in excess of federal 
TS&W limits.  The more permissive interpretation of grandfather provisions outlined in 
the Symms Amendment of the 1982 STAA is necessary for divisible load permits above 
the weights in effect in 1956.  By 1995, thirty-seven states had exercised grandfather 
rights to issue permits for divisible loads (USDOT, 2000). 
Most grandfather clause claims are made to allow exceptions to the federal weight 
limits.  Extra-legal or overweight trucking operations translate into increased productivity 
and profits for trucking companies and ultimately benefit the consumers and end users of 
the commodities through lower prices.  This is because even modest increases allowed in 
GVW represent larger increases in the amount of goods moved.  For example, the typical 
weight of an unloaded 5-axle combination truck is 29,000 lbs (Luskin et al., 2002); 
therefore the payload for a legally loaded GVW of 80,000 lbs is 51,000 lbs.  A 5% 
increase of the GVW (4,000 lbs) translates into a 7.8% increase of the payload becacuse 
there is no increase in the tare weight of the vehicle, only an increase in the payload.  
Similarly, increasing the GVW by 8,000 lbs (10%) increased the payload by 
approximately 15%.  The increased profits carriers gain from additional delivered goods 
per trip is typically far in excess of the additional operating costs including fuel taxes and 
the costs of permits.  By and large, state grandfather clause claims to permit GVWs over 
the 80,000 lbs federal limit for divisible loads require permitted vehicles to abide by all 




1.3 Motivation for the Present Study 
TS&W and Highway Cost Allocation (HCA) studies dating back to the 1980s have 
consistently demonstrated that permit revenues for overweight vehicles do not fully 
recover the cost of additional asset consumption.  Middleton et al. (1988) found that the 
permit fees paid by overweight trucks amounted to only 1/20th of the overweight-
attributable damage costs for pavements.  This gap does not include the additional 
consumption cost for bridges, which far exceeds that for pavements (Everett et al., 2014; 
VTRC, 2008).  In the most recent USDOT TS&W study it was determined that for 
combination trucks between 80,000 lbs and 100,000 lbs, only half of the usage cost was 
recovered (USDOT, 2000).  Straus and Semmens (2006) estimated that $12-$53 million 
in uncompensated pavement consumption is attributable to overweight vehicles on 
Arizona’s roadways.  Again, this does not include the uncompensated bridge 
consumption. 
The comprehensive overweight fee structure study conducted in Virginia by the 
Virginia Transportation Research Council (VTRC) recommended a two-part fee 
calculation method to determine appropriate permit fees to account for both pavement 
and bridge consumption (VTRC, 2008).  The analysis results for pavements led to the 
establishment of equitable fees in terms of the unit cost of damage; however, the authors 
determined that it was not feasible to establish a similar fee to cover bridge consumption 
due to the excessive amount of bridge consumption associated with a small number of 
vehicles, and instead recommended a scheme to achieve “relative equity.”  The 
researchers stated that any fee based on the actual consumption of both pavements and 
bridges would be so high that trucking industry operations and productivity could be 
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seriously impaired.  In the end, VDOT adopted a fee structure which recovers only a 
portion of the attributable pavement consumption cost and excludes any recovery of 
bridge consumption costs. 
Prozzi et al. (2012) conducted a similar comprehensive overweight fee structure 
study in Texas.  Based on an analysis of the fees collected from more than 570,000 
permits in fiscal year 2011, the authors concluded that the actual oversize/overweight 
pavement and bridge consumption and other monetized impacts (infrastructure operations 
and safety) exceeded six times the permit revenues.  The actual consumption and 
monetized safety and mobility impacts amounted to approximately $410 million in 
excess of the $111.4 million collected in permit fees. 
Other states have also recently carried out similar TS&W or oversize/overweight 
vehicle studies.  These include Minnesota in 2006, Wisconsin and Ohio in 2009, South 
Carolina in 2013, and an ongoing study in Indiana (Cambridge Systematics, Inc. and SRF 
Consulting Group, Inc., 2006; Cambridge Systematics, Inc., 2009; ODOT, 2009; 
Chowdhury et al., 2013; Everett et al., 2014).  Continued national and state interest in 
TS&W, HCA, and oversize/overweight vehicle studies indicates an unresolved issue, 
namely, how to address the excessive uncompensated consumption of highway 
infrastructure by overweight vehicles. 
 
1.4 Options for Protecting Common Assets 
There are a number of ways by which state agencies can preserve their highway 
infrastructure while allowing overweight truck operations.  Nearly all 50 states use 
traditional revenue sources to attempt to recuperate some or all of the costs incurred from 
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trucking companies.  These include registration and licensing fees, fuel tax revenues, and 
existing permit fees.  TS&W limits and fee structures, some proposed and others in place, 
have provided (or will potentially provide) incentives for investment in equipment that is 
less damaging to the existing infrastructure.  These programs, if successfully 
implemented, can present a win-win situation where the infrastructure does not 
experience undue deterioration while the trucking industry benefits from more efficient 
operations.  Although it has not been explicitly applied to overweight vehicles, 
transportation demand management through a quota system has been used in other 
countries as a viable method to control traffic growth.  Quotas can be similarly applied to 
overweight vehicles to control the extent of highway infrastructure consumption. 
 
1.4.1 Traditional Revenue Sources 
The primary revenue sources currently employed by state departments of 
transportation (DOTs) and departments of revenue (DORs) include registration and 
licensing fees, fuel tax revenues, and permit revenues.  Registration fees are paid by all 
vehicles.  Typically, vehicles which operate at or above the federal limit of 80,000 lbs 
pay the same registration fee.  Fuel tax revenues are meant to be a “pay as you go” 
system.  Unfortunately, the federal fuel tax has not increased since 1993, although the 
cost of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of the infrastructure has increased.  
Currently, the federal diesel fuel tax is 24.4 cents per gallon (Weingroff, 2013).  Similar 
to registration fees, fuel taxes are paid by all vehicles regardless of weight.  Typically, 
heavier vehicles are less fuel efficient; therefore, the fuel taxes paid by overweight 
vehicles are higher than for vehicles at or below the federal GVW limit.  In addition to 
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registration fees and fuel taxes which are paid by all users, permits are the traditional 
means to collect revenue specifically from overweight vehicles. 
Previous research has indicated that the revenues generated from permit fees are 
insufficient to offset the pavement and bridge consumption from overweight vehicles, as 
discussed in Section 1.3.  Additionally, reliance on overweight vehicle permitting fees 
alone may not lead to a balance between costs and benefits.  If the fees are too low, the 
costs of consumption are not recovered and assets deteriorate more quickly compared to 
the situation where there are no additional loadings from overweight vehicles.  Fees that 
are too high place an undue burden on the trucking industry, hinder economic 
development, and may even drive industry away to other locations that have more 
favorable overweight permitting policies.  Mathematical programming tools can address 
the competing needs of protecting infrastructure and supporting economic activity to 
optimize traditional overweight vehicle permits. 
 
1.4.2 Incentives for Infrastructure-Friendly Vehicle Usage 
Since the 1980s, a number of states have explored the use of TS&W limits and 
permit fee structures which encourage the use of infrastructure-friendly vehicles.  Perhaps 
the earliest known example is the “Turner Proposal” first proposed by Francis C. Turner 
in a 1984 address to AASHTO (TRB, 1990b).  The Turner Proposal advocated for lower 
axle weight limits, longer vehicle length limits, and higher GVW limits.  Although 
Turner’s proposed TS&W limits were never adopted nationally, individual states have 
explored methods to move in this direction. 
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In Michigan, state TS&W limits allow vehicles up to 164,000 lbs, but limit most 
individual axle weights to only 13,000 lbs (MDOT, 2013).  By requiring additional axles 
for higher GVW, Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) ensures that trucking 
companies use equipment that causes less damage to the infrastructure.  That way, the 
trucking industry can increase, or in some cases more than double, their payload, increase 
efficiency, and reap the financial benefits. 
Similarly, Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) introduced a new, 
inexpensive annual, multi-trip permit for vehicles configured to limit consumption of 
infrastructure beginning February 1, 2014 (INDOT, 2013).  The INDOT annual, multi-
trip permits cost $20 and require vehicles configured to less than 2.40 equivalent single 
axle loads (ESALs).  ESALs are the traffic input parameter in the 1993 AASHTO Guide 
for the Design of Pavement Structures, the most widely-used pavement design method, 
and the method used to design most existing pavements.  The ESAL for a given truck is 
the number of standard 18,000 lbs single axles that will cause the same amount of 
pavement consumption as the given axle load and axle configuration for that vehicle.  
INDOT’s annual, multi-trip permits are based on a pavement consumption measure 
(ESAL-miles of travel); however, ESALS are not directly reflective of actual bridge 
consumption. 
States may either mandate infrastructure-friendly vehicles, similar to the Michigan 
state TS&W limits, or may encourage vehicle loading behavior to limit consumption of 
highway assets through financial incentives, similar to the efforts in Indiana.  Although 
INDOT uses an inexpensive permit option to encourage infrastructure-friendly vehicle 
14 
 
use, other mechanisms available for implementation include rebates, bonuses, and other 
reduced fees. 
 
1.4.3 Overweight Vehicle Permit Quotas 
Quotas are a transportation demand management strategy that has been used to 
mitigate congestion.  Transportation demand management can refer to any number of 
strategies that lead to an efficient use of transportation resources.  Quotas have not been 
previously applied to overweight vehicle operations.  Instead of targeting congestion, an 
overweight vehicle quota would lessen undue asset deterioration by enforcing an upper 
limit on the amount of infrastructure consumption allowable by overweight vehicles. 
Quotas have been successfully applied in Singapore, Shanghai, and Beijing to 
control vehicle ownership and usage.  The primary constraint in Singapore is the limited 
land available to add capacity.  In all three locations, population growth, disposable 
income growth, and the increased car ownership associated with both have led to 
excessive congestion.  In Singapore, the vehicle quota system (VQS) was adopted in 
combination with the existing cordon and tolls after high vehicle taxes and gasoline taxes 
were found to be ineffective at limiting demand for additional vehicles (Phang, 1993).  In 
Singapore, Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) that entitle an individual to own and 
operate a vehicle for 10 years are auctioned off twice each month by the Singapre Land 
Transport Authority.  Private car license plates (PCLPs) are also auctioned off in 
Shanghai; however, Beijing uses an egalitarian lottery system to allocate the limited 
quota of license plates.  Chu (2012) observed that in the egalitarian system in Beijing, 
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individuals wanted the option to purchase a license plate even if they did not have any 
intention to do so, or entered to help the chances of friends or family. 
Vehicle quotas present a novel opportunity for overweight vehicle demand 
management.  Existing overweight vehicle permit fees, both fixed and variable, clearly 
do not adequately address an increasing demand for use of such vehicles.  Murphy et al. 
(2012) found that profits from a 4,000 lbs increase in GVW are sufficient to justify the 
purchase of permits that cost between $225 and $1080 annually in Texas; operating 
overweight vehicles leads to profits higher than the cost of those permits.  Given the 
inefficiencies of the lottery system used in Beijing (which would also likely occur in a 
first-come first-served system), an auction is likely the most useful format to implement a 
quota system for overweight vehicles. 
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of the current study is to present options to address the 
growing use of overweight vehicles and their impacts on common highway infrastructure 
assets.  Four overweight vehicle permitting alternatives are explored as follows: 
 Optimization of traditional permitting mechanisms 
 Incentives for infrastructure-friendly vehicle use 
 Use of quotas with auction allocation to manage road consumption 
 Harmonization of overweight vehicle permitting among multiple states 
The options are not mutually exclusive.  For example, both incentives for 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles and the quota can be employed simultaneously.  
Additionally, harmonization requires the implementation of some form of overweight 
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vehicle permitting, whether through traditional permits (preferably optimized), incentives, 
and/or quotas. 
For each of the first three alternatives, the framework is first described.  Then, for 
illustrative purposes, the newly-introduced overweight vehicle permit fee structure in 
Indiana is used as a case study to demonstrate application of the framework. 
In addition to the application of the three options for new permits in Indiana, a 
qualitative discussion of regional and national cooperation explores the additional 
efficiencies that can be achieved through TS&W and overweight vehicle permitting 
harmonization among several or all 50 United States. 
 
1.5.1 Indiana Case Study 
On June 1, 2013, Indiana’s House Enrolled Act 1481 (HEA-1481) established a 
provisional permit structure based on equivalent single axle load miles (ESAL-miles) for 
overweight divisible loads of agricultural goods (up to 97,000 lbs) and metal goods (up to 
120,000 lbs) (Permits for Loads, House Enrolled Act No. 1481, 2013).  ESAL-mile fees 
are a special type of weight-distance fee that relates weight into a measure of pavement 
consumption, ESALs. 
Pavement deterioration depends on several factors, including traffic loading, 
pavement materials and layer thickness, underlying soil characteristics, and 
environmental factors.  Two approaches are currently used to design pavements to 
withstand the stresses and strains from each of these factors: empirical and mechanistic-
empirical.  Although mechanistic-empirical design is a newer, major change from 
traditional pavement design and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) considers 
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implementation of this type of design to be a high priority, the vast existing network was 
designed based on empirical methods (FHWA, 2011).  The 1993 AASHTO Guide for the 
Design of Pavement Structures remains one of the most widely-used pavement design 
methods.  These procedures are based on an empirical AASHO Road Test conducted in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s on a test track in Ottawa, Illinois.  The design equations 
have been modified four times since the original guide was published in 1961 to meet the 
needs of current users.  The traffic input parameter for the traditional empirical approach 
is the Equivalent Single Axle Load (ESAL).  As previously described, the ESAL for a 
given truck is the number of standard 18,000 lbs single axles that will cause the same 
amount of pavement damage as the given axle load and axle configuration.  A standard 
single axle weight of 18,000 lbs was selected on the basis of the legal limit in many states 
at the time of the Road Test in Ottawa (Schwartz & Carvalho, 2007).  As weight 
increases, the damage to pavement infrastructure is exponential; for example, doubling 
the weight on an axle causes approximately 16-times the amount of damage.  ESAL 
calculations account for the non-linearity so that having twice as many ESALs does relate 
to twice the damage to pavement infrastructure.  Although mechanistic-empirical design 
has many benefits over traditional empirical design (see for example the work of Zhang 
et al., 2000 and Prozzi et al., 2007), empirical methods use a single traffic input 
parameter, ESALs, which can also be estimated quickly for any given vehicle using the 
network.  Straightforward ESAL calculations are the basis for INDOT’s overweight 
commodity permit fees. 
The new overweight commodity permits introduced in HEA-1481 supplement 
several existing overweight vehicle permits available in Indiana including 
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oversize/overweight (OS/OW) vehicle permits for non-divisible loads and Special 
Weight permits (also called Michigan Train permits) for overweight vehicles up to 
134,000 lbs operating on a specified network known as the Extra Heavy Duty Highway 
Network (XHDH).  Prior to June 1, 2013, overweight divisible loads could be moved 
only on the XHDH under Special Weight permits.  Since enactment, overweight divisible 
loads can continue to be moved under the Special Weight permit on the XHDH or on 
other State and U.S. Routes and the Interstate system using the new overweight 
commodity permits as long as the vehicles are in compliance with the various regulations 
associated with each permit type. 
As mandated in the original legislation, the fee structure defined in HEA-1481 was 
followed by Emergency Rules which took effect January 1, 2014.  The Emergency Rules 
maintained the overweight commodity permits with changes to the fee schedule including 
an administrative fee, the charge per ESAL-mile of travel, the ESAL-credit or number of 
ESALs for which a carrier did not have to pay a fee in the ESAL-mile determination, and 
standard weights used to calculate ESAL-miles for larger axle groups with four or more 
axles.  Additionally, the Emergency Rules established the annual, multi-trip permits 
available for vehicles configured and loaded at or below 2.40 ESALs. 
To date, the introduction of overweight commodity permits in Indiana has followed 
the status quo of traditional permitting mechanisms.  The state is able to permit 
overweight divisible loads because of the grandfather rights granted in surface 
transportation authorization legislation and the broad interpretation of those rights 
granted by the Symms Amendment included in the 1982 STAA.  The new permit class 
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was established by the state legislature but administration of those permits, including the 
selection of appropriate fees, was delegated to the state DOT and DOR. 
By law, INDOT was required to consider the results of a study of the impacts of 
overweight divisible loads by December 31, 2014 to set final permitting rules.  On behalf 
of INDOT, a research team at Purdue evaluated the impacts of overweight commodity 
permits on revenue generation, asset degradation, modal distribution, economic 
development, and economic competitiveness (Everett et al., 2014). 
In addition to the impacts analysis, the decision makers at INDOT could be better 
informed through an analytical exploration of the tradeoffs associated with different fee 
levels (in terms of dollars per ESAL-mile of travel).  The annual, multi-trip permits 
introduced in the Emergency Rules are a living example of incentives for infrastructure-
friendly vehicles.  Finally, the quota and auction allocation mechanism and the 
harmonization of overweight practices are additional alternatives that could supplement 





CHAPTER 2. OPTIMIZATION OF TRADITIONAL PERMITTING MECHANISMS 
2.1 Introduction 
Overweight vehicle permit fees are the traditional mechanism in place to collect 
revenue from overweight vehicles to offset the consumption from their excess loads.  In 
an equitable and efficient system, overweight vehicle permit fees should be designed to 
collect the additional consumption specifically attributable to the overweight load.  Here, 
additional consumption is defined as consumption beyond what would have occurred 
from a non-overweight vehicle.  Appropriate permit fees need only recover the additional 
consumption because other revenue collection mechanisms (registration and licensing 




In the United States, the status quo of overweight vehicle operations is that each 
individual state separately exercises grandfather rights to determine, implement, and 
enforce their individual TS&W regulations including any overweight vehicle permitting 
procedures.  Individual state and national TS&W, HCA, and oversize/overweight vehicle 
studies have been used to inform decision makers within state DOTs or DORs for 
establishing overweight vehicle permitting fee structures.  The TS&W limits and  
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overweight vehicle permit fee structures, including price points, vary across states and 
over time.  Overweight vehicle permits can be categorized by the type of fee structure 
and the time period and/or number of trips for which permits are valid. 
Overweight vehicle permitting fee structures can be classified as fixed fees, weight-
based fees, distance-based fees, or a combination of weight-distance based fees.  The fee 
types cover a spectrum in terms of both the administration complexity and the 
relationship to actual consumption, as shown in Figure 2.1.  At one extreme, fixed fees 
are the easiest to administer, require the least administrative resources, but are the least 
reflective of actual asset consumption.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, weight-
distance based fees are the most closely linked to consumption but are the most complex 
to administer.  More states are adopting (or at a minimum researching) fee structure 
based on weight, distance, or both; although several still use fixed fees which are the least 
related to actual consumption.  Additionally, a state may offer multiple types of permits 
for different categories of overweight movements, all with different fee structures. 
 
 
Increasing ease of administration  Decreasing ease of administration 
Decreasing relationship to consumption  Increasing relationship to consumption 






Figure 2.1 Classification of Permit Fee Structures 
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In addition to the different types of fee structures, transportation agencies may offer 
single-trip permits, blanket permits, or a combination of both.  Single-trip permits are 
typically issued for one trip by a single vehicle within an established time period, often 7-, 
10-, or 14-days.  Blanket permits are issued individual vehicles for a specified time 
period (often quarterly or annually) and allow the vehicle to make an unlimited number 
of trips during the time period.  Blanket permits are typically issued using a fixed fee 
structure, although this is not a requirement.  Whitford and Moffett (1995) observed a 
general trend among highway agencies to move from single-trip permits to annual 
blanket permits with fixed fee structures which resulted in net loss in agencies revenues.  
They also estimated the cost savings from reduced monitoring efforts for Indiana 
specifically (an advantage of blanket fees) to be less than the loss in revenue.  Another 
consequence of the widespread introduction of blanket permits, noted by Whitford and 
Moffett, was that many trucking companies consolidated their overweight operations by 
shifting from many vehicles, each operating on single-trip permits, to a few vehicles 
dedicated to overweight operations. 
The primary benefit of blanket fees is administrative convenience.  For trucking 
companies that frequently transport overweight loads, the process to request multiple 
single-trip permits is time consuming, laborious, and may make it impossible for truckers 
to make just-in-time deliveries.  In the extreme, this can be disruptive to efficiency of 
operations, economic productivity, and lead to business losses.  For agencies issuing 
overweight vehicle permits, the duplicate efforts to review each single-trip permit request 
are eliminated when carriers can obtain blanket permits. 
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In addition to overweight vehicle permits, several states make exemptions or 
exceptions to statutory limits for select industries.  In these cases, carriers may operate 
specific vehicles that are beyond legal limits and/or normally would require a permit 
without paying the full amount, or in some cases any amount, of permit fees according to 
the existing fee structure.  Exemptions significantly reduce the amount of revenue 
collected by the state agency while allowing additional consumption of highway assets.  
Prozzi et al. (2012) reported that a Texas permit fee structure that imposes fees on 
previously exempt vehicles could recover an additional $150 million in revenue annually.  
States typically make exceptions or exemptions for industries that are considered 
significant to the state economy and for equipment used in emergency operations.  
Examples include reduced fee permits for coal, sand gravel and crushed stone in Virginia; 
weight exceptions for seed cotton haulers in Texas; a ten percent extra weight allowance 
for agricultural products in certain states, such as Indiana; and, exemptions for equipment 
for fire rescue, the military, and train derailment recovery in a number of states.  
Although exemptions and exceptions may be appropriate for public safety or to promote 
economic activity, they contribute to additional consumption of public assets without 
additional revenue to pay for that usage. 
Under traditional permitting mechanisms, individual states operate independently 
to determine TS&W limits, overweight vehicle fee structures including price, and any 
exemptions or exceptions.  These policies, as well as the inefficient fuel taxes and 
licensing and registration fees, tend to result in insufficient funds for maintaining 




2.2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages 
The primary advantage of the current system, in which each state establishes 
overweight vehicle policies independently, is that states are given significant latitude to 
set priorities and make decisions appropriate for their infrastructure needs and economic 
climate.  Beginning with the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916, highway maintenance has 
been recognized as a state rather than federal responsibility, even though both parties 
provide funding.  The idea that states are best able to make decisions regarding TS&W 
limits has been perpetuated through the grandfather rights included in every major federal 
surface transportation authorization legislation.  Although consumption typically exceeds 
revenues, the traditional permitting mechanisms have been the tried-and-true method 
used by nearly every state since the 1940s, even before construction of the Interstate 
System.  States can and do easily and routinely exercise grandfather rights to establish 
new or revised permitting structures because these mechanisms were in place prior to 
January 1, 1956.  State sponsored changes outside of the realm of grandfather rights 
likely would require modification to existing federal enabling legislation. 
As previously discussed, the primary disadvantage of traditional overweight 
vehicle permitting mechanisms is that, at present rates, the consumption of infrastructure 
assets far exceeds permit revenues.  Straus and Semmens (2006) estimated that $12-$53 
million in uncompensated pavement consumption is attributable to overweight vehicles 
on Arizona’s roadways.  The VTRC (2008) determined that equitable consumption fees 
could not be imposed in Virginia because a very small percentage of overweight vehicles 
caused a disproportionately large percentage of bridge consumption related damage to the 
state bridges; the consequences of imposing equitable fees likely would have decimated 
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some industries.  Prozzi et al. (2012) determined that the pavement consumption, bridge 
consumption, and monetized operations and safety impacts from overweight vehicles 
were more than six times greater than the permit revenues collected in Texas.  TS&W, 
HCA, and oversize/overweight studies consistently document the highway equivalent of 
the tragedy of the commons when overweight vehicles disproportionately consume 
highway assets at reduced prices. 
A second disadvantage of traditional individual state permitting mechanisms is the 
fostering of competitive regulations and/or pricing schemes that neither protect the 
existing infrastructure nor benefit haulers moving goods between multiple states.  For 
example, steel production is a vital industry in the Midwest with several mills located in 
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Kentucky; yet, all five of these states have different 
permitting practices for moving steel coils.  Illinois does not issue divisible load permits 
for metal goods over the federal limits of 80,000 lbs. 
Michigan does allow GVWs in excess of 80,000 lbs through the unique application 
of axle weight TS&W limits.  Carriers may load up to 164,000 lbs on vehicles with 13-
axles without obtaining any explicit overweight vehicle permit.  Instead of regulating the 
GVW, Michigan limits axle loadings for overweight vehicles to 13,000 lbs with the 
exception of a single tandem axle group which can be 32,000 lbs (16,000 lbs each) and a 
steering axle up to 18,000 lbs. 
Kentucky and Ohio have similar regulations—each issue overweight divisible load 
permits for steel loads up to 120,000 lbs; however, both states impose travel limitations.  
Kentucky restricts travel to 150 miles.  Ohio issues both steel and aluminum coil permits 
but also restricts travel to 150 miles.  Furthermore, Ohio requires an approved steel coil 
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facility as the origin for 90-day and 365-day permits.  Ohio’s approved steel coil facilities 
are all within the state of Ohio with the exception of the AK Steel Corporation facility 
located in Ashland, Kentucky on the Ohio River.  Although not explicitly stated, the 
distance restrictions and requirements for origin facilities in Ohio appear to encourage 
overweight movements only within the state and prevent carriers from moving steel coils 
across Ohio.  This effectively retains steel manufacturing and use facilities within the 
state issuing permits. 
Recently, Indiana enacted legislation to introduce permits for metal commodities 
up to 120,000 lbs.  In addition to creating new permits, the legislation explicitly required 
INDOT to conduct a study on the impacts of the new permits including Indiana’s 
economic competitiveness compared to other Midwestern states. 
Although there are no restrictions preventing Midwestern states from working 
together to enable carriers to move steel throughout the region, each state has 
independently adopted overweight divisible load permitting practices to protect their own 
interest in attracting and retaining steel mills within their own state boundaries. 
The competition that is introduced through individual states establishing different 
permitting mechanisms presents two issues.  First, carriers that desire to move goods 
across multiple states (or even from one state to another) are at a disadvantage when 
neighboring states have different GVW limits, different axle limits, or require different 
vehicle configurations.  In some cases, carriers are able to move a vehicle across one state 
but then have to stop and unload to a different vehicle or multiple vehicles to meet the 
requirements of the next state on their route.  Alternatively, lift axles, which are lowered 
when a vehicle is weighed by enforcement, and dummy axles, which carry very little 
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weight, have been used in some sectors to meet the requirements of the law without 
meeting the spirit of the law to protect infrastructure.  Fortunately, the use of lift axles 
and dummy axles has been prohibited in most overweight provisions for vehicles over 
80,000 lbs.  They are used more often for short haul vehicles such as waste disposal 
trucks, concrete mixers, etc which have lower GVW limits due to the length of the 
vehicles.  The second potential downside is that infrastructure may not be adequately 
protected when states reduce permit fees and/or allow higher GVWs to induce companies 
to relocate from states with practices perceived to be less favorable to the trucking 
industry. 
 
2.2.2 Permitting Efficiency and Economic Productivity Improvements through 
Optimization 
Within the context of traditional permitting mechanisms, state agencies can 
improve overweight vehicle permitting fee structures through the use of mathematical 
programming.   Assessing any type of usage fee is a critical decision that involves both 
transportation agencies and legislators who must be responsive to the needs of multiple 
stakeholders.  Decisions have significant consequences for both the infrastructure owner 
and the infrastructure users (both overweight and non-overweight); therefore, choices 
should be made based on input from all parties, technical analysis of the anticipated 
consequences of each choice or policy, and information about tradeoffs between different 
alternatives.  Similar to other transportation related decisions, mathematical programming 
tools can be used to better inform transportation agencies about the potential 
consequences and tradeoffs across various overweight vehicle permitting fee structures. 
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In setting appropriate TS&W limits and establishing overweight vehicle permitting 
mechanisms, decision makers must consider multiple conflicting objectives.  On one 
hand, the state has a responsibility to protect highway infrastructure from excessive 
deterioration to provide a safe and efficient system for all users.  Nominal permit fees do 
not adequately recover the cost of consumption.  The current fees employed throughout 
the United States have led to underfunded highway infrastructure which deteriorates 
faster than expected.  On the other hand, the state also has a responsibility to foster 
economic development.  Excessively high permit fees may serve as a burden for the 
trucking industry, and may even induce companies—both trucking companies and those 
that rely on trucks to move their goods—to relocate to other states with more favorable 
policies. Permitting agencies should not adopt policies that will hinder economic 
productivity. 
 
2.2.3 Optimization in South Carolina 
Dey at al. (2014) identified two conflicting objectives in a multiobjective 
optimization of overweight vehicle permit fees in South Carolina; objectives in their 
multiobjective optimization formulation were to minimize the unrecovered consumption 
cost and to minimize the permit fee.  Dey et al. (2014) used the percentage of cost 
recovery as the decision variable.  The study additionally included tradeoffs between 
different permit fees to provide information to the South Carolina DOT prior to adopting 




2.2.4 Methodological Improvements for Indiana 
In formulating a mathematical programming model for overweight vehicle 
permitting in Indiana, improvements were made to the work carried out by Dey et al. 
(2014) to correspond to choices available to both the agency and the trucking industry. 
First, the decision variable for the Indiana study, the price of permits in dollars per 
ESAL-mile, is a better representation of the policy decision INDOT can make.  Different 
vehicles consume highway infrastructure at different rates based on vehicle configuration 
and loading.  It is impractical for INDOT to charge a specific percent of consumption 
unless INDOT can quantify the consumption for each permitted trip.  Additionally, a fee 
structure based on the percentage of consumption cost recovery would be complicated for 
trucking companies to assess before requesting permits. 
Additionally, the objective in Dey et al.’s (2014) formulation to minimize permit 
price is a rudimentary approach at capturing the agency’s goal to support economic 
activity.  Although all carriers would like to obtain permits at the lowest possible cost, 
vehicle permit acquisition costs are only a small fraction of total operating costs.  
Different overweight vehicle permits can be better or worse, independent of price, 
depending on how carriers can leverage those permits to move goods more efficiently.  
Carriers make decisions about which vehicles to load based on their available fleet and on 
the total logistics cost of moving goods from origin to destination.  Total logistics costs 
include transportation costs, warehouse costs, and inventory costs.  Minimizing the total 
logistics cost, or maximizing the total logistics cost savings, facilitates trade and 
commerce; minimizing permit prices does not necessarily achieve this goal.  The 
multiobjective optimization formulation contained herein includes a more accurate 
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representation of decision maker’s goals following a brief overview of multiobjective 
optimization principles. 
 
2.2.5 Multiobjective Optimization Introduction 
Multiobjective optimization is a mathematical tool “in which the designer’s goal is 
to minimize and/or maximize several objective functions simultaneously” (Gero, 1985).  
In general, a multiobjective optimization problem is formulated as follows: 
minimize	ሼ ଵ݂ሺࢄሻ, ଶ݂ሺࢄሻ,⋯ , ௞݂ሺࢄሻሽ 
subject	to	ࢄ ∈ ࡿ 
where ݇ is the number of objective functions, ௜݂ሺࢄሻ is the ݅th objective function, and ࢄ is 
the vector of decision variables that belong to the nonempty feasible region ࡿ.  In practice, 
the decision maker may wish to maximize some objective functions.  Maximization 
objective functions can easily be transformed into minimization objective functions and 
some solving techniques can accommodate both minimization and maximization 
objectives at the same time.  If there is only one objective (݇ ൌ 1), the problem simplifies 
to a single objective optimization problem which can have zero, one, or many optimal 
solutions.  Due to the conflicting nature of the objective functions, it is typically not 
possible to minimize/maximize all objective functions at the same time; therefore, 
objective vectors ࢠ ൌ ࢌሺࢄሻ ൌ ሼ ଵ݂ሺࢄሻ, ଶ݂ሺࢄሻ,⋯ , ௞݂ሺࢄሻሽ், are considered optimal “if none 
of their components can be improved without deterioration to at least one of the other 
components” (Branke et al., 2008). 
Often there is not a single optimal solution but a set of solutions called Pareto 
optimal or non-dominated solutions.  (A dominant solution can only exist  if the objective 
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functions do not conflict.)  Pareto optimal solutions are defined mathematically as 
follows:  a decision vector ࢄ∗ ∈ ࡿ  is pareto optimal if there does not exist another 
decision vector ࢄ ∈ ࡿ such that ௜݂ሺࢄሻ ൑ ௜݂ሺࢄ∗ሻ for all ݅ ൌ 1, 2,⋯ , ݇ and ௝݂ሺࢄሻ ൏ ௝݂ሺࢄ∗ሻ 
for at least one objective function ݆  (using minimzation notation for all objective 
functions) (Branke et al., 2008).  In other words, if there does not exist a solution that 
dominates the feasible solution for at least one objective function while all others are at 
least as good, then that solution is a pareto optimal solution.  The set of all pareto optimal 
solutions is called the Pareto frontier.  When there are exactly two objective functions, 
the Pareto frontier takes the shape of a two-dimensional curve; when there are more 
objective functions, the Pareto frontier is a hyperplane or surface. 
Given the multitude, often even infinite number, of Pareto optimal solutions, 
typically multiobjective solution methods are aimed at helping the decision maker choose 
the most preferred of Pareto optimal solutions.  Solution methods are most often 
classified by decision maker’s involvement in the analytical process (Mavrotas, 2009; 
Branke et al., 2008).  In a priori methods, the decision maker first indicates his or her 
preferences then the analyst attempts to find an optimal solution that meets those 
preferences.  If the decision maker provides preference information by way of goals or 
weights, a multiobjective optimization may be transformed into a single objective 
optimization problem.  The drawbacks to a priori methods are that decision makers may 
not have realistic expecations, may not be confident in their preferences, and are not 
provided additional information about other Pareto optimal solutions. 
In interactive methods, the decision maker and the analyst iteratively provide 
preference information and search for solutions until the process converges on a most 
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preferred solution.  Interactive approaches are an improvement from a priori methods 
when the decision maker alters their preferences based on knowledge about the 
interdependencies of the problem variables. 
Finally, a posteriori methods seek to generate all or a sufficient representation of 
Pareto optimal solutions to provide the the decision maker.  Then the decision maker can 
choose among the full set of Pareto optimal solutions.  The drawbacks to a posteriori 
methods are that generating a representative set of Pareto optimal solutions can be time 
consuming and/or computationally expensive; and, if there are more than two or three 
objective functions, visualizing the Pareto frontier can be difficult. 
In addition to these methods, the fourth class of solution methods are no-preference 
methods in which a decision maker is not present but assumptions are made about a 
“reasonable” decision maker’s preferences (Branke et al., 2008).  No-preference methods 
may or may not result in an “ideal” solution depnding on the assumptions made regarding 
the “reasonable” decision maker (Bai, 2012). 
A posteriori methods are adopted for the present study.  These methods provide the 
decision maker complete information, including visualizations of the Pareto optimal 
frontier and associated tradeoffs, to support the chosen permit fee structure.  In the 
Indiana case study to follow, the resulting visualizations are a resource for INDOT, 
provided at the end of the optimization routine, so that decision makers can make an 
informed choice of permit fees.  In contrast, a priori and interactive methods both require 
input from INDOT either prior to or during the optimization process.  The optimal 
solution using either of those methods is influenced by INDOT’s stated preferences, 
whereas INDOT may not realize that they would prefer a different optimal solution 
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included in the Pareto optimal frontier defined using a posteriori methods.  No-
preference methods were not used because assumptions about a “reasonable” decision 
maker might not reflect the preferences of decision makers at INDOT and they do not 
provide as much information as a posteriori methods. 
The two most widely used solution methods for multiobjective optimization are the 
weighting method and the -constraint method.  In general, for the weighting method, the 
multiobjective optimization problem is re-stated using weights, ݓ௜, as follows: 




subject	to	ࢄ ∈ ࡿ 
where ݓ௜ ൒ 0 and ∑ ݓ௜ ൌ 1௞௜ୀଵ .  In a priori settings, the decision maker states his or her 
preferences as weights initially.  In a posteriori settings, the weights are varied to obtain 
multiple solutions which are then presented to the decision maker. 
In the -constraint method, one objective function is optimized while all others are 
incorporated as additional constraints.  The multiobjective optimization problem is re-
stated as follows: 
minimize	ݖ ൌ ଵ݂ሺࢄሻ 
subject	to	 ௝݂ሺࢄሻ ൑ ߝ௝	for	all	݆ ൌ 2, 3,⋯ , ݇ 
and	ࢄ ∈ ࡿ 
where ௝߳ are either the upper bounds for each respective objective function (if known and 
specified by the decision maker) or are varied to develop the Pareto frontier.  The -
constraint method is thus an a posteriori method. As before, minimization notation has 
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been used here, but in practice the decision maker may seek to minimize some objective 
functions and maximize others. 
Mavrotas (2009) developed an augmented -constraint method which incorporates 
surplus variables (or slack variables) to overcome difficulties in determining the range of 
objective functions.  Mavrotas formulated the augmented -constraint multiobjective 
optimization problem as follows: 




subject	to	 ௝݂ሺࢄሻ ൅ ݏ௝ ൌ ߝ௝	for	all	݆ ൌ 2, 3,⋯ , ݇ 
and	ࢄ ∈ ࡿ 
where ݏ௝ are the surplus variables and ߜ is a very small number between 10ିଷ and  10ି଺.  
In addition to the new solution method, Mavrotas created a General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS) model publically available through the GAMS Model Library 
(http://www.gams.com/modlib/modlib.htm, Mavrotas’ model is number 319, named 
“epscm”). 
 
2.3 Optimization of Overweight Commodity Permit Fees in Indiana 
The first step in any multiobjective optimization is to formulate a mathematical 
model of the problem including the decision variables, objective functions, constraints, 
and variable bounds (Branke et al., 2008).  The tradeoffs associated with the newly-
introduced ESAL-mile based fee structure in Indiana can be explored using a bi-objective 




2.3.1 Decision Variable 
For the Indiana model, the decision variable is the ESAL-mile based fee to charge 
overweight commodity permit holders, consistent with the overweight commodity 
permits.  Although other decision variables describing the fee structure could be used, the 
ESAL-mile based fee was used because it is a weight-distance usage measure.  This is 
preferable to other fee structures in terms of its relationship to actual consumption; 
secondly, it is the consumption measure currently used to administer permits. 
The drawback to using the ESAL-mile based fee as the decision variable is that 
ESAL-miles are a measure of marginal pavement consumption, not marginal bridge 
consumption.  To remedy this situation, INDOT is able to charge a fee per ESAL-mile of 
travel that includes the cost of pavement consumption and the “relative” cost of bridge 
consumption (similar to that proposed by VTRC (2008) for bridge consumption in 
Virginia).  The “effective” fee is therefore higher than the cost in $/ESAL-mile of 
pavement consumption alone to account for additional bridge consumption that would 
not be captured otherwise.  ESAL-miles of travel are easy for both the agency and the 
carriers to compute for any given vehicle and trip. 
 
2.3.2 Minimization of Uncompensated Consumption Cost 
The first objective function is to minimize the uncompensated consumption cost 
(UCC).  This objective captures INDOT’s fiduciary responsibility to protect the state 
highway infrastructure from undue damage.  This is similar to one of the objectives 
included in Dey et al.’s (2014) multiobjective optimization for South Carolina; however, 
Dey at al.’s results indicate the percentage of consumption that is uncompensated 
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whereas the present analysis quantifies the amount of uncompensated consumption in 
dollars. 
 
2.3.3 Maximization of Total Logistics Cost Savings 
The second objective function is to maximize total logistics cost (TLC) savings 
with respect to the total logistics cost without overweight commodity permits.  The total 
logistics costs include all of the costs associated with the flow of goods including both 
transportation costs and any other costs associated with storage or transportation of goods.  
TLC savings quantify the reduction in TLC for all carriers due to the introduction of 
overweight commodity permits.  This objective captures the interests of freight operators 
and shippers who rely on trucks to move their goods.  This objective also captures 
INDOT’s responsibility to adopt policies that will not be a burden to the trucking industry 
and will facilitate trade and commerce.  Dey et al. (2014) minimized the permit fees 
themselves, which is only one aspect of the cost of moving goods from origin to 
destination.  The maximization of TLC savings (and in turn the minimization of TLC) 
better reflects the actual decision making process of both shippers and carriers who 
would like to move goods as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. 
 
2.3.4 Constraints 
The demand for overweight vehicle permits is influenced by changes in the total 
logistics cost.  Often, transportation analysts consider the relationship between demand 
and transportation cost, only one component of total logistics cost.  In this framework, 
TLC is more appropriate because a newly imposed permit fee (a small increase in one 
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component of the transportation cost of a single trip) which allows previously prohibited 
movements often results in a reduction of both the overall transportation costs and other 
logistics costs.  Demand is also related to the uncompensated consumption because 
demand pertains to the system users who pay a portion of the cost of consumption.  
Demand is incorporated into the bi-objective optimization model in both the objective 
functions and the constraints. 
Dey et al. (2014) also incorporated demand as a constraint using elasticities; 
however, Dey et al. assumed that demand would decrease because permit fees would 
increase.  Although this is true if regulations are the same but prices merely change, the 
South Carolina framework does not account for the cost savings carriers can experience 
by operating at weights previously not allowed.  In contrast, the present analysis accounts 
for an increase in demand due to TLC savings. 
 
2.3.5 Variable Bounds 
The final constraint on the system is the variable bounds for the decision variable.  
Although it is technically possible to collect more money in permit fees than the cost of 
consumption, this would represent a reverse subsidy from the industry to maintain the 
public assets, opposite to the conventional use of subsidies, an undesirable outcome.  
Therefore, an additional constraint requires that the ESAL-mile based permit fees be less 
than or equal to the ESAL-mile based cost of consumption.  Finally, it is not possible to 





2.3.6 Mathematical Programming Formulation 
The bi-objective model can be generally formulated as follows: 
minimize	ݖଵ ൌ ܷܥܥ ൌ ݂ሺܥ, ݔ, ܦଵሻ 
( 2-1 ) 
and	maximize	ݖଶ ൌ ܵ ൌ ݃ሺݔሻ 
( 2-2 ) 
subject	to	ܦଵ ൌ ݄ሺܦ଴, ܵ, ܶܮܥ଴, ݁ሻ 
( 2-3 ) 
and	ݔ ൑ ܥ 
( 2-4 ) 
and	ݔ ൒ 0 
( 2-5 ) 
where ܷܥܥ is the uncompensated consumption cost, ܥ is the ESAL-mile based cost of 
consumption, ݔ  is the ESAL-mile based permit fee, ܦଵ  is the resulting demand for 
overweight vehicle permits in ESAL-miles, ܵ is the total logistics cost savings, ܦ଴ is the 
initial demand for overweight vehicle permits in ESAL-miles, ܶܮܥ଴ is the initial total 
logistics cost, and ݁  is the elasticity of demand in ESAL-miles with respect to total 
logistics cost (note, the elasticity is not with respect to the initial total logistics cost, but 




2.3.7 Parameter Estimation 
2.3.7.1 Objective Function to Minimize Uncompensated Consumption 
Intuitively, the functional relationship of the first objective is as follows: 
ݖଵ ൌ ሺܥ െ ݔሻܦଵ 
( 2-6 ) 
where the uncompensated consumption cost is equal to the total cost of consumption, ܥ ൈ
ܦଵ, minus the amount that was paid for via permit fees, ݔ ൈ ܦଵ.  When the ESAL-mile 
based fee is equal to the cost of consumption there is no uncompensated consumption.  
The cost of consumption is a single estimated value in dollars per ESAL-mile.  The 
ESAL-mile based fee is the decision variable being optimized.  The demand for using the 
system (in ESAL-miles of travel) is also variable and changes due to the cost of doing 
business and any cost savings resulting from using overweight vehicles relative to non-
overweight vehicles.  The demand estimation is not a constant parameter in the 
multiobjective optimization and requires extended consideration; therefore, it is presented 
in a later subsection. 
 
2.3.7.2 Cost of Infrastructure Consumption 
The cost of consumption typically consists of a number of cost items. In their 
multiobjective optimization, Dey et al. (2014) included unit pavement damage costs per 
mile and per ESAL-mile and unit bridge damage costs per mile for each axle group 
ranging from 2-axles to 8-axles.  In the comprehensive study of the Texas overweight 
vehicle fee structure, permit revenues were compared to the total cost of pavement 
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damage, bridge damage, and monetized  infrastructure operations and safety impacts 
(Prozzi et al., 2012).  For the multiobjective optimization contained herein, the Indiana-
specific consumption estimate includes the cost of pavement and bridge damage 
attributable to the additional weight of overweight vehicles (Everett et al., 2014). 
The marginal cost of pavement consumption has previously been measured in 
ESAL-miles of travel.  Ahmed et al. (2013) estimated the unit cost per ESAL-mile of 
travel in Indiana on different highway networks:  the Interstate system, the non-Interstate 
National Highway System (NHS) (a network of high national importance that includes 
the Interstates plus other important routes), and the non-NHS. 
Ahmed et al. (2013) also estimated unit bridge consumption.  Bridge consumption 
estimation is much more complex than pavement consumption estimation because  
consumption depends on the moment created when an overweight (or any other vehicle) 
traverses the bridge.  The moment depends on the axle weights and spacing, the bridge 
type (steel, pre-stressed concrete, reinforced concrete), the bridge span length, and the 
age of the bridge.  Ahmed et al. established several lookup tables that provide the unit 
cost per foot-pass for each AASHTO equivalent vehicle, highway network (Interstate, 
non-Interstate NHS, non-NHS), bridge material, and bridge age.  For a single overweight 
vehicle, the AASHTO equivalent vehicle is determined as a function of the GVW, the 
average axle spacing, and the average axle loading, as described in Ahmed et al. (2013). 
The comprehensive study for Indiana used individual permit records to estimate the 
total cost of pavement and bridge consumption resulting from HEA-1481 (Everett et al., 
2014).  A total of 10,517 individual permit records were queried from the Indiana 
Department of Revenue (INDOR) database which contains vehicle configuration and 
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permit information.  Geographic information systems (GIS) software was used to 
determine the cost of pavement and bridge consumption based on the vehicle 
configuration, GVW, and permitted route for each individual record.  In addition to the 
consumption cost for each record, a breakeven analysis was conducted to determine the 
ESAL-mile based fee that would result in full collection (via permit fees) of the total cost 
of pavement and bridge consumption. 
Although bridge consumption is not measured in $/ESAL-mile, the breakeven fee 
was determined by taking the full cost of consumption (pavement plus bridge) and 
dividing that by the ESAL-miles of travel, to yield a quasi ESAL-mile based cost of 
consumption.  The quasi ESAL-mile based cost of consumption was estimated to be 
$0.84 per ESAL-mile of travel (Everett et al., 2014). 
Additionally, although the fee structure established in the Emergency Rules 
includes a $20 administrative fee per permit, it is assumed in this multiobjective 
optimization that the ESAL-mile component of the fee accounts for the consumption of 
highway infrastructure while the $20 administrative fee is for administrative purposes 
only. 
 
2.3.7.3 Objective Function to Maximize Total Logistics Cost Savings 
The functional relationship for the second objective function (to maximize total 
logistics costs savings) is not quite as straightforward as the first objective function.  The 
overweight commodity permits introduced in HEA-1481 provide new opportunities for 
overweight divisible loads in Indiana.  Overweight operations typically are more efficient 
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for carriers compared to multiple trips at or below legal limits, typically resulting in cost 
savings.  Murphy et al. (2012) considered permits for a 5% extra weight allowance, (i.e., 
a total GVW of 84,000 lbs) on non-load-zoned roadways in Texas.  The authors found 
that companies were willing to pay between $225 and $1,080 annually for the 4,000 lb 
increase in GVW due to the increased profitability of doing so.  The overweight 
commodity permits introduced in Indiana represent far larger payload increases than 
those studied by Murphy et al. (2012).  In the northern portion of Indiana, specifically 
near the XHDH, it is epected that not all carriers will take advantage of the new 
overweight commodity permits because the existing Special Weight permits may be more 
profitable to use.  Similarly, for some origin/destination and shipment combinations, 
movements at or below legal limits (and thus not requiring a permit) may be more 
profitable depending on the permit price.  The following subsections detail the statistical 
tools used to estimate the functional relationship between total logistics costs savings and 
ESAL-mile based overweight vehicle permit fees, ܵ ൌ ݃ሺݔሻ, where ܵ is the TLC savings 
and ݃ሺݔሻ is a function of the permit price in dollars per ESAL-mile. 
 
2.3.7.4 Total Logistics Cost Savings 
The Intermodal Transportation and Inventory Cost (ITIC) model is a tool 
developed by FHWA to investigate the modal shifts that can occur between truck and rail 
and between multiple overweight truck configurations due to truck or rail productivity 
improvements.  For each shipment record, ITIC evaluates the transportation and 
inventory costs using each available mode—rail if possible and each of the available 
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truck configurations—and assigns the shipment to the mode with the minimum total 
logistics cost.  ITIC uses an all-or-nothing assignment for each record, a shipment cannot 
be split among multiple modes or multiple truck configurations (TRB, 2014).  
Additionally, not every mode is available for each record.  For example, rail is not an 
option for some origin-destination pairs which are not connected by existing rail lines.  
The outputs of the ITIC include the vehicle-miles traveled for each truck configuration 
and the transportation and inventory costs.  The ITIC model was used to estimate the total 
logistics costs with various ESAL-mile based fees imposed on overweight operations. 
The major drawback of using disaggregate models such as ITIC is the large amount 
of input data required for analysis.  Fortunately, the ITIC software comes pre-loaded with 
freight data.  Commodity flow data from the Freight Analysis Framework (FAF) and rail 
cost data from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) Waybill sample are included.  
The FAF incorporates data from a variety of sources including the periodic Commodity 
Flow Survey conducted jointly by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (BTS) as part of the Economic Census.  The most recent Commodity Flow 
Survey was conducted in 2012 but the most recent FAF release (version 3) included in 
the ITIC software uses data from the 2007 Commodity Flow Survey.  FAF data include 
origin-destination pairs, commodity type and miles shipped.  The FAF data are 
complemented by commodity attribute data such as density, value, etc. from the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA); transportation cost data from Trans-Research 
International, Inc.; and rail cost data from the STB Waybill sample (FHWA, 2006).  The 
preloaded data also includes assumptions for drayage miles (distance required to 
transport a good from one mode to another when applicable) and circuity miles 
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(additional distance required for truck transport in urban areas) which were not changed 
in analysis. 
The user inputs for the ITIC include the vehicle configurations that can be used and 
the additional user fees associated with using each configuration.  Additional assumptions 
preloaded in the ITIC software can be modified to reflect local conditions, but were not 
changed for this analysis.  The present study considers the total logistics cost savings that 
result from the introduction of new overweight commodity permits at different price 
points; therefore, other input assumptions do not need to be changed. 
The ITIC is limited in the types of vehicle configurations which can be included 
because it is not fully customizable.  Typical vehicles included in ITIC were used in place 
of corresponding vehicles permitted in Indiana as shown in Table 2.1.  For the larger 
vehicle configurations (8- and 9-axle vehicles), the ITIC allows higher GVWs than 
allowed in Indiana.  These vehicles were penalized in individual model runs to represent 
the decreased payload allowed in Indiana.  
Table 2.1 Representative Vehicles in Intermodal Transportation and Inventory Cost (ITIC) 
Software 
Configuration Maximum GVW in ITIC (lbs) Permitted GVW in Indiana (lbs)
5-axle 80,000 80,000 
6-axle light 90,000 90,000 
6-axle heavy 97,000 97,000 
7-axle 110,000 110,000 
8-axle 124,000 120,000 
9-axle 140,000 134,000 
 
The ITIC is also limited in terms of origin-destination pair data.  Exact origins and 
destinations are not included, only the corresponding states.  To account for the Special 
Weight permit stipulations that users only travel on the XHDH, the database was split 
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into two components for individual model runs.  Records with origin-destination pairs 
between Illinois and Michigan and between Illinois and Ohio (and vice versa for each), 
were assumed to be able to use the Special Weight permits and the XHDH.  All other 
origin-destination pairs—including Indiana-Indiana, Indiana-Illinois, Indiana-Kentucky, 
Indiana-Michigan, Indiana-Ohio, Illinois-Kentucky, Kentucky-Michigan, and vice versa 
for each—were assumed to use routes off of the XHDH.  Some shipments in the XHDH 
pool, for example, Illinois to Michigan, might use routes that are not on the XHDH.  
Similarly, some shipments in the non-XHDH pool, for example within the state of 
Indiana, could potentially use the XHDH network.  It is assumed that sufficient 
shipments in each pool that could have been placed in the other pool cancel each other 
out in determining the total logistics costs when the results from each pool are summed as 
a synthesis of freight movements throughout the entire state.  Records for agricultural and 
metal commodities only were included in this analysis. 
 
2.3.7.5 Initial Total Logistics Cost 
For purposes of this research, the Base Case represents the available truck 
configurations used in practice prior to HEA-1481.  The first model run established the 
initial total logistics cost.  The initial total logistics cost is the reference point to 
determine the total logistics cost savings for successive model runs.  The ITIC 
automatically creates its own default case for comparison in every model run where the 
5-axle single trailer loaded up to 80,000 lbs is the only truck configuration available; 
however, there were Special Weight permits available for overweight divisible loads 
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prior to HEA-1481.  Therefore, the first model run included the option for 6-axle light, 6-
axle heavy, 7-, 8-, and 9-axle vehicles in the XHDH pool but not in the non-XHDH pool. 
The user fees, applicable to the carriers, were the primary inputs that were altered 
for model runs.  ITIC uses per mile user fees; therefore, all Indiana permit fees were 
converted into per-mile fees.  For the Base Case development, the Special Weight permit 
fee of $42.50 per 24-hour period was assumed equal to $0.089 per mile.  Assuming that 
an overweight vehicle operates at approximately 60 miles per hour for 8 hours within the 
24-hour period equates to approximately 480 miles per Special Weight permit.  Not all 
carriers will use the Special Weight permits in the same manner.  Some may make 
multiple short trips while others might make one trip across the entire state.  For those 
who travel more than 480 miles on a single permit, the per-mile cost is lower; for those 
who travel fewer miles, the per-mile cost is higher.  It was assumed that 480 miles was 
the typical distance on Special Weight permits and therefore for all successive model 
runs, the per-mile cost of a Special Weight permit was $0.089. 
The results for the Base Case model run are presented in Table 2.2.  The number of 
records and tons shipped do not change between successive model runs because each 
record is assigned to the minimum TLC.  If overweight vehicles are used, each vehicle 
has a higher payload capacity, thus vehicle miles traveled (VMT) is reduced when fewer 
vehicles trips are made to move the same amount of goods.  Finally, Table 2.2 includes 
the total logistics cost for each vehicle configuration and the sum is the initial total 
logistic cost of $844,491,655.19.  In addition to being used to estimate the total logistics 




2.3.7.6 Incremental Savings for Range of ESAL-mile Fees 
Following the development of the Base Case, multiple model runs of the ITIC 
model software were used to estimate diversion among the various truck configurations 
and the resulting total logistics costs associated with various levels of the ESAL-mile 
based fee.  Successive model runs were carried out for the following fees:  $0.01, $0.02, 
$0.05, $0.07, $0.10, $$0.25, $0.40, $0.50, $0.75, and $1.00 per ESAL-mile of travel.   
As previously discussed, the ITIC model software uses mile-based fees.  Therefore, 
for each successive model run, the per-ESAL-mile fee was converted into an equivalent 
per-mile fee for each typical vehicle.  The ESAL-mile fees were multiplied by the ESALs 
attributable to being overweight (i.e., the number of ESALs above the 2.40 ESAL credit) 
for each typical vehicle.  Table 2.3 outlines the calculated total ESAL values assigned for 
each typical vehicle.  The ESALs are calculated on the basis of the weights of each axle 
or axle group.   
Vehicles with the same number of axles can be configured in a number of ways 
using different combinations of axle groups.  For purposes of this research, the 
configuration and axle weights were assumed for each typical vehicle, as outlined in 
Table 2.3, to complete the ESAL computation.  The penalties for 8- and 9-axle ITIC 
typical vehicles with GVWs higher than those permitted in Indiana are incorporated in 
the ESAL calculation step.  The lower vehicle weights permitted in Indiana would result 
in lower ESALs which would then result in lower ESAL-mile fees and corresponding 
per-mile fees.  As previously discussed, only the additional consumption attributable to 
overweight vehicles should be included in the cost of consumption because licensing and 
registration fees and fuel taxes account for the consumption of vehicles at or below legal 
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limits.  The Emergency Rules address this by providing an ESAL-credit of 2.40 ESALs 
which can be achieved using a 5-axle truck at or below 80,000 lbs.  The per-mile fees 
entered into ITIC include only the ESALs above the 2.40 ESAL-credit which 
corresponds to a typical non-overweight vehicle.  In addition to the ESAL based 
component of the fee (above 2.40 ESALs), the $20 administrative fee was incorporated 
into the per-mile fee.  Unlike Special Weight permits which can be used for a period of 
time, the overweight commodity permits may only be used for a single trip (with 
exceptions for vehicles under 2.40 ESALs which would not incur a charge).  An average 
trip distance of 250 miles was used to convert the $20 administrative fee into a per-mile 
fee of $0.08.  Again, for trips longer than 250 miles, the per-mile fee is lower than the 
average, and for those shorter than 250 miles the per-mile fee is higher than the average. 
Table 2.4 outlines the mileage-based fees entered into ITIC for each typical vehicle 
configuration for each successive model run using a different $/ESAL-mile fee.  The fee 
per mile for 6-axle light vehicles does not change throughout the analysis because the 6-
axle light vehicle is less than 2.40 ESALs and thus pays only the $20 administrative fee.  
The per-mile fee increases as the number of ESALs increases (down the columns) and as 
the per-ESAL-mile fee increases (across the rows). 
For each successive run, the user fees were adjusted separately for the XHDH and 
non-XHDH pools and the results were summed to estimate the total logistics costs across 
the state.  For the non-XHDH pool, the user fees are equal to the adjusted mileage-based 
overweight commodity permit fees detailed in Table 2.4.  For the XHDH pool, the user 
fees are equal to the minimum of the adjusted Special Weight permit cost of $0.089 per 
mile or the adjusted overweight commodity permit fees outlined in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.5 presents the ITIC model run results for permit fees of $0.01/ESAL-mile.  
As previously discussed, the number of records and tons shipped do not change by 
default because each shipment is moved by one configuration or another.  Thus, the truck 
VMT decreases because fewer vehicles are necessary to move the same amount of goods 
between each origin-destination pair.  As a result, even though carriers are paying more 
in permit fees which are a very small part of transportation costs, the total logistics costs 
are reduced. 
The summary details for each successive ITIC model run are presented in 
Appendix A.  Figure 2.2 depicts the total logistics cost savings for each level of the 
ESAL-mile based fee. 
 


























Table 2.2 Summary of ITIC Results for Base Case Scenario (Special Weight permits only) 
Base 
Case 












(110,000 lbs) Total 
Number of 
Records 314 0 64 0 65 0 443 
Tons 
Shipped 13,549,081.98 0 2,265,460.466 0 2,536,450.521 0 18,350,992.97 
Number of 
Shipments 705,884 0 83483 0 61,870 0 851,237 
Truck 
VMT 216,793,784 0 29,444,840.88 0 29,150,640.67 0 275,389,265.5 
 Logistics 
Cost ($)  650,666,262.52 - 93,696,379.39 - 100,129,013.28 - 844,491,655.19
 
Table 2.3 Vehicle Configurations, Axle Weights, and Calculated ESAL Values for Typical Vehicles 
Vehicle Description Axle Weights (lbs) ESAL 
Axle 1 Axle 2 Axle 3 Axle 4 Axle 5 Axle 6 Axle 7 Axle 8 Axle 9 
5-axle Single, tandem, tandem 12000 17000 17000 17000 17000 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.40 
6-axle 
light Single, tandem, tridem 12000 17000 17000 14000 15000 15000 n/a n/a n/a 2.13 
6-axle 
heavy Single, tandem, tridem 12000 17000 17000 17000 17000 17000 n/a n/a n/a 2.81 
7-axle 
Single, tridem, tridem 12000 17000 17000 15000 15000 17000 17000 n/a n/a 
2.77 
 
8-axle Single, tandem, tridem, 
tandem 12000 17000 17000 14000 15000 15000 17000 17000 n/a 3.23 
9-axle Single, tandem, 
tandem, tandem, 
tandem 






Table 2.4 Conversion of ESAL-Mile Fees to Per-Mile Fees for Each Vehicle Configuration 
Vehicle 
$/ESAL-mile 
$       0.01 $       0.02 $       0.05 $       0.07 $       0.10 $       0.25 $       0.40 $       0.50 $       0.75 $       1.00 
5-axle No Fee (Not OW) 
6-axle light 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 
6-axle 
heavy 0.084 0.088 0.100 0.109 0.121 0.182 0.243 0.284 0.386 0.488 
7-axle 0.084 0.087 0.099 0.106 0.117 0.173 0.229 0.266 0.359 0.453 
8-axle 0.088 0.097 0.122 0.138 0.163 0.289 0.414 0.497 0.706 0.914 
9-axle 0.092 0.105 0.142 0.167 0.205 0.392 0.580 0.705 1.017 1.330 
 
Table 2.5 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.01/ESAL-mile 
0.01 
















50 1 205 122 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




6827.5875 121.6495 10793108.57 2831081.83 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 198673.809 2878.774488 144396334.5 30805700.02 29150640.67 0 204554227.8 -70835037.69 
 Logistics 














2.3.7.7 Relationship Between Total Logistics Cost Savings and Permit Fee 
As observed in Figure 2.2, the relationship between total logistics cost savings and 
permit fee is nonlinear.  Nonlinear relationships can be modeled using simple linear 
regression by transforming either the predictor variable or the response variable.  Several 
variable transformations were explored to linearize the relationship.  Exponential 
regression was selected to model the relationship depicted in Figure 2.1. 
The general form of the exponential regression models is as follows: 
ܵ ൌ ߙ݁ሺఉ௫ሻ 
( 2-7 ) 
where  and  are estimated parameters and ܵ and ݔ are as previously defined.  The 
transformation of the response variable, in this case the total logistics cost savings, by 
taking the natural logarithm linearizes the relationship as follows: 
ln ܵ ൌ ln ߙ ൅ ߚݔ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݔ 
( 2-8 ) 
where ߚ଴ and ߚଵ are estimated using linear regression.  From the transformation above, it 
is clear that ߙ ൌ ݁ఉబ  and ߚ ൌ ߚଵ .  Using the data presented in Figure 2.1, ߙ ൌ
108137615 and ߚ ൌ െ0.597.  The model fit is extremely reasonable with an ܴଶ value 
of 0.946. 
Therefore, by replacing the parameters with estimated values into Equation ( 2-7 ), 





ܵ ൌ 108137615݁ି଴.ହଽ଻௫ 
( 2-9 ) 
where ܵ is the total logistics cost savings, and ݔ is the ESAL-mile based permit fee. 
 
2.3.7.8 Demand for Overweight Vehicle Permits 
The final step in parameter estimation is to model the demand for overweight 
vehicle permits in ESAL-miles of travel which serves as a constraint in the multiobjective 
optimization.  Elasticity is a concept typically applied to travel demand forecasting.  
Elasticity is defined as the “percentage change in demand for a 1% change in a decision 




( 2-10 ) 
where ݔ is the attribute which changes and ݕ is the resulting demand.  Elasticities can be 
used to estimate change in demand via elasticity-based demand models which are 
functions of the change in an attribute and the initial demand. 
For this analysis, it is assumed that demand is nonlinear; specifically, the demand 
has a function of the following general form: 
ܦ ൌ ݇ݔ௔ 
( 2-11 ) 
where ܦ is the demand, ݔ is an attribute of interest, and ݇ and ܽ are estimable parameters.  
For this type of nonlinear demand, elasticity can be generally estimated as follows: 
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݁௫ሺܦሻ ൌ ܽ ൌ logܦ଴ െ logܦଵlog ݔ଴ െ log ݔଵ  
( 2-12 ) 
where the subscripts 0 and 1 correspond to the before and after situations, respectively.  
Rearranging terms, the new level of demand, which results from a change in the attribute 
of interest, can be generally estimated as follows: 
ܦଵ ൌ ܦ଴ ൬ݔଵݔ଴൰
௘ೣሺ஽ሻ
 
( 2-13 ) 
In this problem, the attribute of interest is not the permit fee itself but the total 
logistics costs.  Therefore, the demand to be estimated is as follows: 
ܦଵ ൌ ܦ଴ ൬ܶܮܥ଴ െ ܵܶܮܥ଴ ൰
௘೅ಽ಴ሺ஽ሻ
 
( 2-14 ) 
where ܶܮܥ଴ is the initial total logistics cost, ܵ is the total logistics cost savings, ܦ଴ is the 
initial or latent demand, and ்݁௅஼ሺܦሻ is the elasticity of demand with respect to total 
logistics cost.  As previously discussed, the ܶܮܥ଴ was estimated using the ITIC model 
software to be $844,491,655. 
 
2.3.7.9 Previously-Estimated Elasticity Values 
Freight demand elasticity estimates vary widely due to the different demand and 
attribute measures, estimation methods, commodities studied, and locations studied.  
Recent research has also collated and compared empirical freight demand elasticity 
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measures from multiple studies.  Abdelwahab (1998) used data from the US Commodity 
Transportation Survey conducted by the Census Bureau in 1981.  Abdelwahab estimated 
truck price elasticity of demand between -0.956 and -2.489.  Clark et al. (2005) surveyed 
both aggregate and disaggregate mode choice models to compare elasticity estimates 
across modes and estimation methods.  Among the multiple estiamtes reported from other 
studies, Clark et al. (2005) note the work by Oum in 1989 which found a log-linear own 
price elasticity for truck freight of -1.341.  Clark et al. (2005) also provided appropriate 
ranges for various commodities transported using various modes based on their survey of 
other works.  For corn, wheat, and other agricultural commodities transported by trucks, 
the range surveyed was -0.99 to -0.73.  For primary metals and metallic products, the 
range surveyed was -1.36 to -0.18.  These are the most appropriate ranges for the 
agricultural and metal commodities permitted under HEA-1481.  Li et al. (2011) also 
conducted a meta analysis of 12 previous elasticity studies completed between 1978 and 
2010 to explore sources of variation among estimates; they reported translog elasticity 
ranges of tonne-kilometers of travel in the United States between -0.9299 and -1.3034 for 
natural resources and between -0.7127 and -1.0861 for other products.  More recently, 
McCoullough (2013) specifically estimated the effect of TS&W limits on the rail and 
truck markets in the United States (McCullough, 2013).  McCullough (2013) based his 
analysis on the classic work of Friedlaender and Spady (1980) which considered specific 
key commodities such as food, wood products, automobiles, etc.  In McCullough’s (2013) 
updated work using the Commodity Flow Survey and Economic Census data from 1997, 
2002, and 2007 (all after Friedlaender and Spady’s original analysis), the truck elasticity 
for agricultural products was -0.786.  The truck elasticity for primary metal 
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manurfacturing was -0.822.  These values are lower in absolute magnitude than those 
originally reported by Friedlaender and Spady. 
For the multiobjective optimization, Clark et al.’s (2005) reported value of -1.341 
was used in the model formulation.  Estimates from previous studies indicate inelastic 
demand for agricultural commodities but elastic demand for metal commodities.  In 
practice, the new overweight commodity permits are primarily used by metal carriers; 
therefore, the elastic estiamte of -1.341 can be considered more appropriate than an 
inelastic value.  Additionally, the value of -1.341 is well within the general range 
reporeted by Abdelwahab (1998) and can be used to determine an upper bound on the 
increase in demand in response to TLC savings.  Clark et al.’s (2005) value was 
estimated for all truck freight using a log-linear elasticity demand model which is easier 
to apply to demand estimation than translog elasticity-demand models and models with 
lagged structures.  Finally, although recent research projects have focused on 
commodities separately, the analysis herein does not distinguish between agricultural and 
metal commodities in determining the total logistics cost savings, the demand, or the cost 
of highway infrastructure consumption. 
 
2.3.7.10 Initial Demand 
Finally, the initial or latent demand for overweight vehicle permits, ܦ଴ , was 
estimated to be 35,000,000 ESAL-miles annually.  The term latent demand is used here 
because prior to HEA-1481, carriers were not able to purchase overweight commodity 
permits although a demand for these permits existed (as evidenced by the purchase of 
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permits after enactment).  The records queried from the INDOR database indicated that 
over 40,000,000 ESAL-miles of travel is expected to be permitted annually for both 
overweight commodity and Special Weight vehicle permits (Everett et al., 2014); 
however, this value is for a permit fee of $0.07/ESAL-mile.  As discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs, demand can change based on the total logistics cost.  Therefore, 
the initial demand value was calibrated to reflect higher demand in the presence of cost 
savings which occurs at $0.07/ESAL-mile. 
 
2.3.8 Multiobjective Optimization Formulation for Indiana 
The general multiobjective optimization outlined in Equations ( 2-1 ) through ( 2-5 ) 
can be replaced with the estimated parameters above to specifically formulate the 
multiobjective optimization for overweight commodity permits in Indiana as follows: 
minimize	ݖଵ ൌ ሺ0.84 െ ݔሻܦଵ 
( 2-15 ) 
and	maximize	ݖଶ ൌ 108137615݁ି଴.ହଽ଻௫ 
( 2-16 ) 
 





( 2-17 ) 
and	ݔ ൑ 0.84 




and	ݔ ൒ 0 
( 2-19 ) 
where ݖଵ is the objective to minimize uncompensated consumption, ݖଶ is the objective to 
maximize total logistics cost savings, ݔ is the ESAL-mile based permit fee, and ܦଵ is the 
resulting demand for overweight vehicle permits in ESAL-miles. 
 
2.3.9 Optimization Results 
The formulation presented in Section 2.3.8 includes an equality constraint for the 
demand function because the demand is not a choice made by the decision maker, but 
rather an effect of market decisions that are consequences of the decision maker’s choice.  
Two analysis tools were used to solve the multiobjective optimization problem 
formulated herein, one involved an inequality constraint and the other used an equality 
constraint. 
 
2.3.9.1 General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) Analysis Results 
First, the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) was used to 
mathematically model the problem.  GAMS is a high-level modeling system designed for 
optimization problems (Rosenthal, 2014).  High-level refers to the type of language used 
in GAMS.  In GAMS, the model is defined using algebraic equations.  Then a command 
is issued to solve the model using the appropriate third-party optimization solver.  GAMS 
is capable of modeling and solving linear, non-linear, and mixed integer optimization 
problems.  In addition to the capabilities included in GAMS, the publicly available 
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GAMS Model Library contains 403 (as of January 2015) models that are selected for 
inclusion because of either the importance of the model problem or the modeling 
capabilities they represent.  Models included in the Model Library are developed by 
individuals but may be used by others to solve similar problems.  Mavrotas (2009) 
developed one such model for the augmented -constraint method described in Section 
2.2.5. 
The model formulation in Section 2.3.8 was modified to allow demand to vary.  
The demand constraint in Equation ( 2-17 ) was broken into two separate constraints as 
follows: 





( 2-20 ) 
and	ܦଵ ൒ ܦ଴ 
( 2-21 ) 
where ݔ is the ESAL-mile based permit fee, ܦଵ is the resulting demand for overweight 
vehicle permits in ESAL-miles, and ܦ଴ is the latent demand. 
This way, demand is made to vary between the upper bound defined by the 
elasticity-demand function and the lower bound of the latent demand which always exists.  
All other variables and inequalities in the original formulation were used without 
modification. 
The GAMS program developed by Mavrotas (2009) uses two models:  first, a 
model of the system of interest, and second, a modification of the initial model to modify 
the epsilon constraints to improve the efficiency of the solution mechanism.  Mavrotas’ 
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(2009) original GAMS input was modified to represent the present problem by changing 
the set of objective functions, parameters, variables, and equations in the first model.  The 
second model which augments the first was not changed, as outlined in Mavrotas’ (2009) 
explanation for using his sample. 
Additionally, Mavrotas’ (2009) original GAMS input called for a linear 
programming algorithm.  The present multiobjective optimization includes non-linear 
inequalities; therefore, the command to call up the solver was replaced with one to a non-
linear programming algorithm. 
The GAMS output is presented in Appendix B.  The termination message, “** 
Optimal solution. There are no superbasic variables” typically indicates the 
solution is a locally optimal corner point.  This is not surprising given that minimizing the 
first objective function, in the absence of the second objective function, would result in a 
corner point solution in which the ESAL-mile fee is equal to the cost of consumption.  
Similarly, given that the savings monotonically decreases with ESAL-mile based fees, if 
the second objective function were maximized, in the absence of the first objective 
function, the optimal point would again be a corner solution in which the ESAL-mile 
based fee is equal to zero. 
 
2.3.9.2 Simultaneous Equations Solution 
In addition to the GAMS model, the multiobjective optimization problem can be 
visualized using simultaneous equations when demand is exactly equal to the elasticity-
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demand curve, as formulated in Section 2.3.8.  Equations ( 2-15 ) through ( 2-17 ) were 
rearranged to determine and graph the Pareto frontier using sequential equations. 
 
 
2.3.9.3 Pareto Frontier Visualizations 
Figure 2.3 presents a three-dimensional plot of the uncompensated consumption 
cost, total logistics cost savings, and the decision variable—the price per ESAL-mile of 
travel to charge for overweight commodity permits.  As the amount charged per ESAL-
mile increases, both the savings and the uncompensated consumption cost decrease.  
Similarly, as the amount charged per ESAL-mile decreases, the total logistics cost 
savings increases but so does the uncompensated consumption cost. 
 





The Pareto optimal frontier is more easily visualized in two-dimensions where the 
objective function values are projected onto the plane of the ESAL-mile fee, as shown in 
Figure 2.4.  Again, when the logistics cost savings are high, the uncompensated 
consumption cost is high as well and when the logistics cost savings are low, the 
uncompensated consumption cost is also low. 
 




2.3.9.4 Tradeoff Analysis 
In addition to visualizing the Pareto frontier, trade-off analysis provides additional 
information to the decision maker.  Branke et al. (2008) define the tradeoff, ௜ܶ௝ሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ, 

























௜ܶ௝ሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ ൌ ௜݂ሺݔ
ଵሻ െ ௜݂ሺݔଶሻ
௝݂ሺݔଵሻ െ ௝݂ሺݔଶሻ 
The trade-off value quantifies the loss in one objective function for a gain in 
another objective function.  As expected from the definition above, for two objective 
functions, the tradeoffs between the two are related as follows: 
௝ܶ௜ሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ ൌ 1௜ܶ௝ሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ 
Figure 2.5 presents the calculated tradeoffs for uncompensated consumption cost 
and total logistics cost savings.  In the figure, the tradeoff “unit UCC per unit Savings” 
represents the reduction in uncompensated consumption achieved for a unit reduction in 
cost savings.  These values are less than one for the full range of the decision variable.  
This indicates that reduction of $1 in uncompensated consumption requires more than a 
$1 loss in total logistics cost savings (or more than a $1 increase in total logistics cost).  
The tradeoff “unit Savings per unit UCC” represents the increase in savings possible for 
an increase in uncompensated consumption.  These values are greater than one for the 




Figure 2.5 Tradeoffs for Uncompensated Consumption Costs and Total Logistics Cost 
Savings 
 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a mathematical programming approach that can greatly 
improve the efficiency of traditional permitting mechanisms.  Currently, the revenues 
collected from traditional overweight vehicle permits are significantly less than the actual 
cost of consumption.  Multiobjective optimization addresses this gap while also 
incorporating the need for transportation agencies to establish overweight vehicle 
permitting programs that facilitate economic activity. 
In contrast to previous efforts to optimize overweight vehicle permitting fees, both 












































































represent the problem more accurately with respect to the options available to both 
decision makers (the transportation agency) and the carriers who use the system.  The 
choice of permit price as the decision variable directly corresponds to the transportation 
agency’s choice in determining a fee schedule.  As a result, the actual uncompensated 
consumption cost, rather than a percentage of that cost, is determined for every possible 
level of permit fee imposed by the agency. 
Additionally, the objective function to maximize the total logistics cost savings is 
more indicative of the way carriers operate.  Trucking companies determine which 
vehicles to use based on the total logistics cost, not simply the cost of permit acquisition.  
Therefore, the agency’s goal to establish overweight permitting regulations that are not a 
burden to the trucking industry is met when the agency seeks to maximize total logistics 
cost savings. 
The results of the multiobjective optimization were expressed, or visualized, in the 
form of a Pareto optimal frontier and associated tradeoffs.  Pareto optimality is important 
in multiobjective optimization because not all the decision makers’ conflicting objectives 
can be satisfied simultaneously.  Points on the Pareto optimal frontier cannot be improved 
for one objective without a loss in at least one other objective.  The Pareto optimal 
frontier and trade-off values inform the decision makers of the possible outcomes for 
different levels of permit price, in terms of the uncompensated cost of consumption and 
the total logistics cost savings experienced by the trucking industry.  The tradeoffs 
specifically provide information about the effects of incrementally increasing or 
decreasing the permit fee. 
66 
 
Future work in this area can include additional improvements to the multiobjective 
optimization formulation and parameter estimation specific to other states.  Additional 
model forms for the total logistics cost savings and the relationship between savings and 
additional demand should be explored in future studies.  Finally, researchers in other 
states can estimate parameters appropriate to the regulations and practices in their 




CHAPTER 3. INCENTIVES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE-FRIENDLY VEHICLE 
USAGE 
3.1 Introduction 
For purposes of this research, infrastructure-friendly vehicles refer to overweight 
vehicles that are configured and loaded to reduce the amount of damage to highway 
infrastructure.  The use of infrastructure-friendly vehicles can be mandated through 
TS&W limits and oversize/overweight permit regulations or incentivized through a 
variety of mechanisms including low cost permits, reduced taxes, rebates, and/or bonuses. 
Infrastructure-friendly vehicles are desirable because they reduce the cost of 
highway asset consumption and increase freight productivity.  The key to achieving these 
competing goals is that carriers receive the full benefits associated with higher GVW 
allowances, such as increased productivity and lower transportation costs, if and only if 
they exercising responsible loading behavior.  Responsible loading behavior refers to the 
use of equipment that minimizes the loads imposed on pavement and bridge assets, 
therefore reducing consumption. 
The use of infrastructure-friendly vehicles may not be applicable in all cases for 
overweight operations.  In one of the earliest studies of infrastructure-friendly vehicles, a 
TRB study committee determined that prototypes for infrastructure-friendly vehicles 
would most likely be attractive to “bulk commodity haulers” and “less-than-truckload 
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freight traffic” carriers, but would not serve as adequate replacement vehicles for full 
truckload carriers (Morris, 1989). 
Two truck loading concepts are useful here:  cube-out and weigh-out.  These 
concepts are applicable to divisible loads and refer to the limiting factor in loading a 
vehicle, truck size limits or truck weight limits.  Low-density goods cube-out, or fill up 
the volume of the trailer before reaching the GVW limit.  High-density goods weigh-
out—the GVW limit is reached even though there is physical space left in the trailer for 
more goods.  Infrastructure-friendly vehicles are most likely to be used by bulk 
commodity carriers who weigh-out because there is volume left in the trailer (thus, less-
than-truckload) that does not contain goods.  Carriers that regularly carry cubed-out 
goods (full truckload) would not benefit from higher GVW limits without changes to 




In practice, the term infrastructure-friendly vehicles has been used to refer to a 
number of vehicle requirements and other voluntary measures that increase the safety and 
decrease the pavement and bridge consumption often associated with overweight vehicles.  
In addition to axle loading and spacing, characteristics that influence safety and asset 
consumption include the number of tires, tire pressure, suspension, coupling, and vehicle 
dimensions.  This chapter is primarily devoted to axle loading and spacing characteristics; 
however, agencies should also be aware of the other factors. 
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The number of tires and tire pressure directly impacts pavement consumption.  
Typically, the steering axle has two single tires (one on each side) while all other axles 
have dual tires on each side for a total of four tires per axle.  More recently, single wide-
base tires, also called super-single tires, have been used in place of dual tires on load-
carrying axles.  Additionally, tire inflation pressures have increased from between 75 and 
85 pounds per square inch (psi) in the 1950s when the original AASHO Road Test was 
conducted to approximately 100 psi in the 1980s where they have remained (USDOT, 
2000).  The use of super-single tires and higher inflation pressures effectively reduces the 
“footprint” of the tire, concentrating the load on a smaller area of pavement.  
Concentrated loads generally result in greater damage to pavement infrastructure 
compared to those spread out over a larger area. 
Suspension systems distribute loads across an axle group and dampen vertical 
dynamic loads such as those that occur when heavy vehicles travel along a highway.  
Dynamic loads refer to the fluctuations in axle loadings above and below average values.  
Fluctuations occur because of pavement roughness, speed of the vehicle, tire stiffness, 
and particularly the vehicle suspension. Good suspension dampens the fluctuations and 
equalizes the load between axles.  In addition to affecting pavement wear, suspension 
systems impact vehicle handling which in turn impacts safety. 
Coupling and vehicle dimensions impact the safety of infrastructure-friendly 
vehicles.  Coupling between the tractor and the trailer, and between trailers in double-
trailer configurations, affects stability and offtracking.  Offtracking occurs when the rear 
wheels of a combination vehicle deviate from the path of the front wheels on curves.  
Similarly, the vehicle dimensions affect the maneuverability of vehicles in the traffic 
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stream because the distance between points of articulation and the rear axles, as well as 
the spacing between axles, affect stability and offtracking. 
For tire, suspension, and coupling characteristics, agencies are most likely to 
mandate requirements rather than encourage voluntary adoption of infrastructure-friendly 
practices, if they are considered at all.  For example, the New York State DOT 
(NYSDOT) adopted infrastructure-friendly vehicle requirements for all vehicles with a 
model year 2006 or later and intends to impose similar regulations for earlier model year 
vehicles beginning January 1, 2020.  NYSDOT’s infrastructure-friendly vehicle 
requirements mandate the use of dual tires for all non-steering axles, prohibit the use of 
lift-axles that are not steerable or trackable, require that air pressure controls for lift axles 
are located outside of the cab to ensure that lift axles are used properly, and require 
uniform distribution of load so that no single axle in a multi-axle group carries less than 
80% of the load of any other axle in the group (NYSDOT, 2011).  In Ontario, Canada, 
the Ministry of Transport phased in Safe, Productive, Infrastructure Friendly (SPIF) 
vehicles over a ten-year period between 2001 and 2011.  Ontario’s SPIF vehicles are 
fully described vehicle configurations including the axles, suspension, and other 
requirements, designed to provide stability and control, minimize damage to roads and 
bridges, and to be as productive as possible (Government of Ontario, 2011). 
The impacts of tires, suspension, coupling, and dimensions on pavement and bridge 
consumption are lower in magnitude than the actual axle loadings and spacing which 
directly impact the deformation of pavements and the moments applied to bridges.  Thus, 
through the remainder of the chapter, infrastructure-friendly vehicle usage measures will 
only refer to those regulations or incentives which address axle weights and spacing.  
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Whereas the infrastructure-friendly vehicle requirements of NYSDOT and the Ontario 
Ministry of Transport do not provide any productivity benefits to users, axle weight and 
spacing measures typically provide benefits through higher GVW allowances.  The 
general framework for the use of infrastructure-friendly vehicles begins with a definition 
of the typical vehicles or vehicle limits that are considered infrastructure-friendly, and 
then either mandates or incentivizes their use.  Three examples of this framework are the 
Turner truck limits, Michigan TS&W limits, and INDOT’s ESAL-mile based multi-trip 
annual permits. 
 
3.2.1 Turner Proposal 
In a 1984 address to AASHTO, former Administrator of the FHWA, Francis C. 
Turner advocated for truck size and weight limits based on lower individual axle weight 
limits, longer vehicle length limits, and higher GVW limits.  The increase in length limits 
is necessary for operators to add sufficient extra axles to reduce the load carried by each 
individual axle.  The proposal is now commonly referred to as the “Turner Proposal” and 
the prototype vehicles as “Turner trucks.”  Turner advocated for the altered limits as a 
potential win-win situation:  truck operators would benefit from higher GVWs and 
agencies would benefit from reduced pavement damage due to the lower axle loads. 
Turner originally proposed the following TS&W limit changes (Morris, 1989):  
single axle load limit of 15,000 lbs; tandem axle load limit of 25,000 lbs; greater vehicle 
lengths; and maximum GVW of 112,000 lbs. 
Turner’s prototypical truck was a 9-axle double trailer combination with a steering 
axle and four tandem axles.  He estimated that the pavement consumption would be 
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approximately 1/3 that of an 80,000 lb 5-axle vehicle for every ton-mile of travel (Morris, 
1989). 
In 1989 and 1990, TRB evaluated the Turner Proposal in conjunction with an 
ongoing study of TS&W limits and alternatives (TRB, 1990a; TRB, 1990b).  The results 
of both analyses were released in 1990.  TRB expanded the Turner truck analysis to 
include four different prototype vehicles—a 7-axle tractor trailer, a 9-axle double, an 11-
axle double, and a 9-axle B-train double—with higher GVW limits than Turner proposed.  
Unlike Turner’s original prototype vehicle, not all of the vehicles analyzed met Federal 
Bridge Formula B regulations; Turner’s prototype did.  Researchers also considered a 
voluntary system which did not prohibit use of vehicles previously in use; a variety of 
policy alternatives including thicker pavements, redesigned trucks, and user fees; and 
alternative tax treatments to encourage operators to use Turner trucks (TRB, 1990b). 
TRB (1990b) determined that any new vehicle options must be voluntary.  Turner 
originally proposed that the lower axle weights apply to all vehicles; those that could not 
practically meet new lower maximums might purchase special permits and/or pay higher 
registration fees.  TRB (1990b) advocated for a voluntary system because forcing 
operators to adopt the Turner truck configurations goes against the spirit of the proposal 
to benefit both trucking companies and agencies.  A mandatory system would effectively 
burden those companies who do not shift voluntarily to the Turner truck configurations. 
The Turner proposal directly addressed pavement consumption.  Pavement 
consumption is reduced when the axle weights limits are reduced.  As previously 
discussed, bridge consumption depends on the bending moment produced when a vehicle 
traverses a bridge and is a function of the span length, bridge materials, and the 
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distribution of the vehicle weight on its axles.  The Turner proposal did not address 
bridge consumption (Morris, 1989).  The Turner truck limits would overstress thousands 
of bridges that have a lower design capacity.  As a result, bridges would need to have 
posted weight limits, be strengthened, or replaced.  Posting weight limits on bridges 
reduces the available roadway network that Turner trucks are able to use.  Strengthening 
or replacing bridges costs the agency money. 
 TRB (1990b) estimated that approximately 23% of vehicle miles traveled by 
combination trucks would ultimately be attracted to Turner trucks.  Based on this level of 
expected market penetration, the authors estimated there would be $729 million annual 
savings to maintain pavements in their current condition.  When the additional bridge 
costs to strengthen or replace deficient bridges (due to the higher Turner truck limits) 
were incorporated, the annual agency savings to maintain the network in the same 
condition without adoption of Turner trucks were reduced to $326 million.  Similar to 
previous research, TRB (1990b) determined that freight cost savings would far exceed 
the agency savings at approximately $2.0 billion annually. 
TRB also discussed the potential tax treatment of Turner trucks to provide 
“incentives to choose trucks that are truly the most efficient” (Morris, 1989).  Adjustment 
via alternative tax treatments is important for cases where use of a Turner truck might 
lead to lower highway agency costs but would require the operator to pay higher taxes via 
higher purchasing prices, registration fees, and/or fuel taxes.  The higher taxes might 
discourage adoption of Turner trucks.  The authors recommended some form of tax 
adjustment to equate the operator’s cost whether he or she used a Turner truck or a 
typical 5-axle, 80,000 lb vehicle is used. 
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Although TRB (1990b) determined that adoption of the refined version of the 
Turner proposal would result in overall savings to highway agencies and even larger 
freight cost savings, the lower axle weight limits were never adopted.  In its report, TRB 
(1990b) recommended that each state consider the Turner proposal as a supplement to 
existing state and national TS&W limits, yet no state studies explicitly considered the 
Turner proposal.  Notably, the alternatives studied in the more comprehensive 1990 study 
of various TS&W limits and options were not adopted either.  National TS&W limits 
were not significantly altered following the 1990 studies. 
 
3.2.2 Michigan’s TS&W Limits 
The Michigan DOT (MDOT) did adopt the philosophy of lower axle weights 
outlined in the Turner proposal in its unique state TS&W limits.  Michigan does not have 
a GVW limit, but rather limits the individual axle weights as follows (MDOT, 2014):  
single axles (spacing over 9 feet): 18,000 lbs for GVW over 80,000 lbs, 20,000 lbs 
otherwise; axle groups with spacing between 3 ½ and 9 feet: 13,000 lbs for all vehicles; 
axle groups with spacing less than 3 ½ feet: 9,000 lbs for all vehicles; tandem axle 
assembly: one assembly with 16,000 lbs per axle for GVW over 80,000 lbs, two 
assemblies with 16,000 lbs per axle otherwise; maximum load on any given wheel not to 
exceed 700 lbs per inch width of tire; and maximum of 11 axles on a combination vehicle. 
The effective maximum allowable GVW in Michigan is 164,000 lbs using an 11-
axle vehicle, with most axles carrying 13,000 lbs (MDOT, 2013).  Heavy vehicles in 
Michigan do not need a permit when the GVW exceeds 80,000 lbs as long as the vehicles 
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meet all Michigan state TS&W limits.  Michigan is allowed to apply its unique TS&W 
limits through the grandfather clause. 
The Michigan TS&W limits are an example of mandated use of infrastructure-
friendly vehicles.  Carriers are not simply encouraged to limit the individual axle 
spacings but are required to do so.  The higher GVWs result in higher payloads which 
reduces the number of vehicle trips necessary to move the same amount of goods.  
MDOT (2013) estimates that approximately 5% of vehicles in Michigan operate above 
80,000 lbs but these vehicles provide substantial benefits to a few basic industries such as 
manufacturing, forestry, mining, agriculture and construction.  In addition to the 
pavement repair and maintenance cost savings, MDOT experiences savings through the 
reduced transportation costs for goods such as cement and asphalt used to construct 
roadways.  MDOT (2013) predicts that changes to the current state TS&W limits to align 
with federal limits would result in more vehicle miles traveled, more congestion, 
increased costs for consumers (due to higher transportation costs), decreased industrial 
competitiveness (for industries such as manufacturing and forestry), and increased 
consumption of pavements.  The unique TS&W limits demonstrate the benefits 
experienced by both the agency and the trucking industry. 
 
3.2.3 INDOT’s Annual, Multi-Trip Permit Incentive 
As detailed in Chapter 1, the Indiana House Enrolled Act 1481 (HEA-1481) created 
overweight commodity permits for divisible metal and agricultural loads in Indiana.  
INDOT issued Emergency Rules to supplant the fee structure defined in HEA-1481 
which took effect January 1, 2014.  In the Emergency Rules, INDOT created a new 
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subset of overweight commodity trip permits called “annual, multi-trip permits” available 
after February 1, 2014 (INDOT, 2013).  The annual, multi-trip permits are the only 
annual permit for overweight vehicles in Indiana and are available to those eligible for 
overweight commodity permits—carriers transporting metal and agricultural 
commodities up to 120,000 lbs and 97,000 lbs, respectively, along with additional 
requirements. 
When trucking companies apply for overweight commodity permits, the ESALs are 
calculated using the process defined in the Emergency Rules, individual axle weights and 
spacing, and standard weights for each axle group.  The standard weights and calculation 
procedure outlined in the Emergency Rules are consistent with previous transportation 
research on the relationship between ESALs and weight in pounds.  In general, the 
weight of an axle or axle group is divided by the standard weight and that value is raised 
to the fourth power.  The standard weights for single, tandem, tridem, quad, and five-axle 
groups are 18,000 lbs; 33,200 lbs; 46,000 lbs; 57,000 lbs; and 65,000 lbs, respectively. 
If the calculated ESALs are less than or equal to 2.40, the applicant is eligible for 
an annual multi-trip overweight commodity permit.  The INDOR system automatically 
generates annual, multi-trip permits for those who are eligible.  Annual, multi-trip 
overweight commodity permits are both vehicle and route specific.  The permit fee is $20 
and the permit is valid for an unlimited number of trips by that vehicle on that route for 
364 days from the requested start date for the permit.  Carriers that request permits for 
vehicles exceeding 2.40 ESALs are charged the $20 administrative fee plus the ESAL-
mile based fees (ESALs above 2.40 multiplied by the distance traveled in miles) for 
every single trip.  For carriers who have multiple vehicles that are less than 2.40 ESALs 
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traveling multiple routes, each vehicle and route combination must be permitted at a cost 
of $20 annually for each vehicle/route combination. 
Unlike Michigan’s mandated compliance with state TS&W limits, Indiana’s new 
annual, multi-trip overweight commodity permits are voluntary, thereby serving as an 
incentive for trucking companies to use infrastructure-friendly vehicles.  Those who are 
willing to purchase new equipment, retrofit existing equipment, and to load vehicles to 
less than 2.40 ESALs can take advantage of the low-cost annual permits.  Those who 
cannot practically configure their loads to less than 2.40 ESALs, or those who choose not 
to do so due to their business models, must pay at least a portion of the additional 
consumption of highway resources.  In contrast to Michigan’s TS&W limits, Indiana’s 
incentive program is more consistent with TRB’s (1990b) voluntary Turner proposal 
mechanism.  The voluntary nature of the Indiana system does not prohibit users of the 
system from using non-infrastructure-friendly vehicles but also will not result in full 
adoption of new vehicle configurations.  Only those trucking companies that can increase 
productivity, reduce overall costs, or offer lower cost services to shippers within the new 
regulations will use vehicles that take advantage of the annual, multi-trip permits.  The 
new Indiana annual, multi-trip permits are used for the case study later in this chapter. 
 
3.3 Advantages and Disadvantages 
The primary advantage of infrastructure-friendly vehicles is a win-win operating 
environment for the trucking industry and for state transportation agencies.  Trucking 
companies benefit from higher GVWs to transport the same quantity of goods more 
efficiently.  Industries that feed into the truck freight network also potentially experience 
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some of these savings along with consumers, as savings are passed from carriers to 
shippers.  State DOTs benefit from lower individual axle loads which causes the cost of 
pavement maintenance and rehabilitation to decrease substantially. 
The primary disadvantage of the Turner proposal, Michigan’s efforts, and Indiana’s 
efforts to encourage or mandate the use of infrastructure-friendly vehicles is that they do 
not include an explicit measure of bridge consumption.  All three approaches rely on the 
premise of controlling the cost of infrastructure consumption by lowering the individual 
axle weights, which has a direct relationship to pavement consumption.  Individual axle 
or axle group weights are less related to the bending moment produced in bridges because 
there are a variety of other explanatory variables including the span length, the axle 
spacing, and the total GVW.  In Indiana, the measure used to determine the cut-off point 
for infrastructure-friendly and non-infrastructure-friendly vehicles is based on ESALs, a 
pavement consumption measure. 
MDOT states that bridges in Michigan are “designed to carry the concentrated 
weight of Michigan trucks” (MDOT, 2013).  The “considerable investment…to carry 
heavier, more productive trucks” (MDOT, 2013) is similar to the approach of using some 
cost savings from pavement consumption to fund the cost of posting weight limits, 
strengthening, and/or replacing deficient bridges (due to the heavier loads) advocated by 
TRB (1990b).  No such measures were included in INDOT’s Emergency Rules, but it is 
both possible and likely INDOT will address this issue in the future. 
Inherent in each of the infrastructure-friendly vehicle approaches described above 
is the premise that axle weights are the most important consideration.  Axle weights are 
important to carriers because individual axle weights and GVW are interdependent and 
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GVW dictates payload capacity.  Axle weights are important to transportation agencies 
because pavement stress is caused by individual axle loads applied to the pavement—
pavement consumption is a monetized value of this repeated stress.  However, axle 
spacing and total vehicle length, again interdependent elements, are also extremely 
important, particularly for bridge stress (USDOT, 2000). 
Axle spacing has divergent impacts on pavement and bridge distress.  Placing 
individual axles close together creates a group that distributes the load along the 
pavement, or increases the “footprint” discussed earlier, causing less pavement stress 
than the same weight on each axle spaced far apart, approximately 9 feet or more.  In 
contrast, bridge distress depends on the bending moment due to point loads applied to the 
bridge at each axle.  The bending moment is greatest, and causes the most stress, when 
the axles are closest together.  The Federal Bridge Formula B controls the maximum 
amount of weight that can be put on any axle group, without overstressing bridges, based 
on the number of axles in the group and the length of the axle group. 
The USDOT (2000) explicitly demonstrated this concept when it addressed the 
optimal allowable weight and spacing of tridem axles.  The research team demonstrated 
the decrease in bridge stress as axles in the tridem were spread apart, and the 
corresponding increase in pavement stress for the same spreads.  By plotting the 
allowable loads for different spacings using both pavement and bridge stress limits, the 
Department recommended an optimal total weight for tridem axle groups with 4.5 feet 
between each axle of 44,000 lbs, as shown in Figure 3.1.  For closer axle spacings, the 
Federal Bridge Formula B overstress criteria dictate lower weights.  For greater axle 




Figure 3.1 Allowable Loads for Tridem Axles vs. Axle Spacing (Source: USDOT 
National TS&W Study, 2000) 
 
The Turner proposal, Michigan’s TS&W limits, and INDOT’s ESAL calculation 
all include some consideration of axle spacing; unfortunately, each focuses primarily on 
the side of pavement consumption.  Francis Turner recognized that longer vehicle lengths 
are necessary to add sufficient axles to lower individual axle weights to remain within the 
confines of the Federal Bridge Formula B; he therefore recommended increases in length 
limits to accommodate the bridge requirements.  Although Turner advocated a truck 
design that met the Federal Bridge Formula B requirements, AASHTO expanded the 
scope for the larger TRB (1990b) study to include some configurations that overstress 
long-span steel bridges more than what is allowed in the Federal Bridge Formula B, 
contrary to Turner’s original proposal.  The overstress from these vehicles is the impetus 
for recommendations in the report to post weight limits, strengthen, and replace bridges 
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used by Turner.  Inherent in the use of ESALs, INDOT’s annual, multi-trip permits are 
most beneficial to users who can add more axles, typically resulting in closely-spaced 
axles, to reduce the pavement consumption.  More closely-spaced axles cause more 
damage to bridges compared to longer axle spacings.  The annual, multi-trip permits do 
not account for efforts that carriers might undertake to limit the amount of bridge 
consumption. 
The recent Indiana study estimated that the cost of bridge consumption exceeded 
the cost of pavement consumption by at least an order of magnitude.  While the annual 
pavement consumption attributable to the additional weight carried by overweight 
vehicles was estimated to be approximately $2 million, bridge consumption was 
estimated to be approximately $42 million annually under the assumption that the share 
of bridge consumption attributable to load (called the load-share) was approximately 30% 
while the remaining 70% of the cost of bridge consumption was common for all users 
(the non-load-share) due to the weight of the bridge itself and environmental factors 
(Everett et al., 2014).  If the load-share is increased, the discrepancy between pavement 
consumption and bridge consumption also increases. 
Incentives and mandates to encourage the use of infrastructure-friendly vehicles are 
commendable when they can reduce the agency’s cost of maintaining highway 
infrastructure and providing acceptable levels of service.  Unfortunately, to date, actions 
in Michigan and Indiana to reduce axle weights and ESALs lead to minor pavement 
consumption cost savings when bridge consumption is the higher cost.  Future research 
that addresses highway infrastructure asset consumption more holistically might indicate 
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that overweight vehicle configurations different than those espoused by Turner and 
advocated in Michigan and Indiana are more infrastructure friendly. 
 
3.4 Willingness to Pay for Investment in Infrastructure-Friendly Vehicles 
As previously mentioned, the Indiana overweight commodity permits introduced in 
HEA-1481 served as a case study for each of the alternative overweight vehicle 
permitting mechanisms described herein.  The annual, multi-trip permits introduced in 
the Emergency Rules specifically served as the case study for infrastructure-friendly 
vehicles in Indiana. 
The trucking permitting questionnaire used to solicit information and opinions from 
truck users as part of the HEA-1481 mandated study was leveraged to include opinion 
questions about carriers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for investment in infrastructure-
friendly vehicles.  Previous state TS&W and oversize/overweight studies including recent 
efforts in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Texas also used expert opinions and surveys of 
shippers and carriers (Cambridge Systematics, Inc. and SRF Consulting Group, Inc., 
2006; Cambridge Systematics, Inc., 2009; Bienkowski & Walton, 2011; Prozzi et al., 
2012). 
 
3.4.1 Permitting Questionnaire Design 
Any shifts in the distribution among multiple vehicle configurations are expected 
occur mostly over the long term as carriers replace vehicles in their fleet, retrofit existing 
vehicles, and purchase new vehicles in response to changes in permitting regulations and 
technology improvements.  The nature and magnitude of these changes result from 
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choices made by both shippers and carriers.  The shippers choose the transportation 
mode—rail, water, air, or truck.  The carrier makes decisions such as investments in the 
truck fleet and the operating configurations and weights for each vehicle in the fleet.  The 
decisions made by shippers and carriers are often symbiotic:  for example, a carrier’s 
decision to invest in additional or new equipment that enables the use of a more cost-
effective vehicle configuration may translate into lower shipping costs and therefore 
attract business from other shippers who previously used either another trucking 
company or transportation mode.  Furthermore, some companies own and operate their 
own trucking fleet, serving as both shipper and carrier.  In such instances, investments 
that increase the cost-effectiveness of shipping translate into increased profits.  Finally, 
shippers and carriers often enter into contracts to transport goods over a period of time.  
Carriers may choose to delay investment if they are uncertain whether they will continue 
transporting a particular shipper’s goods after the contract period.  The permitting 
questionnaire was designed to elicit information about carriers’ fleet choices. 
Methods for studying choice behavior can be categorized revealed preference (RP) 
and stated preference (SP) methods.  RP methods are used to study choices that have 
already been made, thus the individual’s preference is revealed through their actions.  SP 
methods are used to elicit information on individual preferences when the actual choices 
cannot be observed because the decisions have not yet been made.  This typically occurs 
when the decision environment is physically non-existent at the time of the survey.  SP 
methods include the contingent valuation (CV) approach and stated choice (SC) 
experiments.  Traditionally, CV uses data from a survey instrument to place an economic 
value on one or more public goods (Carson & Louviere, 2011).  Often, the survey 
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instruments use dichotomous (yes/no) choices; although a binary choice task is not 
synonymous with CV.  Historically, CV has been used to estimate residents’ willingness 
to pay (WTP) for applications in a wide range of sectors including water supply, 
renewable electricity, solar energy systems, and other public or quasi-public goods or 
services (Carson & Mitchell, 1993; Guo et al., 2014; Radmehr et al., 2014).  In contrast, 
SC experiments are a type of elicitation method where respondents are presented with a 
finite number of discrete hypothetical alternatives in which one or more attributes are 
systematically varied.  SC experiments have been used in a wide variety of past 
transportation studies:  for example, to determine the value of time (VOT) and the value 
of reliability (VOR) of travel time for light auto users by varying the cost and travel time 
between origin-destination pairs.  In this manner, SC experiments can be used in 
conjunction with CV to place economic value on a public good (travel time or reliability). 
 
3.4.2 Hypothetical Bias 
The major criticism of stated preference methods is that choices made in a 
hypothetical setting do not always reflect the actual choices made in real-life settings.  RP 
data, which are observed actions rather than pronounced intentions, do not suffer from 
this hypothetical bias.  Unfortunately, observed data are not always available. 
People tend to value goods at an amount higher than they are truly willing to pay.  
Typically, the hypothetical bias can be as much as a factor of two or three, although 
higher and lower values are possible for different goods and among different individuals 
(Norwood, 2005; Murphy et al., 2005).  In 1996, a National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) study suggested dividing hypothetical bids by two to calibrate 
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bids, a recommendation that prompted research into why and by how much people 
misstate their actual preferences (List & Gallet, 2001).  In addition to the uncertainty 
people experience about their preferences in natural setting, in choice questions regarding 
public goods, some individuals may strategically overstate the value they place on that 
good with the hope that those goods will be somehow subsidized (Norwood, 2005).  This 
strategic bias can be treated the same as general hypothetical bias resulting from 
individual uncertainty. 
 
3.4.3 Mitigation Techniques for Hypothetical Bias 
Recent research has addressed possible mitigation techniques to address 
hypothetical bias.  These techniques are categorized as ex ante techniques incorporated 
into the elicitation method or ex post techniques applied to the collected data.  Carson and 
Groves (2007) found that consequentiality, defined as the respondent’s belief that survey 
results will influence policy decisions and the respondent’s interest in the outcomes of 
those decisions, is absolutely necessary for participants to reveal their true preferences.  
Whenever possible, ex ante techniques should be used to create incentive compatibility, 
or a link between actions and rewards that encourages participants to answer truthfully.  
Typically, SP methods do not have direct incentives because any incentives for 
participation are provided regardless of the truthfulness of an individual’s response (Fifer 
et al., 2014).  Thus, researchers must establish consequentiality (and therefore an 
incentive-compatible experiment) by including only participants who have a stake in the 




3.4.3.1 Cheap Talk Scripts 
“Cheap talk” is an ex ante method shown to mitigate hypothetical bias by appealing 
to consequentiality (Fifer et al., 2014).  Cheap talk scripts are text scripts presented to 
participants prior to completion of the survey.  The scripts range from a few sentences to 
a few paragraphs that provide essential pieces of information:  first, an alert about the 
potential bias associated with hypothetical situations, and second, an emphasis on the 
importance of truthful answers. 
In the trucking permitting questionnaire, following demographic questions about 
their company and immediately prior to answering questions about hypothetical 
situations, respondents were shown a cheap talk script, seen in Figure 3.2.  The cheap talk 
script designed for this study includes information that has been demonstrated effective in 
past research:  a brief explanation of bias that could occur and why it occurs, and 
encouragement and assurances that the survey results will be used in policy making.  The 
policy making assurances develop consequentiality.  The researchers balanced the need to 
adequately explain information without tiring the respondents, or providing so much 
information that would discourage the respondents from reading the script.  This was 




Figure 3.2 Cheap Talk Script Shown to Respondents Prior to Hypothetical Situation 
Questions 
 
3.4.3.2 Certainty Calibration 
In addition to establishing an incentive-compatible experimental design prior to 
survey administration, there are several ex post calibration techniques to account for 
hypothetical bias.  These include the use of general calibration factors, certainty 
calibration, and frontier calibration.  In addition to the NOAA rule to divide by two, List 
and Gallet (2001) then Murphy et al. (2005) quantified calibration factors for both public 
and private goods using meta-analysis of several SP studies.  Certainty calibration has 
been used extensively in CV experiments.  In addition to the choice question, respondents 
are also asked, either qualitatively or using a certainty scale, about their level of certainty 
regarding their choice.  Norwood (2005) reported that when a scale of 1 to 10 (where 10 
means “very certain”) was used and the “yes” response of all individual who reported 
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certainty less than 8 were re-coded as “no” responses, the hypothetical bias disappeared.  
Certainty scales are preferable to qualitative questions or categorical lists because 
researchers can use the numerical scales to define uncertain responses and calibrate 
results.  Frontier calibration has been used address bias in hypothetical auction data.  
Frontier calibration assumes that individuals with similar deomgraphics will submit 
similar bids in an auction; any differences in bids among individuals in the same 
demographic are due to the hypothetical nature of the auction.  Thus, the true bid amount 
is the lowest hypothetical bid for each demographic group (Norwood, 2005). 
In the trucking permitting questionnaire, respondents were asked follow-up 
certainty scale questions regarding the choice they have made using the five-level Likert-
type scale shown in Figure 3.3.  In addition to a numerical scale, each possible response 
included a qualitative description of the level of certainty/uncertainty.  The qualitative 
information may have aided respondents while the quantitative responses provided 
flexibility in subsequent analysis.  Respondents were asked a certainty scale question 




Figure 3.3 Example of Certainty Scale Question Posed Subsequent to Question on Future 
Investment 
 
3.4.4 Online Survey Instruments 
Two surveys were administered online using Qualtrics, a web-based survey 
software licensed at Purdue University.  The first survey, developed specifically for the 
HEA-1481 study, is outlined in Appendix C.  Representatives from the Indiana Motor 
Truck Association (IMTA), the Agribusiness Council of Indiana (ACI), INDOT, and 
INDOR facilitated with the development of the survey questions and advertisement of the 
survey to potential respondents.  Links to the online survey instrument were provided on 
various INDOT and INDOR websites related to oversize/overweight vehicles. 
In the first survey, respondents were initially asked several questions about their 
company and operations including descriptions of their truck fleet, company location, 
number of employees, type of goods hauled, average trip distances, total annual tonnage 
shipped, and past and current permit purchases.  The company and operations 
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information questions could be answered by all respondents.  Next, the cheap talk script 
introduced the hypothetical scenario questions.  Only respondents who carried metal or 
agricultural commodities were asked additional SP questions.  Several hypothetical 
permit fee questions addressed each respondent’s intent to purchase permits on a 
quarterly or annual basis, willingness to invest in infrastructure-friendly vehicles 
(consistent with the annual, multi-trip permits established in the Emergency Rules), and 
an alternative scheme for blocks of ESAL-mile permits to determine a self-reported value 
for each ESAL-mile of travel. 
A follow-up survey was developed to encourage additional participation.  The 
questions included in the follow-up survey are detailed in Appendix D.  To reduce the 
amount of time necessary for participants to complete the survey, questions related to 
past and current permit use were eliminated because they were not relevant to the 
willingness to pay analysis.  Survey respondents who took the follow-up survey were 
presented with select demographic and operational questions and SP questions.  The texts 
of questions in the follow-up, including descriptions of hypothetical scenarios, were not 
altered from the original survey.  For both versions of the survey, all SP questions were 
followed by certainty scale questions. 
Responses for the original HEA-1481 survey were accepted via the online survey 
system between May 21 and June 17, 2014.  The original survey and the follow-up 
version of the survey were re-opened and opened, respectively, via Qualtrics beginning 
August 11, 2014.  Additional responses were accepted through September 5, 2014.  
During the initial period, 64 participants answered some or all of the questions posed.  
During the second response period, 12 more participants answered some or all of the 
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questions in the original survey while 8 respondents answered some or all of the 
questions in the follow-up survey.  The total number of respondents was 84.  Responses 
that were not complete (for either version of the survey) were not entirely rejected due to 
limited sample size.  In the following discussion of the survey findings, the number of 
responses for each individual question is indicated where appropriate. 
 
3.4.5 Demographic and Operational Characteristics of Respondents 
Table 3.1 outlines the demographic and operational characteristics of the 
respondents’ companies.  Survey participants were asked to describe their fleet in terms 
of both the number of vehicles and the average age of the vehicles.  The results indicate 
that the most common vehicle, by far, is the five-axle single-trailer truck.  There is a large 
range in the fleet size of the individual participating companies.  The overall vehicle age 
range is from brand new (0 years) to 25 years old.  Different vehicle types have different 
age ranges.  The number of employees was used as a second measure of company size.  
Nearly all of the respondents employ a majority of full-time employees with relatively 
few part-time employees.  Again, there was a large range in the responses of individual 
participating companies. 
Table 3.1 also includes approximations of the annual weight of goods transported 
and distances traveled.  In the original survey, the average distances were not asked 
directly but were derived using the average distances traveled for each type of good and 





Table 3.1 Trucking Company Demographics and Operational Characteristics 
Variable Average Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
No. of 
Responses 
Fleet size characteristics 
Number of single-trailer 
trucks with five axles 
88.83 283.45 0 2249 84
Number of single-trailer 
trucks with size or more axles 
7.75 18.89 0 90 84
Number of multi-trailer trucks 
with five or fewer axles 
2.13 10.93 0 92 84
Number of multi-trailer trucks 
with six axles 
2.65 12.25 0 90 84
Number of multi-trailer trucks 
with seven axles 
1.43 5.38 0 34 84
Number of multi-trailer trucks 
with eight axles 
1.04 4.57 0 38 84
Number of multi-trailer trucks 
with nine or more axles 
2.45 12.40 0 100 84
Total number of vehicles 106.29 315.20 0 2525 84
Fleet age characteristics 
Average age of single-trailer 
trucks with five axles 
8.94 4.64 1.5 25 71
Average age of single-trailer 
trucks with six or more axles 
6.15 4.13 0 15 30
Average age of multi-trailer 
trucks with five or fewer axles 
7.22 7.52 0 20 18
Average age of multi-trailer 
trucks with six axles 
2.40 3.29 0 10 15
Average age of multi-trailer 
trucks with seven axles 
3.25 3.57 0 10 16
Average age of multi-trailer 
trucks with eight axles 
4.15 4.45 0 12 13
Average age of multi-trailer 
trucks with nine or more axles 
2.64 3.37 0 8 14
Employment characteristics 
Number of full-time 
employees 
107.92 181.40 0 1200 83
Number of part-time 
employees 
15.60 29.73 0 150 65
Total number of employees 133.40 212.02 0 1210 65
Operational characteristics 
Approximate annual pounds 
of goods moved (in billions) 
6.31 34.2 0 250.0 75
Approximate annual miles 
traveled (in millions) 




Figure 3.4 presents the number of years after purchase at which companies replace 
their vehicles.  The results indicate that nearly three-quarters of companies replace 
vehicles within 10 years.  Another significant fraction replaces their vehicles between 10 
and 15 years while a very small proportion of respondents do so after 15 years or more.  
The typical vehicle replacement age is an important consideration for carriers altering 
their fleet to changes in TS&W limits and oversize/overweight regulations.  Carriers are 
likely to make adjustments at times that are concurrent with their cycles for fleet 
maintenance and replacement. 
 














3.4.6 Willingness to Pay Model Estimation 
The remaining questions on the survey solicited information about industry 
stakeholders’ preferences regarding overweight divisible load permits and their likely 
actions in hypothetical situations.  Figure 3.5 indicates that approximately 40% of 
respondents were interested in some form of annual ESAL-mile based overweight 
divisible load permits, while 31% were not sure and 24% would not want an annual 
permit tied to tax filings.  Four respondents did not indicate a preference.  The low 
number of “yes” responses is inconsistent with repeated comments expressed by 
representatives of the trucking industry at various industry forums advocating for annual 
permits.  The large portion of “Don’t Know” answers could be due to the suggested 
framework of tying an annual system to tax filings for mileage reporting purposes. 
The concept of annual permits tied to tax filings was brought forward as a survey 
question following feedback that the waiting time between permit requests and permit 
approval or acquisition is burdensome for the industry, particularly for companies who 
repeatedly purchase single-trip permits.  Annual permits tied to tax filings reduce the time 
and labor necessary for companies requesting multiple permits for the same vehicle and 
route.  Similarly, INDOR might also have time and labor savings in approval efforts for 




Figure 3.5 Responses to the Question, "Would you be willing to purchase an ESAL-based 
annual permit for overweight divisible loads that is tied to your quarterly tax filings (for 
reporting mileage)?" 
 
Prior to the cheap talk script and hypothetical scenarios, all respondents were asked 
if they would consider changing their fleet to take advantage of permits for overweight 
divisible loads without any indication of cost.  Figure 3.6 indicates that 71% of 
respondents would be willing to invest at least some amount of money in vehicles 
necessary to use overweight divisible load permits.  One respondent did not indicate a 
response and four were not sure if they would invest or not.  When presented with 
hypothetical scenarios involving dollar amounts, the respondents exhibited reduced 












Figure 3.6 Responses to the question, "If divisible load permits were available for your 
industry, would you consider investing in new equipment or altering your existing 
equipment to take advantage of these permits?" 
 
The willingness to pay hypothetical scenario of interest was framed as follows: 
“Suppose INDOT plans to offer annual overweight divisible load permits free of 
any ESAL-mile based fee for those vehicles which do not cause additional 
damage to pavements and bridges beyond that of 80,000-lb. vehicles (which do 
not require permits).  INDOT would charge an annual administrative fee of 
$20.00 per vehicle per route to verify the ESAL-equivalent of the vehicle, address 











purchase, retrofit, or otherwise own vehicles that could be configured and loaded 
to 2.4 ESALs or below.” 
In actuality, this scenario is consistent with the annual, multi-trip permits created in 
the Emergency Rules and available since February 1, 2014.  The CV question and 
certainty scale question followed the scenario development.  Based on conversations with 
industry representatives, three investment amounts were selected:  $5,000, $10,000, and 
$15,000.  Each participant was presented with a randomly-assigned amount. 
Participants who took the full HEA-1481 survey were presented with a number of 
follow-up questions including the certainty scale (the first follow-up question).  
Participants who took the later version of the survey were only asked the certainty scale 
follow-up question. 
As previously mentioned, Norwood (2005) determined that recoding the “yes” 
responses to “no” for all individuals who indicated a certainty of less than 8 on a 1 to 10 
scale eliminated hypothetical bias in estimation results.  Similarly, for the present 
research, all individuals who responded “yes,” indicating they are willing to invest the 
specified amount and less than “4 certain” on the certainty scale question were re-coded 
“no,” they are not willing to invest.  The actual and certainty calibrated responses are 
outlined in Table 3.2.  There were 80 participants who responded to the CV question.  
The actual and calibrated responses suggest that when a monetary amount is included and 
respondents are encouraged to think about their actual operations, their willingness to 
invest in new equipment or alter existing equipment was much less than indicated for the 
open-ended question that did not include a dollar amount.  In contrast to the 71% that 
indicated in the open-ended question that they would invest in equipment, only 32.5% 
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indicated they would do so when a monetary amount was associated with the investment.  
Even at the lowest level of investment included in the CV question, $5,000, less than half 
of respondents indicated “yes,” they would invest. 
Table 3.2 Raw and Calibrated Responses to WTP for Investment Question 
Investment 
Amount 
Actual Responses Calibrated Responses 
Yes No % Invest* Yes No % Invest* 
$5,000 17 20 45.9% 14 23 37.8% 
$10,000 7 17 29.2% 2 22 8.3% 
$15,000 2 17 10.5% 1 18 5.3% 
Total 26 54 32.5% 17 63 21.3% 
*% Invest means the percentage of respondents who were willing to invest in infrastructure-
friendly vehicles 
 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the selected logit estimation of WTP for 
investment in new equipment or alterations for existing equipment among truck carriers.  
The binary logit model was used because respondents were only able to respond “yes” or 
“no”.  The underlying assumption of the binary logit estimation is that the outcome 
(choice) is a linear function of independent variables.  The model results suggest that, in 
addition to the dollar amount of investment, the number of vehicles in the existing fleet 
and the respondent’s interest in annual permits tied to quarterly tax filings are significant 
predictors of their willingness to make such investments.  As expected, the parameter 
estimate for investment amount has a negative sign.  As the amount of investment 
increases, the company is less likely to be willing to invest.  The positive sign for the 
parameter estimate for the number of vehicles indicates that those with larger fleets are 
more inclined to invest in equipment that meets the requirements for the annual, multi-
trip permits.  This result is also consistent with expectations because larger companies, 
using fleet size as a proxy measure, are more willing and/or able to invest in equipment 
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for a particular application—in this case using the annual, multi-trip permits.  Smaller 
companies are likely unable to make investments for a niche market.  The last of the 
statistically significant predictors of WTP for investment is the willingness to use annual 
permits tied to tax filings.  The positive sign of the variable suggests that those 
respondents who are interested in annual permits are also more likely to invest in 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles.  This likely occurs because the trucking companies that 
advocate for annual permits do relatively large amounts of overweight freight movement; 
these companies are likely to benefit the most from annual permits in general and less 
expensive multi-trip permits specifically. 
Table 3.3 Logit Estimation Results for WTP for Investment in Infrastructure-Friendly 
Vehicles 
Variable Description Estimated 
Parameter 
t statistic 
Investment in dollars -0.000495 -4.33 
Number of vehicles in fleet 0.00799 3.17 
Annual permits indicator (1 if willing to purchase annual 
permits tied to quarterly tax filings, 0 otherwise) 2.539 3.31 
Number of observations 80 
Log-likelihood -23.084 
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.442 
 
Model fit statistics indicate that the logit model is satisfactory.  The log-likelihood 
of the estimated model indicates the model’s improvement over a naïve model with only 
a constant term.  The higher the log-likelihood (or less negative), the better the model 
accounts for heterogeneity in the sample.  McFadden’s pseudo R2 is another goodness-of-
fit measure that indicates the model accounts for a portion of the heterogeneity.  The 
significance of variables, log-likelihood, and pseudo R2 were used to select the model 
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presented in Table 3.3 over other estimated models.  Other variables such as the average 
age of vehicle replacement, amount of goods transported annually, and average distances 
were not found to be statistically significant predictors of willingness to pay for 
investment. 
Figure 3.7 presents the WTP curves for the uncorrected raw data, the certainty 
calibrated data, and the estimated average WTP curve.  The difference between the 
uncorrected data and the certainty calibrated data reflects the hypothetical bias.  The 
calibrated data indicate that the WTP to invest is lower after the hypothetical bias is 
accounted for.  The estimated average WTP curve represents companies with an average 
number of vehicles (approximately 107) and an average value for interest in annual 
ESAL-based permits tied to quarterly tax filings (0.425).  In actuality, companies will 
either be in favor or not in favor of annual ESAL-based permits tied to quarterly tax 




Figure 3.7 WTP Curves for Investment in Infrastructure-Friendly Vehicles 
 
For any given company, the estimated likelihood of the respondent’s willingness to 
pay for investment changes based on the number of vehicles in their fleet and whether or 
not they are in favor of ESAL-mile based annual permits tied to their tax filings.  Figure 
3.8 presents the change in the WTP curves when indicator values of 0 (not in favor) and 1 
(in favor) are used instead of the mean value 0.425 for whether respondents are in favor 












































Figure 3.8 WTP Curves for Different Annual Permit Preferences 
 
None of the WTP curves (Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8) indicate that 100% of carriers 
would opt to invest even if the cost of investment were dropped to zero (y-axis in the 
figures).  Although this might not seem intuitive, this is consistent with previous CV 
studies; even at no cost, some individuals are not willing to change current practices 
because they find current practices acceptable.  In the open-ended question without a 
dollar amount, this type of behavior is captured by some respondents who answered “no” 








































3.4.7 Parametric Results 
The results of the logit regression model were also used to estimate the mean WTP 
using the following equation: 
ܯ݁ܽ݊	ܹܶܲ ൌ െߚ஼ߚଵ  
where ߚଵ is the estimated coefficient for the investment amount variable and ߚ஼  is the 
grand constant calculated as the sum of the products of each estimated coefficient and 
their respective means. 
The mean WTP for investment in infrastructure-friendly vehicles is estimated to be 
$3,907.72 for each company.  This is lower than $5,000, the lowest randomly-selected 
investment amount included in the questionnaire.  This result corroborates the 
observation that a very low percentage of respondents (regardless of uncorrected data or 
certainty calibrated data) stated they are willing to invest in equipment that would ensure 
loading of 2.40 ESALs or less. 
 
3.5 Additional Incentive Program Structures 
Indiana’s annual, multi-trip permits embody an incentive structure where the 
reward for using infrastructure-friendly vehicles is lower costs for permit acquisition.  
The annual, multi-trip permits are significantly less expensive at $20 annually compared 
to the tens of thousands that might be spent on single-trip permits for vehicles above 2.40 
ESALs.  Michigan’s TS&W limits embody an incentive structure where the reward for 
using infrastructure-friendly vehicles is an increase in GVW.  Other mechanisms besides 
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those used in Indiana and Michigan can be used to incentivize the use of infrastructure-
friendly vehicles. 
The TRB (1990b) Turner proposal study considered one mechanism—special tax 
treatment.  The research committee acknowledged that the taxes paid to own and operate 
Turner trucks might exceed those for a 5-axle, 80,000 lb vehicle.  The increased taxes 
could come from the sales tax associated with a higher purchase price and the additional 
fuel taxes associated with a decrease in fuel economy.  TRB (1990b) determined that if 
the Turner proposal were implemented, individual states would need to adjust tax fee 
structures as appropriate to incentivize the use of vehicles that benefit both the trucking 
industry and the state agency that maintains the infrastructure. 
Another mechanism to incentivize ideal behavior is the use of rebates or bonuses.  
The estimated mean WTP for investment in infrastructure-friendly vehicles in Indiana is 
likely much less than the actual expenditures necessary to obtain infrastructure-friendly 
vehicles (either new or through retrofits).  Rebates could be returned to carriers based on 
the number of infrastructure-friendly vehicles they purchase.  Similarly, bonuses could be 
provided for carriers who can demonstrate that they replaced a number of trips by 
vehicles over 2.40 ESALs with trips by vehicles loaded at or below 2.40 ESALs, 
although this likely would be more difficult to verify. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from incentives, penalties can be used to 
discourage the use of non-infrastructure-friendly vehicles.  Inherent in Indiana’s 
overweight commodity permits for vehicles above 2.40 ESALs are the time and labor 
penalties associated with requesting multiple single trip permits.  The acquisition time 
can jeopardize just-in-time delivery requests.  Additionally, trucking companies must pay 
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an employee for the time to repeatedly request permits.  Harsher penalties, in terms of the 
approval time or permit price, for vehicles over 2.40 ESALs may encourage carriers to 
invest more money in infrastructure-friendly vehicles. 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter detailed the use of incentives and mandates for use of infrastructure-
friendly vehicles.  Infrastructure-friendly vehicles are configured, loaded, and operated in 
a way to minimize, or at a minimum reduce, the consumption of highway infrastructure 
assets. 
Three examples of proposed and existing initiatives to encourage the use of 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles were described.  The Turner proposal, which was to 
decrease the federal axle load limits and increase the federal vehicle length limits, would 
cause less damage to pavements and would have higher GVWs resulting in productivity 
gains for the trucking industry.  Michigan’s unique set of TS&W limits are based on a 
similar philosophy of limiting individual axle weights.  Unlike an incentive program, 
Michigan’s TS&W limits require carriers to comply with lower axle weight limits to take 
advantage of higher GVWs.  Indiana recently introduced annual, multi-trip overweight 
commodity permits for metal and agricultural carriers who load their vehicles to 2.40 
ESALs or less.  Indiana’s program is a perfect example of an incentive program because 
individual carriers can choose to use infrastructure-friendly vehicles for a minimal permit 




A stated preference survey was conducted to determine carriers’ willingness to pay 
for investments in infrastructure-friendly vehicles for use in Indiana.  Although the 
majority (71%) of respondents indicated they would invest in equipment to take 
advantage of divisible load permits, when a monetary value was associated with 
investment, respondents were less willing to invest (32.5% willing to invest).  The mean 
willingness to pay for investment in infrastructure-friendly vehicles was estimated to be 
slightly less than $4,000.  Future research is necessary to determine if carriers’ 
willingness to pay changes after the incentives have been in place for a longer period of 
time.  Finally, the chapter discussed other initiatives to encourage the use of 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles for overweight movements, including rebates, special tax 





CHAPTER 4. OVERWEIGHT VEHICLE QUOTAS WITH AUCTION ALLOCATION 
4.1 Introduction 
Traditional overweight vehicle permits, even when optimized, and incentives for 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles address the issue of excessive pavement and bridge 
consumption from overweight vehicles by collecting revenues to offset some or all of the 
damage that occurs, independent of the total amount of that consumption.  Neither of 
these strategies limits the total amount of consumption—as long as carriers pay 
appropriate fees and operate within the regulations, there is no upper limit on the amount 
of overweight vehicle trips that may be permitted.  Quotas on the other hand directly limit 
the amount of allowable consumption from overweight vehicles. 
Manheim (1979) defined the total transportation system to include all modes of 
transportation, the people and goods being transported, the vehicles used, and the 
networks over which people and goods flow.  In focusing this total transportation system 
definition to the context of overweight vehicles, the overweight vehicle system includes 
the goods being carried, the various vehicle configurations used to move those goods, and 
the highway infrastructure the vehicles traverse.  The overweight vehicle system is a 
subset of the total transportation system because the highway infrastructure is shared by 
both overweight vehicles, non-overweight trucks, and passenger vehicles.  Another way 
to consider the total transportation system is supply.  Specifically, the total transportation 
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system components of infrastructure and vehicles using the infrastructure supply the 
ability to move the people and goods—collectively, the demand. 
Manheim (1979) also observed that the total transportation system can be varied 
through technological improvements, changes to the network, vehicle improvements, and 
policy changes.  Incentives for infrastructure-friendly vehicles exemplify the type of 
vehicle improvements that alter the overweight vehicle system.  The infrastructure can 
accommodate more trips by infrastructure-friendly overweight vehicles than non-
infrastructure-friendly overweight vehicles that consume additional highway 
infrastructure assets. 
Traditional overweight vehicle permit fees are a policy option, but also, ideally, the 
revenues collected through permit fees are used for improvements to the network via 
routine maintenance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of highway infrastructure assets.  
Unfortunately, the revenues collected from permit fees are typically insufficient to 
account for consumption of the infrastructure assets.  Without intervention, the network 
of highway infrastructure deteriorates, which results in less available supply. 
Quotas are another policy option that approaches the overweight vehicle system 
from the other direction.  Instead of modifying supply through vehicle improvements or 
improvements to infrastructure, quotas account for the total amount of damage that can 
be tolerated by the existing highway infrastructure given the available vehicle 
configurations and do not let that amount be exceeded.  Although overweight vehicles 
improve the productivity of the trucking industry, the existing infrastructure was not 
designed for these loads.  Quotas are a way to manage the infrastructure damage. 
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To date, quotas have been used in transportation primarily to mitigate congestion 
by limiting the demand for travel that is supplied.  In the context of overweight vehicles, 
a quota mechanism would also manage the amount of demand for overweight vehicle 
trips that is being supplied; however, the goal is not to limit demand specifically but to 
limit highway asset consumption. 
In quota mechanisms, the agency defines the supply as either a minimum or a 
maximum and does not allow usage to fall below the minimum or exceed the maximum, 
as appropriate.  For the proposed overweight vehicle quota, the supply is the amount of 
infrastructure consumption attributable to overweight vehicles which can be tolerated.  
Quotas also require the decision maker to allocate the limited supply.  Allocation 
techniques include first-come-first-serve, lotteries, cap-and-trade, merit-based, and 
auctions. 
 
4.1.1 Quota Allocation in the Road Use Sector 
As noted, quotas in the road transportation sector have premoninantly been used as 
a transportation demand management tool; however, there are lessons to be learned from 
the allocation methods used in these real-world quota examples. 
Driving restrictions in Mexico city limit use of personal vehicles to specific days 
based on an individual’s license plate.  This is an egalitarian system because license 
plates are randomly-assigned.  One negative consequence of the license plate restrictions 
in Mexico City is that the system indirectly encourages slightly increased vehicle 
ownership, as opposed to use, for individuals to have access to enough vehicles to travel 
on any given day. 
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Quotas in Asia have used both egalitarian lottery systems and auctions to allocate 
limited supply.  Singapore first introduced its vehicle quota system (VQS) in May 1990 
when it became apparent that large increases in import duty, vehicle registration, gasoline 
tax, and road use tax, combined with a cordon for travel into the city center, were 
ineffective at limiting demand (Chu, 2012; Phang, 1993).  Although there have been 
numerous small changes to the system since May 1990, the VQS has always issued 
certificates of entitlement (COEs) allowing the individual holder to own and operate a 
vehicle for ten years through an auction.  The road transport agency determines the quota 
as the number of vehicles that will be deregistered, (i.e., taken off the roadway network 
and exported or scrapped) plus an allowance for growth rate.  Successful high bidders 
pay the market clearing price which is equal to one Singapore dollar more than the 
highest unsuccessful COE bid price.  When several individuals enter the same reserve 
price, it is possible to have fewer successful bidders than the quota.  These “extra” 
unclaimed COEs are rolled into the following month’s quota. 
Although some of the COE categories have been combined, separate groups of 
COEs for smaller cars, larger cars, and motorcycles have always been used as an effort to 
protect owners of small vehicles and motorcycles from being outbid by the “richer” 
owners of larger cars (Phang, 1993; Chu, 2012).  Similar efforts may be necessary for 
application to overweight vehicle permits to protect smaller companies that might not be 
able to afford permits via an auction. 
The city of Shanghai also implemented a quota system using auction allocation for 
private car license plates (PCLPs).  In 2008, the auction system was changed from single 
sealed bids to a two-round open auction system in which bid revisions can occur during 
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the second round within a small range above and below the prevailing price (Song & 
Zhou, 2010; Chu, 2012).  Unlike the Singapore system, in the Shanghai PCLP auction, 
successful bidders pay their bid amount.  Chu (2012) found that the constraint on bid 
revision amounts helped mitigate the “winner’s curse” phenomenon, or the idea that the 
winners who pay the most are worse off because they paid more than other winners who 
paid only slightly more than the prevailing price.  Essentially, the bid revision constraint 
prevents bids from continuing to escalate so that all winners remain within a narrow price 
band. 
Additionally, throughout its history, the Shanghai governent has used minimum 
bids for foreign and domestic cars to achieve various policy objectives (Song & Zhou, 
2010).  Minimum bid prices may be useful in the context of auctioning overweight 
vehicle permits to ensure a minimal amount of revenue is collected to offset the cost of 
consumption, particularly if the number of participants is low. 
In contrast to Shanghai, Beijing uses an egalitarian lottery system to allocate its 
quota of license plates. The consequence of a lottery system is inefficient collection of 
funds from the sale of license plates.  In Shanghai, the license plates are purchased by the 
individuals who most value the PCLP.  This generates the greatest funds for the 
transportation agency. 
 
4.1.2 Auction Allocation for Non-Road Use Transportation 
Beyond the realm of road use, auctions have also been used to allocate other 
limited transportation resources.  Both pipe lines and rail lines are used to transport goods 
over long distances.  Unlike the previous road use quota examples, pipe and rail transport 
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is physically constrained by pipe capacities and rail car volumes.  Pickl and Wirl (2011) 
explored different allocation strategies for auctioning the rent on the capacity of the 
Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project in western Europe.  The authors considered allocating 
similar to a traditional auction where the highest bidders win, allocating capacity to each 
bidder until there was not enouch capacity for the next ranked bid.  Unfortunately, this 
type of sequential allocation can result in unused capacity of the pipeline.  As alternatives, 
Pickl and Wirl (2011) evaluated the likely allocation using both a pro rata system and 
optimization.  Under the pro rata system, every bidder gets a portion of the total pipeline 
capacity relative to their bid compared to all other bids.  For the optimization approach, 
the objective was to maximize the total revenue for the auctioneer. 
Auctions have also been explored for allocating rail resources.  Affuso (2003) 
detailed some of the advantages and disadvantages of auction allocation for rail capacity.  
One large disadvantage is the extremely high capital costs of creating rail capacity.  
Affuso (2003) determined the revenues from the auctions would be small compared to 
the capital costs necessary for investment.  The advantages of auction allocation include 
clear indications of locations of scarce rail resources (where there are the highest auction 
prices) and information about the actual market value of rail capacity, which is different 
than the cost of constructing the rail infrastructure.  Research is currently underway on 
auction allocation strategies for shared rail infrastructure in the California High Speed 
Rail (HSR) and Northeast rail corridors in the United States (Levy et al., 2014).  One 
unique aspect of rail capacity auctions is that the value an individual places on using one 
link or terminal at a designated time is directly linked to the ability to use another link or 
terminal at a different designated time.  This results in combinatorial auctions where bid 
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prices are likely contingent on getting portions or all of the capacity for which an 
individual is bidding. 
 
4.1.3 Cap and Trade Initiatives in the Transportation Sector 
In addition to auctions, cap and trade mechanisms have been explored as a 
transportation demand management tool to curb traffic congestion.  Yang and Wang 
(2011) created a hypothetical tradable mobility credit scheme in which the government 
initially distributes a given amount of travel credits to all users.  Users can buy or sell 
additional credits to meet their individual travel needs among themselves in a competitive 
market.  The authors found that selection of the total number of travel credits in the 
system could be used to achieve optimal traffic flows.  Markose et al. (2010) 
demonstrated similar results on an existing transportation system using the transportation 
demand model of the Gateshead borough roadway network in North East England.  The 
authors observed that a cap and trade scheme provided an incentive to all individuals, 
including those who were priced out of the system, to change travel patterns.  In the cap 
and trade scheme, those who cannot afford the price of using credits can sell their credits 
in the trading market for additional income.  Markose et al.’s (2010) tradable credit 
scheme employed a sealed-bid uniform Dutch auction for the initial allocation of credits.  
In a sealed-bid uniform Dutch auction, the bids are collected secretly and the credits are 
allocated sequentially to the highest bids at the price the participants bid.  The cap and 
trade scheme has not been explicitly applied to the right for vehicle ownership (like the 
auctions in Singapore, Shanghai, and Beijing), but rather only the extent of usage of a 
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system.  The mobilitiy credits in these schemes are typically tied to the cost of using an 
individual link in the system, similar to a toll. 
 
4.2 Framework 
A overweight vehicle permit quota using an auction allocation process, similar to 
the Singapore VQS, can be applied to cap highway asset deterioration attributable to 
overweight vehicles.  Instead of issuing COEs for car ownership, the overweight vehicle 
permit auctioneer issues blocks of usage to auction winners.  This will limit the extent of 
infrastructure consumption. 
Barter (2005) proposed a similar usage based scheme to replace the Singapore VQS.  
In contrast to flat fees, via registration and licensing or purchasing COEs in the case of 
Singapore, usage charges are much closer to the ideal Pigouvian pricing that accounts for 
the marginal externalities.  Additionally, flat fees that are not associated with 
transportation infrastructure usage are inherently inequitable for those who use the assets 
less but must pay the same amount.  Barter (2005) noted that the high cost of COEs in 
Singapore undermines the existing road pricing system because the tolls and cordon 
charges were insignificant compared to the large cost of purchasing a COE.  As a remedy, 
a transition from COEs for ownership only to usage based COEs was proposed, which 
continue to entitle purchasers to own a vehicle, tied to an established amount of usage.  
Instead of a COE being held for a period of ten years, the COE would be valid until the 
usage was spent.  Therefore, instead of bidding for and buying a COE every ten years, 
continuous auto owners would bid for additional usage every time they were close to the 
allowance tied to their COE.  Those who use the infrastructure least would have the most 
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time between bidding events while though who use the infrastructure most would 
participate in the auctions more frequently. 
A usage scheme for the overweight vehicle permitting quota and auction is more 
appropriate than auctioning a number of blanket, or unlimited usage, permits as the 
measure of supply because it allows the agency to control consumption of the highway 
infrastructure.  The agency doesn’t necessarily want to curb the demand for overweight 
permits, only the consumption attributable to those types of operations.  For the present 
overweight vehicle permit auction framework, the transportation agency (or a third-party 
auctioneer acting on behalf of the transportation authority) defines the usage measure, 
determines auction parameters such as the quota, the minimum bid price (if necessary), 
and auction schedule, and determines permit parameters such as the amount of usage and 
the time limit for which a permit is valid.  Trucking companies and permit service 
providers then bid on the permits.  Auction winners receive the permits while those who 
are unsuccessful must comply with state and federal limits for vehicles without a permit. 
This mechanism would most likely be applicable only to overweight divisible loads 
which can be broken apart into multiple smaller loads; this is how those who do not 
obtain a permit in the auction would be required to move goods.  Carriers of non-divisible 
goods, which cannot be broken into smaller units to be below state and federal TS&W 
limits, would not be required to participate in the auction because they would not be able 
to move the load without a non-divisible overweight load permit. 
Auction allocation is more appropriate for overweight vehicle permitting than 
egalitarian lottery, first-come-first-served, or cap and trade systems.  In both egalitarian 
lotteries and first-come-first-served allocation, the permits are not put to their most 
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efficient use.  Some companies will value the overweight vehicle permits more than 
others.  The additional value, which is captured in an auction but not in a lottery, is 
additional revenue that the transportation agency would have available to invest in 
infrastructure maintenance.  In a cap and trade system the usage credits would likely end 
up in the hands of those who most value them through the trading market; however, this 
does not necessarily mean that the transportation agency would receive the revenue from 
the trading market.  Additionally, in a cap and trade system, the agency must identify all 
users.  In a general road use context, this is rather evident because all vehicles use the 
highway infrastructure.  Full user identification and allocation is not straightforward in 
the context of overweight vehicle permits because not all trucking companies use 
overweight vehicles and not all vehicles owned and operated by any given company are 
used for overweight operations.  In an auction, participants identify themselves by 
submitting a bid. 
 
4.3 Case Study: Divisible Load Permit Auction in Indiana 
In practice, the proposed quota and auction framework does not necessarily 
preclude other permitting strategies.  In particular, the incentives for infrastructure-
friendly vehicles can easily be implemented in tandem with the auction system.  If the 
same usage measure is applied in both contexts, ESAL-miles of travel in Indiana for 
example, those who are below a certain limit would be exempt from the auction while 
any company which decides to operate above the limit would have to participate in the 
auction.  Auction participants either pay for usage with a successful bid or operate within 
state and federal TS&W limits with an unsuccessful bid. 
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In the present case study, it is assumed that INDOT will continue to allow any 
users who configure their vehicles to 2.40 ESALs or below to obtain an annual, multi-trip 
permit for $20 for each vehicle and route.  For all other vehicles, those configured and 
loaded to more than 2.40 ESALs, the trucking companies would have to participate in an 
auction. 
For purposes of analysis, the usage measure will be defined as ESAL-mile blocks 
of travel.  ESALs are already used to determine who is eligible for annual, multi-trip 
permits and ESAL-miles include the distance component of consumption.  For a given 
ESAL-mile block, the trucking company is able to use fewer ESALs or travel fewer miles 
to maximize their own use of individual ESAL-mile blocks; that aspect of use is not 
controlled by the state agency. 
For the present study, each block corresponds to 500 ESAL-miles of travel.  
Although the agency could set each block to more or fewer ESAL-miles of travel, 500 
ESAL-miles is enough to cover several trips without being so much that carriers would 
not want to participate.  If the amount of travel included with each permit is too high, 
carriers may not want to bid for a block that they will not use entirely.  In contrast, if the 
amount of travel included is too low, carriers will bid for hundreds or even thousands of 
blocks. 
 
4.3.1 Cap on Infrastructure Consumption 
The fundamental necessity of an auction is whether there is something finite to be 
allocated.  In the case of overweight divisible load trucking, there is an increasing 
demand for using Indiana’s pavement and bridge assets with limited funds available to 
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maintain those assets. The enactment of HEA-1481 indicates that there is a demand 
which, prior to enactment, was not being met.  An auction scheme would allow INDOT 
to control the consumption attributable to overweight vehicles carrying divisible loads by 
setting a quota of permitted ESAL-mile blocks to be auctioned.  INDOT would also be 
able to increase the number of ESAL-blocks available in a given period based on the 
anticipated investment into the highway network. 
 
4.3.1.1 Determination of Quota 
There are many different methods for INDOT to determine the appropriate quota.  
First, INDOT may choose to calculate supply as the total ESAL-miles the pavements and 
bridges in Indiana can support minus the loading expected from passenger vehicles, 
trucks up to 80,000 lbs, and overweight non-divisible loads.  The total ESAL-miles of use 
that can be supported depends on the existing inventory and condition of pavement and 
bridge assets.  The deterioration curves for bridges and pavements are nonlinear; assets 
that are in worse condition deteriorate faster.  INDOT may determine supply based on the 
actual condition of assets or on the projected condition based on investment in the 
network. 
Alternatively, INDOT may determine the quota based on past or present budgets.  
Initially, INDOT might set the quota using historical maintenance, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction budgets.  INDOT might also base the quota on an estimate of projected 
revenues using either the minimum bid price or some estimate of the resulting 
equilibrium auction prices.  Another budget based option is for INDOT to set a floating 
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quota based on the revenues from the previous auction.  In each case, the funding 
supports a given amount of maintenance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction which 
maintains or improves the condition of the pavements and bridges.  As noted, pavements 
and bridges in better condition deteriorate at a slower pace and can withstand the stress 
and strains of overweight vehicles. 
Finally, INDOT might set the initial quota equal to the current demand, or just 
below to encourage a small amount of competition, then control demand growth in the 
future.  This is potentially the best option because initially the prices for overweight 
divisible load ESAL-mile blocks will be low, or close to the minimum bid, then rise as 
demand for overweight vehicle permits increases.  Initially, the revenues collected 
through the auction would be similar to the revenues from the current overweight 
commodity permits, particularly if the minimum bid is set equal to the current price of 
overweight commodity permits.  Over time, additional companies will become aware of 
the permits, realize the benefits of overweight vehicle operations, and seek to participate.  
The current overweight commodity permit system does not account for increasing 
awareness of the permits or increasing use of the permits.  A quota that is set on the basis 
of meeting current demand with controlled growth in the future would have two benefits.  
First, it would prevent exponential increases in the ESAL-miles of travel by overweight 
vehicles and the associated consumption of highway infrastructure.  Second, over time, it 
would result in higher permit bids in the auction which would result in higher revenues 




4.3.1.2 Initial Annual Supply in Indiana 
For this research, initial supply is estimated on the basis of existing demand for 
overweight commodity permits.  After determining the intitial quota for the first year, the 
annual quota can be updated each year based on a low growth rate between 1% and 3%. 
Permit records for 33,721 overweight commodity permits sold between January 1, 
2014 and June 29, 2014 were queried from the INDOR database.  These records contain 
the start date, mileage, individual axle weights, and axle spacing for each overweight 
commodity permit.  ESALs and ESAL-miles were calculated for each permit record 
using the algorithm defined in the INDOT Emergency Rules and used by INDOR in 
approving permit requests.  Table 4.1 outlines the total number of ESALs, the number of 
ESALs above 2.40, and the number of ESALs above 2.40 multiplied by the miles of 
travel, summed for all overweight commodity permits each month.  The increasing 
number of ESAL-miles (above 2.40 ESALs) each month correspond to more activity in 
the summer months compared to winter months of January and February. 
Table 4.1 ESALs and ESAL-miles of travel for Overweight Commodity Permits, January 
to June 2014 
Month Total ESALs ESALs Above 2.40 ESAL-miles (above 2.40 ESALs) 
January 38,624 25,968 3,529,437
February 37,290 26,164 3,803,633
March 42,816 28,947 4,110,938
April 45,815 31,354 4,437,441
May 44,713 30,436 4,321,203
June 46,564 32,196 4,452,933
Total 255,822 175,065 24,655,586
 
Based on the total number of ESAL-miles in the first six months of 2014, shown in 
Table 4.1, a suggested initial quota is 48,000,000 total ESAL-miles which is equal to 
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96,000 blocks of 500 ESAL-miles each.  In Chapter 2, an initial annual demand of 
35,000,000 ESAL-miles was used to perform the multiobjective optimization.  This is 
much lower than the actual demand seen in the overweight commodity permits obtained 
in 2014—approximately 24,000,000 ESAL-miles in the first six months alone.  However, 
in the multiobjective optimization, the initial demand did not include the demand that 
would result from increased total logistics cost savings.  The initial supply set by INDOT 
for the auction mechanism should not equal the initial demand used in the multiobjective 
optimization because many companies will be attracted to the permits by the additional 
cost savings that can be achieved by operating overweight vehicles.   
 
4.3.1.3 Auction Parameters: Frequency and Minimum Bid Price 
INDOT also must set the other auction parameters.  For demonstration purposes, it 
is assumed INDOT will hold auctions once each month.  Therefore, the total annual quota 
is achieved by auctioning 8,000 blocks each month.  If in a given month, all of the 8,000 
blocks are not allocated during the auction, the remainder roll over to the following 
month.  The initial minimum bid price can be set at $35 per block, which is equal to the 
product of $0.07 per ESAL-mile (the HEA-1481 fee) and  500 ESAL-miles (the block 
size).  Initially, INDOT can expect to collect a total revenue corresponding to the 
minimum bid on each block, or $3.36 million; over time, however, the expected increase 
in demand for overweight vehicle permits will result in increasing revenue per block.  
The quota ensures that the increase in demand does not also result in huge increases in 
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consumption.  Instead controlled increases in allowable consumption are offset by 
auction revenues. 
As previously discussed, INDOT can continue to offer multi-trip annual permits for 
individuals who configure and load their vehicles to 2.40 ESALs or less.  Table 4.2 
presents the number and percentage of overweight commodity permits that were eligible 
for annual, multi-trip permits between January and June 2014.  The percentage of permits 
for vehicles configured and loaded to 2.40 ESALs or fewer is very small, less than 3% in 
all months and typically hovering around 2%.  As a result, most trucking companies who 
wish to transport overweight divisible loads would be required to participate in the 
auction.  Over time, the auction and incentives are expected to collectively encourage 
adoption of infrastructure-friendly vehicles at a faster rate compared to the incentives 
alone. 
Table 4.2 Overweight Commodity Permits for Vehicles at or Below 2.40 ESALs 
Month Permits under 2.40 ESALs Total Number of Permits % Multi-trip
January 55 5,283 1.04%
February 94 4,648 2.02%
March 108 5,791 1.86%
April 74 6,033 1.23%
May 158 5,967 2.65%
June 128 5,999 2.13%
Total 617 33,721 1.83%
 
 
4.3.2 Carriers’ Utility of Operating Overweight 
The original HEA-1481 survey and the follow-up survey contained questions 
aimed at eliciting the value individual carriers place on ESAL-miles of travel.  This 
information is important because the permit price depends on the amount that carriers 
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will bid in the overweight permit auction, which depends on their valuation of acquiring 
permits to operate overweight.  Each carrier’s valuation is a measure of how much utility 
each will derive from using overweight vehicles compared to non-overweight vehicles. 
The self-reported valuation questions were set up similar to the auction framework 
but did not specifically mention an auction mechanism (to prevent bias from carriers). 
The hypothetical auction scenario was phrased as follows: 
“Suppose INDOT plans to offer permits for a limited number of blocks of 500 
ESAL-miles for carrying overweight divisible loads over 2.4 ESAL.  Your 
company could use the block(s) you purchase in any combination so that the total 
number of ESAL-miles used does not exceed the number of blocks multiplied by 
500 ESAL-miles—for example, you could choose to lower the ESAL-value of 
your vehicles or travel fewer miles as appropriate to maximize your use of the 
purchased block(s).  The first 2.4 ESAL for any vehicle is not counted toward 
using your block.” 
The scenario outlines the salient points of the auction for eliciting bid-type 
responses:  the limited number of blocks, the 500 ESAL-miles of usage associated with 
each block, and the 2.40 ESAL mile credit for all vehicles. 
Following the scenario description, survey participants were asked to estimate the 
total number of 500 ESAL-mile blocks their company would be likely to request and the 
total amount of money their company would be likely to pay for those blocks.  As with 
the willingness to pay analysis, participants were also asked to indicate their certainty (for 
both the number of blocks and the total amount of money) using a scale from 1-very 
uncertain to 5-very certain (similar to the question in Figure 3.3).  The number of blocks, 
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multiplied by 500 ESAL-miles, and the total amount were used to estimate a self-reported 
value in $/ESAL-mile that each respondent placed on overweight vehicle permits. 
 
4.3.2.1 Value per ESAL-mile of Travel 
Figure 4.1 depicts a histogram of the $/ESAL-mile from all 31 participants who 
included both a number of blocks and an amount of money for those blocks.  Over half of 
the self-reported values were between $0.00 and $0.02 per ESAL-mile.  Of those, nine 
bids were less than or equal to the current $0.07 per ESAL-mile charged for overweight 
commodity permits. 
 

























4.3.2.2 Certainty of Self-reported Values 
Table 4.3 outlines the descriptive statistics of the corrected and certainty calibrated 
responses to the two auction scenario questions.  Similar to the willingness to pay 
analysis, individuals who indicated less than “4 certain” on the certainty scale question 
were assumed to present hypothetical bias.  Instead of recoding these data, as was done 
with the willingness to pay analysis, these observations were removed from the valuation 
analysis to estimate calibrated values. 
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Auction Scenario Questions 
Variable Average Std. Dev. Min. Max. No. of Responses 
Uncorrected 
How many 500 ESAL-
mile blocks would you 
purchase? 
317.81 1218.12 0 8600 59
How much are you 
willing to pay for these 
blocks? 
$8,507.75 $24,709.80 $0.00 $156,000.00  52
Certainty calibrated 
How many 500 ESAL-
mile blocks would you 
purchase? 
356.96 811.87 0 3120 22
How much are you 
willing to pay for these 
blocks? 
$11,488.10 $31,708.90 $0.00 $156,000.00  27
Uncorrected 
Value of ESAL-mile $0.49 $0.69 $0.00 $3.33  31
Certainty calibrated 
Values of ESAL-mile $0.49 $1.08 $0.00 $3.33  9
 
Table 4.3 indicates that approximately half of the individuals who answered each 
question were certain about their responses.  Additionally, while 31 participants answered 
both auction questions, only 9 were certain about both the number of blocks their 
company would request and the amount of money their company would be willing to pay 
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for those blocks.  Although the average did not change, the certainty calibration resulted 
in a larger standard deviation because the number of responses is fewer. 
 
4.3.3 Equilibrium Auction Price as a Proxy for Market Value 
Auctions are used to allocate items when the value of the good is unknown—if the 
value is known for certain, the seller will provide the good at the highest known price 
(Krishna, 2010).  If INDOT knows for certain the value individual trucking companies 
place on ESAL-miles of travel, INDOT can sell permits at the highest price which 
maintains economic competitiveness with other states to maximize revenues to maintain 
deteriorating highway infrastructure.  Unfortunately, the value individual companies 
place on ESAL-miles of travel for overweight divisible loads is not known.  In the above 
discussion, even among survey participants, only 9 of the 84 total survey participants—or 
approximately ten percent—were certain of both the number of ESAL-mile blocks their 
company would request and the amount of money their company would pay.  The permit 
prices in Texas for 4,000 lbs of additional GVW are low enough that trucking companies 
were almost unilaterally willing to purchase permits—the Texas permits are most likely 
underpriced because TxDOT did not know the true value of permits to permit holders 
(Murphy et al., 2012). 
Given sufficient data, game theory can be used to estimate the market clearing price 
of permits in the auction based on the bids of individual carriers and the auction 
parameters, including the number of blocks being auctioned and the minimum bid.  In the 
quota context, the game is the auction and each participating carrier is a different player.  
Each carrier places a bid to maximize the company’s utility based on the private value of 
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ESAL-miles of travel for overweight operations.  Unfortunately, the nine responses from 
carriers who were certain of their choices is insufficient to estimate bid vectors for 
potential participants.  If sufficient data could be collected, bids could be estimated for a 
each of a number of players based on demographic characteristics; then based on those 
bids, the winners could be identified and the amount of permit revenues collected through 
the auction could be determined. 
In the absence of such data, the following section details the equilibrium bidding 
behavior for various auction formats.  Auction equilibrium bidding behavior can reveal 
some information about the value bidders place on auctioned items, depending on the 
auction format. 
 
4.3.4 Equilibrium Bidding Behavior 
In auction research, private values refer to the known value an individual bidder 
places on having an object himself, regardless of the values of other bidders (Levin, 2004; 
Ausubel, 2008; Krishna, 2010).  In contrast, interdependent values are based on the 
individual’s own information as well as the value of other bidders (Ausubel, 2008).  
Interdependence is not used in auction literature in the same manner as in statistical 
analysis.  Values can be interdependent in terms of auction research, but statistically 
independent; they can also be private as previously defined but statistically correlated 
(Krishna, 2010).  In the overweight vehicle permit auction framework, individual 
trucking companies have private values for ESAL-mile blocks of travel.  Although the 
companies may not know with absolute certainty the value of a block for their operations, 
128 
 
the value is not likely to be influenced by information from other bidders, in this case, 
competing trucking companies. 
The private value assumption is necessary to make conclusions about equilibrium 
bidding behavior.  There are different dominant equilibrium bidding strategies for private 
value goods depending on whether a single unit is auctioned or multiple units and on the 
auction format. 
 
4.3.4.1 Single-Unit Auctions 
Single-unit auctions are important for the present consideration of auctions of 
multiple overweight ESAL-mile blocks because the bidding behavior for multiple-unit 
auctions are abstractions of the behavior for single-unit auctions. 
The two primary auction formats for single items are first-price and second-price.  
The highest bidder pays his or her bid in a first-price auction.  In a second-price auction, 
the highest bidder receives the item, but only pays the price of the second-highest bid 
(Levin, 2004; Ausubel, 2008; Krishna, 2010).  The dominant strategy for second-price 
auctions for a single unit is to bid truthfully, or for each bidder to submit a bid equal to 
his or her private value.  This auction has also been cited as a Vickrey auction (Levin, 
2004), although for purposes of this research, Vickrey auctions will only refer to a 
specific format for multiple-unit auctions.  In a first-price auction, the dominant strategy 
is to bid slightly lower than the actual private value to maximize an individual’s utility—
if the bidder pays the full value, he has zero change in utility because he received the 
value of the good but paid the full cost (Levin, 2004). 
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4.3.4.2 Multiple-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions 
Properties of first-price and second-price auction formats can be extended to 
sealed-bid auctions for multiple units.  In multiple-unit auctions, participants submit bids 
for more than one from a collection of homogeneous or complementary goods.  When 
every participant desires exactly one unit, the auction simplifies to a single-unit auction.  
In the case of overweight vehicle permits, the blocks of ESAL-miles are perfectly 
homogenous goods.  In all multiple-unit auctions, it is assumed that bidders have a 
nonincreasing bid vector describing the amount he or she is willing to pay for each 
additional unit of goods.  Figure 4.2 depicts a set of possible bid vectors from three 
participants in a hypothetical auction.  All of the bid vectors are nonincreasing, but for 
Bidder 2, the marginal value for each unit up to four units is constant.  As shown in the 
sample bid vector diagram, not all of the participants need to bid for the same number of 
goods. 
 















Three sealed-bid multiple-unit auction format extensions include the discriminatory, 
uniform-price, and Vickrey auctions.  In each of these auctions, the ݊ items are allocated 
to the individual(s) who submitted the ݊ highest bids in order, but the price each winner 
must pay for his or her items is different.  These auctions are all called standard auctions 
and multiple bidders can win multiple items in each but are not guaranteed to receive the 
total number of items for which they submitted bids (Krishna, 2010).  There are other 
forms of allocation which are not considered here (see the discussion of Pickl and Wirl’s 
2011 work on pipeline capacity auctions in Section 4.1.2 for alternative allocation 
methods). 
4.3.4.3 Discriminatory Auctions 
The discriminatory auction is a direct extension of the first-price single-unit auction.  
In a discriminatory auction, each bidder pays his or her bid price for each individual unit.  
Although Shanghai has implemented some additional aspects with two rounds of bidding, 
in essence, the Shanghai PCLP auction is discriminatory but has open bidding. 
 
4.3.4.4 Uniform-price Auctions 
The uniform-price and Vickrey auction formats are extensions of the second-price 
single-unit auction.  The uniform-price is an intuitive extension of the second-price 
auction.  The Singapore VQS is an example of a uniform-price auction with open bidding.  
In a uniform-price auction, the ݊ items are allocated to the ݊ highest bids but at a price 
that is between the ݊th highest bid and the ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻth highest bid.  Any price between 
those bids will ensure that the demand supplied is equal to the number of items auctioned.  
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In practice, the highest losing bid is often used as the price and is referred to as the 
market clearing price.  Although this appears similar to the second-price single-unit 
auction, the dominant strategy is not the same. 
 
4.3.4.5 Vickrey Auctions 
The Vickrey auction is the direct extension of the second-price auction which 
maintains the dominant strategy of truthful bidding.  In a multiple-unit Vickrey auction, 
the price each winner pays is equal to the opportunity cost for each item that would have 
gone to another bidder (Ausubel, 2008).  The opportunity cost is the alternative value of 
having other bidders win those units.  In other words, the winner pays for the externality 
he or she caused for other bidders (Krishna, 2010).  In practice, the bidder pays the 
amount that the other bidders would have paid had the winning bidder not been present; 
this calculation is completed for each bidder (Krishna, 2010). 
 
4.3.4.6 Dominant Strategies and Efficiency 
The Vickrey multiple unit auction is not widely used, even though the dominant 
strategy for Vickrey auctions is efficient while the equilibrium bidding strategies of other 
auction formats are not (Krishna, 2010).  Vickrey multiple unit auctions are efficient 
because the dominant strategy for each participant is to bid truthfully and given truthful 
bids, the objects always go to those who value them the most.  The same is true for 
second-price single-unit auctions.  In contrast, the dominant strategy for uniform-price 
multiple-unit auctions is to bid truthfully for the first unit but to shade bids for successive 
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units (Ausubel, 2008; Krishna, 2010).  Figure 4.3 depicts the lower bids a participant 
might submit for the second through sixth units which are lower than the individual’s 
actual private value. 
 
Figure 4.3 Example of Bid Shading in Uniform-Price Auction 
 
The bid vector depicted in Figure 4.3 is an example of dominant auction strategy 
for the bidder in a uniform-price auction because the truthful bid for the first unit 
determines whether the bidder will receive any units while all successive bids determine 
the price he or she pays for any units won.  If the bidder’s first truthful bid sets the market 
clearing price, i.e., is the highest losing bid, the bidder does not receive an item but would 
also not have a reason to increase his or her bid above the private value.  If the bidder 
does win at least one item, his or her other bids influence the market clearing price.  For 
example, if one of the bidder’s successive bids, i.e., any value in the bid vector except for 
the bid for the first unit, sets the market clearing price, he or she could have bid a lower 





















other individuals who won an item.  Bid shading, as depicted in Figure 4.3, is inefficient 
because some individuals shade more than others; therefore, items are not always 
allocated to the participants who most value them.  Vickrey multiple-unit auctions are the 
only efficient type of multiple-unit standard sealed-bid auction. 
 
4.3.4.7 Multiple Unit Open-Bid Auctions 
Until now, the discussion has focused on sealed-bid auction formats.  The 
assumption of private values is important because when bidders have private values, in 
contrast to interdependent values, the dominant equilibrium bidding behavior is the same 
for open- and sealed-bid auction formats (Krishna, 2010).  Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that the equilibrium bidding behavior is less efficient for uniform-price 
auctions when the private values assumption does not hold.  Specifically, there are three 
open-bid auction formats that directly correspond to sealed-bid formats when the private 
values assumption is true.  These three formats are considered for use in overweight 
vehicle quota auctions. 
 
4.3.4.8 Dutch Auctions 
Dutch auctions, where the auctioneer begins at a high price and incrementally 
decreases the bid amount until each item is claimed, are equivalent to discriminatory 
sealed bid multiple unit auctions for private values.  When the values are interdependent, 




4.3.4.9 English Auctions 
English auctions have the same dominant bidding strategy as sealed-bid uniform-
price auctions.  In English auctions, similar to the format used in Singapore, the price is 
gradually increased until the number of units demanded above the market clearing price 
is equal to the number of items supplied.  Again, the formats have the same equilibrium 
with private values but information gleaned during the auction may alter bidder’s 
valuation when the values are interdependent.  The open English auction is superior to 
the sealed-bid uniform-price auction because of subtle differences in bid shading 
behavior (Kagel & Levin, 2008).  In actual practice, Chu (2011; 2012) found that the 
open-bid format for Singapore’s VQS is more efficient than the sealed-bid format used 
from 1990 until 2001. 
 
4.3.4.10 Ausubel Ascending Price Auctions 
Ausubel ascending price auctions are equivalent to Vickrey multiple-unit auctions 
for private value items.  In the Ausubel ascending price auction format, bids are collected 
similar to the English open auction format, but the pricing structure is similar to the 
externality costs used in the Vickrey sealed-bid multiple-unit auction (Krishna, 2010). 
 
4.3.5 Desirable Bidding Behavior 
As shown in the preceding sections, the auction format affects equilibrium bidding 
behavior which influences both the efficiency of the auction and the amount of revenue 
that can be collected.  In the case of overweight vehicle permit auctions in Indiana, 
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INDOT should use the open English auction format, similar to that employed in the 
Singapore VQS.  Although the equilibrium bidding behavior is not as efficient as in the 
Ausubel or Vickrey auctions, the results are likely more transparent and understandable 
to trucking companies participating in the auction.  An open English format is 
recommended over a uniform-price format due to indications that the open-bid format is 
more efficient than the sealed-bid format.  Additionally, in the open system, bidders are 
provided with information which likely decreases the occurrence of collusion among 
parties.  It is difficult for trucking companies to collude to keep prices low if all bidders 
are provided full information about the market clearing price, and therefore the claims of 
other participants.  In the sealed-bid format, INDOT would have to address potential 
collusion among bidders. 
Bid vectors from the companies would likely take one of two forms.  They would 
either submit bids of constant marginal value for all of the ESAL-mile blocks they are 
likely to request; or, submit decreasing bids where the bids for the first (or first few) units 
is close to the private value and successive bids are shaded.  The participating trucking 
companies do not necessarily need to all use one form or the other (constant marginal 
value versus decreasing); there may be a mix of both.  In either case, the highest marginal 
value is likely to be equal to the self-reported $/ESAL-mile value collected in the HEA-
1481 and follow-up surveys. 
Future research should consider the likely bidding behavior of participating 
trucking companies using private values.  At present, the trucking companies are not 
certain of their valuation, as discussed in Section 4.3.2.2.  In addition to constructing bid 
vectors, using the valuation method employed in the HEA-1481 survey or by soliciting 
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bid vectors from trucking companies, the willingness to pay for investment in 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles can be used as a proxy variable.  The typical trip VMT, 
the typical number of trips in a year, and the dollar amount of investment could be used 
to calculate an approximate annual amount that the trucking companies would spend to 
avoid the cost of permit acquisition.  Based on the assumption that companies would 
spend the lesser amount of money—either the amount necessary to invest in 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles or the cost of acquiring permits in the auction—the total 
bid amount for all blocks would be equal to the willingness to pay for investment.  The 
total amount a company is willing to pay for ESAL-mile blocks and the willingness to 
pay for investment can be altered similarly to construct bid vectors of either constant 
marginal value or decreasing values for each company. 
 
4.3.6 INDOT Auction Synopsis 
The previous sections provided rationales for the auction framework, including 
some parameter values, for overweight divisible load permits in Indiana.  The state would 
supply approximately 8,000 permits, each for 500 ESAL-miles of travel, through monthly 
open English auctions.  During each auction, the participating truck companies would bid 
on the number of ESAL-blocks they desired.  The minimum bid, set by INDOT, would 
start at $35 per 500 ESAL-mile block, equivalent to $0.07 per ESAL-mile.  At the same 
time, all companies would have the option of using infrastructure-friendly vehicles to 
acquire permits for $20 for each vehicle and route annually.  The market clearing price of 
the auctioned permits would provide an indication to INDOT the actual value that 
trucking companies place on having overweight divisible load permits (although the 
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clearing price would be somewhat less than true private value due to the inefficiency of 
the dominant bidding strategy).  The auction would also allow INDOT to exercise direct 
control over the extent of infrastructure usage through the supply provided. 
 
4.4 Auction Implementation Considerations 
In addition to the topics explored in the case study (quota, minimum bids, and 
auction format), the highway agency administering the auction will need to consider a 
number of issues prior to implementation. 
 
4.4.1 Sealed vs. Open Bids 
The first issue to address is whether to use sealed or open bids.  In 1990 when the 
VQS was first introduced, the Singapore Land Transport Authority solicited sealed bids.  
The auction system was changed to open-bids in July 2001.  Chu (2011) found that 
switching from the sealed- to open-bid system reduced the COE premium by 
approximately 16%.  One caveat of Chu’s (2011) findings was that although the market 
price for COEs was lower under open bids, the system favored late action bidding where 
bidders would not increase bids to the amount they were actually willing to pay (or enter 
a bid at all) until the final moments of the auction.  The city of Shanghai similarly 
switched to an open-bid system in January 2008.  Song and Zhou (2010) found that the 





4.4.2 Secondary Trading Markets 
The second consideration is whether to use a bid-only system or allow a secondary 
trading market, which would work similar to the trading market in cap and trade 
allocation.  The bid-only system is easier to implement because no additional market 
needs to be created and monitored; however, those persons priced out of permits for 
overweight vehicles must identify other forms of transportation.  As noted previously, 
this would be easier if the permit auction program was used only for divisible loads 
because those priced out can still use non-overweight vehicles.  This would be a salient 
consideration if overweight non-divisible load permits were included in the auction. 
 
4.4.3 Effects on “Winners” and “Losers” 
In addition to generating additional revenue for the transportation agency, the 
auction mechanism has unique consequences for auction winners and losers compared to 
other overweight vehicle permitting alternatives.  Obviously, those who are priced out of 
permits via the auction mechanism must continue to move their goods using non-
overweight vehicles.  In the other options considered in this study, no individuals are 
priced out. 
For the auction winners, there are added benefits in addition to the operating cost 
savings.  In a quota system, the market is necessarily closed to all parties except for the 
auction winners.  Although this could create a monopoly, it also protects the operations of 
the auction winners.  The companies that are allocated usage blocks will be able to offer 
overweight vehicle permitting to shippers when others cannot.  This can provide an 
incentive to participate in the auction. 
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Additionally, there may be concerns that larger, or “richer,” companies are better 
able to absorb the cost of permits in the auction system and would therefore prevent 
smaller companies from winning permits through the auction (through higher bids).  
Agencies may consider having stratified auctions, possibly for different industries, to 
promote social welfare among those participating in the auction.  In the context of 
Indiana, this may warrant having separate overweight divisible load permit auctions for 
haulers of steel and agricultural commodities. 
 
4.4.4 Enforcement 
Enforcement efforts for overweight divisible loads are likely to be simplified using 
a quota system, regardless of allocation.  The current overweight commodity permits 
issued in Indiana are valid for a single trip.  In Indiana, drivers of overweight vehicles 
stopped by the Indiana State Police (ISP) must produce a valid permit.  Some companies 
choose to operate outside of the law and illegally use a single-trip permit to make 
multiple trips.  There is currently no way to prevent this illegal behavior.  Under a 
proposed quota, individual trips do not need to be permitted.  Individuals who are 
allocated usage under the quota will have the permit until their usage is spent.  Trucking 
companies have already adopted GPS technologies and keep detailed records about the 
extent of travel for registration and fuel tax purposes.  ISP, or other enforcement agencies, 




4.4.5 Dedicated Source of Revenue 
Finally, transportation agencies must consider the appropriate use of additional 
revenues collected via the auction compared to other allocation mechanisms.  The most 
transparent and equitable method is to create a dedicated fund for improvements to those 
facilities that are most frequently used by overweight vehicles.  Additional revenues can 
reduce the current gap between consumption and revenues that has resulted from 
traditional overweight vehicle permitting.  Increased funding for infrastructure 
improvements and maintenance on the routes used most often offsets additional 
deterioration of highway infrastructure due to overweight loading.  The improved 
conditions will also benefit trucking companies through lower vehicle operation costs.  In 
the extreme, if additional revenues collected via the auction are invested in bridge 
improvements which raise the load carrying capacity of bridges across the state, 
overweight vehicles may be able to use bridges which previously did not have the load 
carrying capacity for the higher vehicle loads but which result in shorter trip distances, 
improving the overall efficiency of the system. 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided a theoretical framework for using an overweight vehicle 
quota with auction allocation to limit the amount of infrastructure consumption allowable 
from overweight vehicle travel.  Quotas have been used in other contexts to limit travel 
demand but have not been used explicitly to limit consumption of highway assets from 
overweight vehicles.  Auctions have also been used to allocate pipe and rail capacity. 
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Using knowledge gained from previous applications of quotas and auctions, an 
auction mechanism to allocate overweight divisible load permits was developed.  The 
auction mechanism is most practical for overweight divisible loads because trucking 
companies have options to transport goods via another mode or using vehicles that 
comply with state and federal limits; the same is not always true for overweight non-
divisible goods. 
In the quota and auction framework, the state agency determines the supply of 
highway asset consumption which can be used by overweight vehicles—this is the quota.  
Then participating trucking companies bid for permits for defined amounts of 
consumption.  High bidders claim permits for usage while low bidders must operate non-
overweight vehicles. 
Sample auction parameters were determined for Indiana.  The usage measure was 
defined to be blocks worth 500 ESAL-miles of travel each.  ESAL-miles were used in 
accordance with the existing overweight commodity permits and the 2.40 ESAL value 
used to define infrastructure-friendly vehicles.   Future research should consider 
alternative usage measures which reflect bridge consumption.  Although the revenues 
from the auction can offset some of the consumption of bridge assets, ESAL-miles are a 
measure of pavement consumption and do not accurately account for the bending 
moments overweight vehicle impose on bridges. 
Based on overweight commodity permit purchases in the first two quarters of 2014, 
the initial quota was determined to be 8,000 blocks of 500 ESAL-miles each month, for a 
total of 96,000 blocks annually or 46,000,000 ESAL-miles of travel.  The recommended 
auction format is the open English auction. 
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Survey responses were used to determine preliminary estimates of the valuation 
individual carriers place on ESAL-miles of travel using overweight vehicles.  This 
information would indicate the market clearing price for auctions.  Presently, individual 
carriers are uncertain about the private values they place on overweight vehicle permits.  
Future research should establish the private values carriers have for overweight vehicle 
permits to simulate an auction to determine the market clearing price. 
The two primary benefits of implementing a quota and auction system for 
overweight vehicle permits are additional information about the value trucking 
companies place on overweight divisible loads and the direct control the transportation 
agency has over infrastructure consumption.  Information about the market clearing price 
could be used to better price all oversize and overweight permits; currently, state agencies 
do not know the actual maximum amount carriers would be willing to pay.  Controlling 
the amount of allowable infrastructure consumption is also important in light of limited 
budgets.  When traditional permitting mechanisms and infrastructure-friendly vehicles 
initiatives fail to protect deteriorating infrastructure from additional loadings, quota 





CHAPTER 5. REGIONAL AND NATIONAL HARMONIZATION TO INCREASE 
EFFICIENCY 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters explored various alternatives for overweight vehicle 
permitting.  Aside from explicit permit structures, regional or national harmonization of 
TS&W limits and/or overweight permitting practices can also provide efficiency and 
economic competitiveness benefits. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, TS&W limits and oversize/overweight permitting 
practices in the United States have changed over time in a fragmented manner because 
each individual state agency has exercised grandfather rights separately to balance the 
competing needs of infrastructure preservation, safety and mobility, and economic 
development concerns specific to its particular circumstances or industries.  This has 
resulted in both size and weight differences as well as differences in permitted 
oversize/overweight operations. 
Inconsistent TS&W limits and overweight permitting practices among the 50 
United States results in inefficient operations for any vehicles moving between multiple 
jurisdictions.  Carriers who operate in jurisdictions with multiple different TS&W limits 
and overweight permit structures must make one of three choices:  1) maintain separate 
fleets which meet the operational requirements of each jurisdiction, 2) choose the “lowest 
common denominator”  vehicles that meet the requirements of all jurisdictions  
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simultaneously, or 3) operate in other jurisdictions which do not have conflicting 
regulations. 
In the first case, the carriers face several additional costs.  Most obviously, there are 
the capital costs associated with purchasing and maintaining separate vehicle fleets.  In 
addition, there are time and labor costs associated with breaking down the load and 
transferring in onto other vehicles at the jurisdiction boundaries.  Related to this 
consideration, carriers must have access to facilities where the breakdown can take place.  
Either the state or local agency must provide these facilities or private entities, the 
carriers or another group, can finance for these facilities. 
In the second case, carriers forfeit the efficiencies of longer lengths, higher gross 
vehicle weights, or higher axle weights in more permissive jurisdictions.  Typically 
longer or heavier vehicles (depending on whether the goods cube-out or weigh-out) result 
in more payload per trip.  Additional trips are necessary to move the same amount of 
goods using the vehicle configuration appropriate for the most restrictive jurisdiction. 
Finally, some but not all carriers may choose to relocate their business or alter their 
routes to avoid more restrictive jurisdictions.  In some instances, this may not be practical 
or even possible depending on the location of the origins and destinations.  For example, 
vehicles originating in Florida must travel through Georgia or Alabama to reach any 
other state by truck; those in Michigan must choose between Indiana, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin, go through Canada, or make use of waterways to reach other states.  This 
possibility of TS&W limits and oversize/overweight regulations acting as a barrier to 
trade was explicitly recognized in the 1982 STAA when the federal TS&W limits were 
applied as minimums in addition to maximums for the National Network.  The National 
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Network includes the Interstate System and other federal-aid highways critical to the 
trucking industry.  This aspect of the 1982 STAA was a direct response to several states 
in the Mississippi valley that imposed lower TS&W limits than the federal TS&W limits. 
The 1982 STAA was the first United States surface transportation authorization 
legislation to both define a transportation network (the National Network) critical for 
interstate freight movements and recognize the importance of effectively harmonized 
limits on that network so that select vehicle configurations could travel anywhere on that 
critical network.  The limits are effectively harmonized because there are not any single 
states or small groups of states that significantly impede interstate freight truck 
movement though TS&W limits lower than the federal limits; but they are not truly 
harmonized because nearly every state allows its own overweight loads above the federal 
limits.  Since 1982, various surface transportation authorization laws have established 
alternative networks including the Primary System, the NHS, and the Strategic Highway 
Network, among others.  The federal TS&W limits apply to each of these federally- 
funded roadway networks. 
 
5.2 Truck Size and Weight Limits Harmonization Experiences 
Regional or national harmonization of TS&W limits and overweight vehicle 
permitting practices is not a new concept.  It simply has not been applied successfully in 




5.2.1 Attempt by the Western Governors’ Association 
In conjunction with the USDOT Comprehensive TS&W Limits Study in 2000, the 
Western Governors’ Association (WGA) requested that the authors apply the same 
framework used in the comprehensive study to an additional scenario identified as the 
“Western Uniformity Scenario” to harmonize TS&W dimensions for LCVs operating in 
western states (USDOT, 2004).  The final report was intended to complement the 
Comprehensive TS&W Limits Study report.  The ideal of harmonized LCV size and 
weight dimensions among eligible states in the Western Association of State highway and 
Transportation Officials (WASHTO) has not been achieved. 
The proposed Western Uniformity Scenario included lifting the LCV freeze and 
harmonizing weights among the thirteen Western states using LCVs through grandfather 
rights.  The proposed scenario assumed that federal axle weights, the Federal Bridge 
Formula B, and a maximum GVW of 129,000 lbs would apply to two different LCV 
twin-trailer configurations.  One of the two configurations was consistent with a twin 
trailer with 45-foot trailers included in the WASHTO Guide for Uniform Laws and 
Regulations Governing Truck Size and Weight Among the WASHTO States in effect at 
that time.  The WASHTO (2009) guide is a “living document” published since 1990 
aimed at “promoting uniform laws, regulations, and practices” among the WASHTO 
states.  The second configuration included in the Western Uniformity Scenario was a 
longer twin trailer combination with 48-foot trailers specifically requested by the WGA. 
The USDOT (2004) determined that individual states would vary in their use of 
increased flexibility in setting TS&W limits allowed through adoption of the Western 
Uniformity Scenario.  Some states would immediately increase state TS&W limits to 
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those included in the analysis, some would change some but not all of their existing state 
TS&W limits, and some might not change state TS&W limits.  Although the goal was to 
promote uniformity, USDOT (2004) concluded that uniformity would not necessarily be 
achieved via the proposed Western Uniformity Scenario. 
The USDOT also addressed TRB recommendations for a systematic process to 
optimize TS&W policy in the Western Uniformity Scenario report.  TRB Special Report 
267 advocated for federal oversight of a national permit program including quantitative 
analysis of the impacts of permitted vehicles above the federal TS&W limits (TRB, 2002).  
In the Western Uniformity Scenario report, the USDOT (2004) stated that it “does not 
favor change in federal truck size and weight policy” on the grounds that there was not 
sufficient State support for changes to federal policy or the TRB recommendations. 
At the same time, the USDOT (2004) indicated that it also does not support the 
current fragmented approach via grandfather rights for the following reasons: 
 “It makes enforcement and compliance with truck size and weight laws 
more difficult 
 It often contributes little to overall productivity 
 It may have unintended consequences for safety and highway infrastructure 
 And it reduces the willingness to work for more comprehensive solutions 
that would have much greater benefits.” 
Based on limited political support from the relevant states, the USDOT recommended 
against the Western Uniformity Scenario because it could result in further polarization 
between the states that would adopt the uniform TS&W limits and those that would not. 
Furthermore, although the continuing goal of the WASHTO Guide is to promote 
uniformity among member states, harmonization has not been achieved to date.  The 
authors of the guide itself include a note that individual states who participate reserve 
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their rights to make exceptions to the recommendations included in the guide.  Similar to 
the federal TS&W limits, but more permissive in terms of higher GVWs and vehicle 
lengths, the Guide seeks to establish minimum standards which apply to the Interstates 
and National Network in each of the states to facilitate interstate freight movement, 
particularly using LCVs (WASHTO, 2009). 
 
5.2.2 International Harmonization Efforts 
Internationally, there have been several efforts at harmonization within and among 
nations with varying levels of success.  Canada is typically considered the premier 
example of both harmonization and performance-based consideration of TS&W limits 
(Fekpe et al., 2006; Mercier, 2007; Woodrooffe et al., 2011; Reimer et al., 2014).  
Australia and New Zealand have also applied performance-based decision making to 
their TS&W limits; however, they have not achieved complete harmonization (Fekpe et 
al., 2006).  The member nations of the European Union (EU) have also demonstrated 
some success at multi-national TS&W harmonization (Walton, et al., 2010).  In contrast, 
the three NAFTA nations (United States, Canada, and Mexico) have not been able to 
achieve harmonization (Mercier, 2007). 
 
5.2.2.1 Canada 
Similar to the United States, TS&W regulations in Canada are under the 
jurisdiction of the ten provinces and three territories; however, unlike the United States, 
the Canadian provinces and territories established national agreement on select TS&W 
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limits in 1988.  Woodrooffe et al. (2011) provide an extensive history of the creation of 
the “Federal-Provincial-Territorial Memorandum of Understanding on Interprovincial 
Weights and Dimensions” (also called the MOU) and its five amendments. 
The Canadian approach to developing the MOU was a “performance-based” 
systematic method to identify and test model vehicles for both productivity 
improvements (compared to existing vehicles) and performance criteria related to safety, 
mobility, and infrastructure damage.  Vehicles that are more productive are only 
approved if they demonstrate better performance than the less productive vehicles they 
would replace (Fekpe et al., 2006). 
Canada’s performance-based approach is contrasted against the “prescriptive” 
approach.  In the United States, prescriptive TS&W limits outline the height, width, and 
length of vehicles, the GVW, and maximum axle or axle group weights.  As long as a 
vehicle is within the prescriptive limits, it is a legal vehicle.  Unfortunately, many 
different configurations meet both the federal and individual state TS&W limits but 
handle differently and consume more or less of the common highway infrastructure assets.  
The performance-based approach defines more specifically the various vehicle 
configurations that can operate including the dimensions, the performance thresholds 
vehicles must meet, the types of connections that can be used, axle weights and spacings, 
etc.  The MOU vehicles are defined specifically by the aspects of vehicle configuration 





5.2.2.2 Australia and New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand have also applied performance-based approaches to 
TS&W regulations.  Walton et al. (2010) outlined the history of TS&W regulation in 
Australia in the appendices of their 2011 report on LCV use in Texas, with a particular 
emphasis on Australian road train regulations.  Road trains are multi-trailer units, 
typically much longer than LCVs seen in the United States and elsewhere.  The 
Australian performance based framework was established in 1999 and allows vehicles 
that meet each of 16 performance standards to exceed prescriptive TS&W limits.  
Unfortunately, harmonization has not been fully achieved in Australia (Walton, et al., 
2010), possibly due to the combination of both prescriptive and performance-based 
approaches.  The Australian performance-based system is a national program separate 
from individual state and territory permitting systems.  It does not replace those systems 
but is offered as an alternative to those systems.  New Zealand has focused more on 
safety gains rather than productivity improvements in its performance-based system but 
tends to follow the TS&W approaches implemented in Australia (Fekpe et al., 2006).  In 
both Australia and New Zealand, the performance-based systems indicate which 
networks, or functional road classes, and locations the approved vehicles can operate over. 
 
5.2.2.3 North American Free Trade Agreement Countries 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was entered into in 1994 to 
remove existing barriers and promote trade of goods and services among partner 
countries:  the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  The majority of goods moved 
151 
 
between these three countries are carried by heavy trucks; and, of those the largest 
volume is moved over highways in the United States (Mercier, 2007).  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that harmonization of TS&W regulations between NAFTA partners is a 
significant step toward removing existing barriers.  Discrepancies between Canadian, 
Mexican, and United States TS&W regulations result in the same consequences of 
discrepancies between individual states, provinces, and territories.  Carriers moving 
goods between two countries must choose between using lowest common denominator 
vehicles that meet each country’s regulations or maintain separate fleets.  The NAFTA 
recognized the importance of uniform trucking regulations by requiring uniform 
standards and technical measures related to vehicle weights and dimensions within a 3-
year period (Mercier, 2007).  Twenty years since NAFTA was entered into, this has not 
been achieved. 
There are a variety of reasons why the NAFTA has not resulted in uniform TS&W 
limits among partner countries.  First, there is a lack of uniformity within each country.  
The United States has federal TS&W limits that are much lower than the limits of either 
Canada or Mexico; however, individual states (including those at the border) do permit 
loads higher than the U.S. federal legal limits.  As previously discussed, the provinces 
and territories of Canada have entered the MOU that harmonizes most of the TS&W 
regulations in Canada; although, again individual provinces are able to permit vehicles 
outside of the MOU on roads in their jurisdiction.  Unlike the United States and Canada, 
Mexico does have uniform national TS&W limits.  Although the individual state 
governments of Mexico have the authority to establish their own TS&W limits, similar to 
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Canada, none have done so.  Both Mexico and Canada allow unpermitted vehicles longer 
and heavier than those in the United States (Mercier, 2007). 
In addition to the difficulties associated with reconciling 66 different sets of TS&W 
regulations in North America, Mercier (2007) identified four reasons harmonization has 
not been achieved via NAFTA which have been adjusted and combined as follows:  1) 
lack of political will, 2) disagreement over technical standards, 2) jurisdictional and 
stakeholder issues, and 4) issues inherent to the NAFTA.   
1. Lack of political will is quite often a difficulty in changing regulations or 
implementing new regimes.  Although TS&W regulations are intrinsically 
linked to trade barriers/open trade, there are a number of other political 
issues that have been of greater interest to NAFTA partner countries than 
TS&W regulations. 
2. In addition to the different TS&W regulations, each country uses different 
technical engineering standards for design, construction, and maintenance 
of highway infrastructure.  Specifically, the three countries use different 
assumptions and safety factors in bridge design and analysis.  The United 
States uses more conservative assumptions and safety factors; therefore, 
vehicles that are acceptable in Canada and Mexico are not likely to comply 
with Federal Bridge Formula B in the United States. 
3. A number of interested parties focus on different aspects of TS&W 
regulation.  Railroad lobbyists often oppose increases to TS&W limits that 
would allow longer and heavier vehicles for two reasons.  First, vehicles do 
not pay the full capital cost of construction and recurring maintenance costs 
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of roadway infrastructure.  In contrast, railroads pay the full costs for the 
construction and maintenance of the rail infrastructure.  Second, greater 
TS&W allowances may attract business from rail to truck.  Safety advocacy 
groups are concerned about the safety implications of allowing longer and 
heavier vehicles.  Individual government agencies differ in their 
considerations for state exceptions to federal TS&W regulations.  In the 
United States, states that have higher limits through grandfather rights often 
seek to protect these rights to maintain economic activity.  States in 
populated areas may place greater emphasis on the safety impacts and 
concerns about infrastructure preservation. 
4. Finally, disharmony has continued partly due to the legal requirements of 
the NAFTA itself.  Each country is able to apply any technical standards as 
long as they meet two main requirements:  “national treatment” where other 
countries are under the same regulations as the regulating country and 
“most favorite nation treatment” where one other country is under the same 
regulations of any other country.  As long as the United States applies the 
same TS&W limits to interstate travel and vehicles to and from Canada and 
Mexico, these requirements are met.  Furthermore, the legal process to 
determine if a country is using any regulation as a barrier to trade (even if it 
is disguised) is cumbersome and may not result in a resolution. 
Given these difficulties, there has not been any substantial movement toward 
harmonization of TS&W regulations among the NAFTA partner countries.  The first 
three barriers to NAFTA harmonization also apply to regional harmonization within the 
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United States.  Although the fourth barrier, legal aspects contained in NAFTA, would not 
necessarily be present, there may be implementation barriers that would similarly burden 
harmonization efforts regionally. 
 
5.2.2.4 European Union Countries 
In contrast, the European Union (EU) has achieved substantial harmonization of 
TS&W regulations among member countries (Walton et al., 2010).  Similar to the 
relationship between individual states and the federal government, in the EU, individual 
member countries are permitted to allow longer and heavier vehicles within their borders.  
The key difference is that the EU restricts this practice if the allowance of longer and 
heavier vehicles impacts international competition.  In effect, the majority of EU member 
countries agree to the same vehicle dimensions and weights allowed to travel among all 
of the EU countries except for special “gigaliners” permitted in Sweden and Finland 
(Walton et al., 2010).  Gigaliners are longer and heavier vehicles used to move goods 
over very long distances in low density population areas of Sweden and Finland but not 
in other EU member countries.  Similar to the performance-based system in Australia, the 
EU does allow some exceptions for infrastructure-friendly vehicles.  Although the 
relationship between member countries and the EU is somewhat similar to the individual 
states’ abilities to permit vehicles above U.S. federal TS&W limits, the EU has had 





In the United States, incremental TS&W harmonization at the regional level that is 
focused on aligning prescriptive limits included in oversize/overweight permitting 
programs is likely to be the most effective approach to achieve uniform regulations. 
Although the performance-based approach used in Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand would likely yield a more optimized national vehicle fleet, performance-based 
systems are a drastic change from the entrenched system of individual states in the USA 
exercising their grandfather rights.  There would likely be significant pushback from 
states that currently permit vehicles that may not meet specified performance standards.  
Any provisions to grandfather-in vehicles that do not meet standards or phase them out 
over time would prolong the discrepancies between individual state regulations.  There 
would also likely be significant disagreement over the appropriate performance measures 
and the numerical standards for different regions of the country.  Instead, the first step 
should be to foster cooperation in the current prescriptive TS&W atmosphere. 
A national system would also face many more hurdles to implementation than less 
structured regional cooperation.  When TRB (2002) recommended a national 
performance-based system, the authors recognized the importance of significant oversight 
and evaluation.  The USDOT (2004) also agreed that significant national oversight would 
be necessary to implement a performance-based system.  Both TRB and USDOT 
recognized the importance of national uniformity and oversight in line with the strong 
federal role in TS&W regulation; however, many of the differences in state TS&W limits 
and oversize/overweight procedures have occurred in response to the individual needs of 
each state.  Trucks used most often in the densely populated states in the Northeast are 
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very different from the vehicles used for long-distance trips across the larger, less 
populated states in the West.  LCV use is not limited to Western states (Indiana, Ohio, 
New York, and Florida all permit some types of LCVs on some routes) but is 
concentrated in those states prior to the LCV freeze included in the 1991 ISTEA 
legislation.  The permitted vehicles are also often related to industries that differ in 
various regions of the country.  For example, steel production is primarily centralized in 
the Midwestern region of the country. 
Thus, an incremental approach focused on aligning practices within each region is 
more likely to be accepted by individual states than a complete overhaul at a national 
level or a performance-based system.  A nationwide system could be approached after 
substantial harmonization has been achieved at a regional level. 
 
5.4 One-Stop Shopping for Overweight Permits 
Two tools that are already used to monitor and collect fees from large trucks can be 
leveraged to implement regionally uniform overweight vehicle programs:  the 
International Registration Plan (IRP) and the International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA).  
As a first step, an integrated overweight vehicle permit collection and distribution 
procedure, based on existing IRP and IFTA fee collection, would allow for one-stop 
shopping for carriers requiring overweight vehicle permits in multiple jurisdictions.  
Following the establishment of streamlined permit acquisition, states DOTs could turn to 
the issue of harmonizing the TS&W limits and which vehicle configurations can be 
permitted to exceed those limits.  A single permit collection and distribution tool would 
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have small, but real, productivity gains while true harmonization would be even more 
efficient. 
 
5.4.1 International Registration Plan 
The International Registration Plan (IRP) is an agreement among the individual 
states in the United States, Washington, D.C., and the ten provinces of Canada to 
streamline the vehicle registration process (IRP, 2012).  The IRP is a reciprocity system 
based on the distance traveled in each jurisdiction.  Any vehicle that travels in two or 
more of the member jurisdictions must register their vehicles with IRP license plates.  
Carriers who travel interstate must register with IRP but those who operate exclusively 
intrastate may choose to register with IRP or a state specific system. 
The amount of IRP registration fees that a carrier pays to a given state is dependent 
on the distances traveled in each jurisdiction and the registration fees for that vehicle if it 
were to operate exclusively in that jurisdiction.  For example, if a vehicle travels 25% of 
the total annual distance in Jurisdiction A, 50% in Jurisdiction B, and the remaining 25% 
in Jurisdiction C, the IRP for that vehicle is 25% of the cost of the vehicle registration in 
Jurisdiction A plus 50% of the registration in Jurisdiction B plus 25% of the registration 
in Jurisdiction C.  When a carrier is registering his vehicle fleet, he first contacts the base 
jurisdiction, which is the state or province where the business is established, then pays the 
IRP to the base jurisdiction.  IRP handles the transfer of money amongst jurisdictions 
based on the distances traveled in each jurisdiction.  The carrier receives a single plate for 
each vehicle which allows that vehicle to operate between multiple jurisdictions, instead 
of a license for each state or province.  The participating jurisdictions have lower 
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administrative costs because there are fewer registrations to handle—only those for 
whom it is the base jurisdiction and a transfer via IRP. 
The IRP framework could easily be extended to regional overweight vehicle 
permitting where states use fixed fees because registrations are also based on fixed fees.  
Although the total amount of registration with IRP is based on the distances apportioned 
to each jurisdiction, each individual jurisdiction’s registration fees are based on the 
vehicle.  The registration fees themselves do not depend on the amount of mileage.  
Similarly, fixed fees for overweight vehicle trips are typically for a single trip or a 
number of trips in a set period of time.  The primary disadvantage of fixed fee permits is 
that there is limited relationship between the fee and the actual cost of asset consumption.  
This also typically results in only a small fraction of cost recovery. 
The IRP framework could still be appropriate for incentivizing the use of 
infrastructure-friendly vehicles.  In the Indiana context, overweight vehicles that are 
loaded to less than 2.40 ESALs are considered infrastructure-friendly and thus eligible 
for annual, multi-trip permits at a low cost.  If states can agree on the vehicles that are 
infrastructure-friendly and thus eligible for multi-trip or blanket permits using fixed fees, 
the notion of a base state and apportioned fees could be used to streamline overweight 
permit fee collection.  The same base state that applies for IRP registration could collect 
the apportioned overweight permit fees for multiple jurisdictions.  A third party could 
then redistribute the apportioned permit fees among jurisdictions.  This framework would 
save the carriers time and money by avoiding having to apply to and pay each state 
independently.  The framework would not pose any additional burdens on the individual 
states because only those vehicles determined to be infrastructure-friendly, which would 
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qualify for multi-trip or blanket permits anyway, would participate in the harmonized 
permit system. 
 
5.4.2 International Fuel Tax Agreement 
Alongside IRP, the International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA) is another agreement 
among the United States and Canadian provinces (but not territories) used to streamline 
operations.  While IRP collects and redistributes registration fees, IFTA collects and 
redistributes fuel taxes from motor vehicle carriers.  IFTA uses the same concept of base 
jurisdiction and allows each jurisdiction authority to determine the appropriate tax rates 
and exemptions.  Similar to the single license plate issued with IRP registration, 
companies file a single tax return each quarter with the base jurisdiction and make one 
tax payment or receive one tax refund.  IFTA jurisdictions similarly benefit from having 
fewer taxpayers, lower administrative costs, increased audit coverage, and increased 
enforcement. 
IFTA differs from IRP because fuel taxes are paid at the pump and adjusted after-
the-fact using tax return data.  The IFTA tax returns from the carrier to the base 
jurisdiction include the fuel taxes paid in each jurisdiction and the miles traveled in each 
jurisdiction.  Each base jurisdiction then processes the information and provides reports 
and payments (as appropriate) to the other jurisdictions.  After processing the data and 
payments from all of the other jurisdictions, the base jurisdiction either provides a tax 
refund or requests additional taxes, as appropriate, from each carrier in its jurisdiction. 
The IFTA framework with per-mile fees (or, more specifically, per-gallon fees 
which are related to miles traveled through vehicle fuel economies) is more conducive to 
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the overweight permit fees that are based on actual consumption.  The IFTA framework 
may also be more flexible for harmonization among states that want to charge overweight 
vehicles different amounts based on the distance traveled.  For example, Indiana’s 
overweight commodity permits which are based on $/ESAL-miles can be converted into 
$/mile using simple ESAL calculations for each vehicle.  If other Midwestern states 
moved toward distance based fees (instead of current annual, fixed fees in Ohio and 
Kentucky), each state could collect the permit fees from the carriers within their 
jurisdiction and transfer fees as appropriate to the other states based on distances traveled 
in each state. 
For both IRP and IFTA, harmonization only requires that the vehicle dimensions 
and weights permitted in each state be consistent.  The fees associated with overweight 
vehicle trips can still differ from one jurisdiction to another.  IRP and IFTA are example 
tools that can be used to administer permit programs, collect fees, and redistribute 
collected revenues among multiple jurisdictions, not methods to determine what the 
harmonized vehicle dimensions and weight should be.  Thus, IRP and IFTA type tools for 
streamlining overweight vehicle permitting administration are an incremental step toward 
harmonization 
 
5.5 Requirements for Consistent Truck Size and Weight Limits 
Consistent TS&W limits and oversize/overweight limits can provide more 
efficiency over the one-stop shopping of an IRP or IFTA based permitting program; 
however, they are substantially more difficult to attain.  An added benefit of, and an 
incentive for states to pursue, consistent limits within regions and ultimately nationally is 
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that carriers would have a larger market to operate overweight vehicles within, which 
would result in more efficient operations.  With a larger market, states can also work 
collectively to influence carriers to use vehicles that are less damaging to highway 
infrastructure. 
The first requirement to achieve TS&W and overweight size and weight regulation 
harmonization is significant political will to accomplish the objective.  The USDOT 
(2004) indicated that lack of state support was a significant and valid reason for not 
implementing the Western Uniformity Scenario in 2004.  Lack of political motivation is a 
leading factor for lack of uniformity among NAFTA nations (Mercier, 2007).  In contrast, 
strong national agreement from multiple stakeholders that non-uniform size and weight 
regulations contribute to economic inefficiencies was a significant factor in the creation 
of the MOU in Canada (Woodrooffe et al., 2011; Walton et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, federal TS&W limits were first established out of a need for 
uniformity.  Uniform TS&W regulations protect infrastructure from deterioration beyond 
the loads for which it was designed; however, at the same time, trucking companies 
benefit from a network they can reliably use to move goods within the federal vehicle 
limits.  The periodic national TS&W limit studies indicate a continued interest in federal 
TS&W limits.  Alternative scenarios in those studies, which include longer and heavier 
vehicles, indicate interest in vehicles that are more economically efficient.  Unfortunately, 
states’ use of grandfather rights to allow vehicles beyond the federal TS&W limits has 
significantly limited the ability to establish uniformity as more and more states exercise 
their rights for specific industries. 
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TRB (2002) describes this process as “ratcheting” up of vehicle regulations.  A 
given industry gains more permissive regulations in one state.  This creates pressure on 
neighboring states to also increase limits or risk economic disadvantages.  Over time, any 
neighboring states that do not increase limits are labeled as barriers.  Over the longer time 
period, that can result in universal increases above the previously more restrictive 
“uniform” requirements.  Unfortunately, the ratcheting up of TS&W regulations does not 
necessarily result in uniformly-ratcheted TS&W regulations. 
The metal transport industry in the Midwest is a prime example of this process.  
Compared to other Midwestern states, Michigan has axle weight limits that are more 
permissive from the perspective of total GVW compared to other Midwestern states.  The 
largest GVW in Michigan is 164,000 lbs when all of the axle weight regulations are 
followed.  In response, Kentucky and Ohio have permitted overweight divisible loads up 
to 120,000 lbs to move steel coils.  The new Indiana overweight commodity permits now 
allow similar loads of metal goods up to 120,000 lbs in Indiana.  Although Indiana, 
Kentucky, and Ohio now have similar maximum GVW limits for overweight metal 
divisible loads, they are much lower than Michigan’s limits. 
TRB (2002) also recognized that the ratcheting process has occurred in primarily 
political arenas with limited engineering involvement.  The overweight commodity 
permits in Indiana were first introduced through the state legislature and then INDOT 
was tasked with performing an engineering evaluation.  The economic political interests 
were evident in the requirement that the comprehensive study of impacts include an 
evaluation of the economic competitiveness compared to other Midwestern states.  The 
ratcheting up of TS&W regulations indicates that elected officials are currently more 
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concerned with maintaining competitiveness and economic advantages over neighboring 
states rather than cooperative efforts at increasing productivity while preserving 
infrastructure and maintaining safety and mobility.  Infrastructure-friendly vehicles 
provide a basis for a win-win scenario.  A paradigm shift is necessary to generate the 
political will necessary to pursue these types of solutions. 
In addition to the political will, a second requirement for successful harmonization 
is input from all interested stakeholders.  Representatives from all interested state 
departments of transportation, state governments, the federal government, and interested 
industries must be involved.  State transportation officials are best able to provide 
technical input on the amount of asset consumption attributable to overweight vehicles. 
State and federal government representatives are able to identify and pursue any enabling 
legislation necessary to move toward harmonization.  Finally, industry representatives are 
best able to indicate configurations that are likely to be adopted by the industry.  Often 
there is a disconnect between the transportation departments (whose perspective is asset 
consumption) and trucking companies (whose perspective is the allowable payload).  
Inclusion of all interested parties throughout the harmonization process helps ensure that 
desired outcomes, in terms of productivity improvements and transportation system 
preservation, are achieved and undesirable consequences are prevented or mitigated. 
An example of successful collaboration of both officials in multiple jurisdictions 
and industry representatives to improve oversize-overweight vehicle permitting is the 
Manitoba experience accommodating increased truck traffic from the petroleum industry 
(Reimer et al., 2014).  Advances in technology caused a boom in petroleum extraction in 
Southwest portions of Manitoba, Canada, near the border with Saskatchewan (Canada) 
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and North Dakota (United States).  Uniquely configured heavy vehicles carrying both 
non-divisible and divisible loads are necessary at different points in the petroleum 
production process which cannot be paused once started.  Often, the vehicles are oversize 
or overweight and require permits from the Manitoba government.  Also, the only routes 
to and from the petroleum wells often include rural roads historically used for farm-to-
market trips which were not designed for the new vehicles used by the petroleum industry. 
The Manitoba government brought together a stakeholder committee including 
industry representatives and various Manitoba government agencies responsible for 
transportation, water resources, and planning to address the need for streamlined 
permitting.  The Manitoba government also collaborated with representatives from 
Saskatchewan and North Dakota to reduce administrative barriers for overweight vehicle 
operators traveling through the three jurisdictions.  The result of these interactions is a 
special permitting program for oversize/overweight vehicles routinely used by the 
petroleum industry in Manitoba.  The special program expedites permitting by issuing 
annual blanket permits for service rigs, winch-bed trucks, concrete trucks, and pumper 
trucks specific to petroleum extraction without requiring a bridge assessment for each 
single trip.  The Manitoba government decided to offer these permits following an 
extensive data collection program and a quantitative assessment of the truck traffic 
associated with the petroleum industry (Reimer et al., 2014). 
In addition to political will and engagement from multiple stakeholders, 
Woodrooffe et al. (2011) identified several other lessons in the creation of the Canadian 
MOU that could apply to regional harmonization of TS&W regulations in the United  
States.  Although a truly performance-based system for establishing TS&W limits and 
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exceptions in the United States is likely far off, conversations among regional 
stakeholders interested in harmonization should have a sound technical basis.  Decision 
makers should have engineering support for the amount of infrastructure consumption 
attributable to various vehicle configurations, the dynamic handling of those vehicles, 
and the number of vehicle trips necessary to move the same amoung of goods using each 
vehicle configuration. 
Woodroofe et al. (2011) also highlighted the incentives inherent in the Canadian 
MOU to develop and use vehicles that are more productive and have as good as or better 
dynamic handling than existing.  The Indiana annual, multi-trip permits provide such an 
incentive while the Kentucky and Ohio blanket permits do not.  Efforts at regional 
harmonization should maintain some incentive structure for development of vehicles that 
are beneficial for industry while protecting highway infrastructure assets. 
Finally, Woodrooffe et al. (2011) highlighted the formal structures in place to both 
ccreate and oversee a uniform set of TS&W regulations in Canada.  In addition to the 
stakeholders participating in harmonization efforts, either the same body or a third party 
should be established to oversee implementation.  Implementation is not a one-time issue 
because constant monitoring is neccesary to ensure that the desirable outcomes of 
increased productivity, increased safety, reduced environemntal impacts, and reduced 
asset consumption continue to be achieved.  Without routine monitoring, the ratcheting 




5.6 Advantages of Regional Cooperation 
The advantages of regional harmonization include increased understanding of 
vehicle-infrastructure interactions, increased economic efficiency, less administrative 
efforts, and easier enforcement efforts and compliance with TS&W regulations. 
The current regulatory environment has resulted in significant subsidization of 
truck freight.  Individual states must balance the needs to preserve deteriorating 
infrastructure and promote economic interests at the state level.  Typically, the balance 
favors the economic interests as states continue to exercise grandfather rights to compete 
against one another by permitting more oversize/overweight operations without 
recovering the cost of using the system.  International experience has shown that it is 
possible to address both infrastructure preservation and economic productivity.  Regional 
harmonization would address both of these needs by placing them collectively above the 
notion of competing with neighboring states. 
Uniform oversize/overweight regulations for industries of regional significance 
would streamline efforts for both the trucking companies and state agencies.  The carriers 
would benefit by using the same equipment with the same load in multiple states.  A 
common permit program administered by multiple states could provide a single type of 
permit which is easier for state enforcement agencies to identify.  Similarly, if permits 
were easier to obtain through a common permit program, there is one less reason (among 
many) for violators to operate without permits.  Finally, both trucking companies and 
transportation agencies save time and money when multiple single trip permits for the 
same few vehicles and routes are replaced by a single request.  Using the IRP and IFTA 
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frameworks for reciprocity, each state is only responsible for the carriers that identify it 
as the base state. 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided a qualitative discussion about harmonization of 
oversize/overweight permitting practices.  Although the United States has officially 
articulated uniform federal TS&W limits, the grandfather rights included in all surface 
transportation authorization legislation has created a fragmented network of less than 
optimal state TS&W limits and oversize/overweight permitting programs.  Performance-
based systems which look at both the productivity and the dynamic handling of vehicles 
have been used to allow longer and heavier vehicles in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and the European Union.  Canada and the member countries of the European Union have 
achieved a high degree of uniformity in their TS&W regulations.  Although the 
performance-based approach would result in more optimal vehicle fleets, the United 
States can still make incremental improvements through regional harmonization of 
permitting practices.  Harmonization is beneficial both to the overweight permit users and 





CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORKS 
6.1 Four Options for Overweight Vehicle Permitting 
The primary benefit of using overweight vehicles is that the same amount of goods 
are moved with fewer trips, which translates into fuel cost savings, vehicle operation and 
maintenance cost savings, lower driver wages, less congestion and emissions, and so on.  
The monetary savings may be passed on by the carriers to the shippers in their negotiated 
contracts.  Unfortunately, the damage to highway infrastructure due to overweight trucks 
is significant and has a sharply increasing non-linear relationship with weight.  In the 
case of pavement consumption, doubling the weight on an individual axle does more than 
sixteen times the damage.  Past research has identified a wide gap between the actual cost 
of consumption attributable to overweight vehicles and the amount of revenues collected 
to offset the damage.  The status quo where individual states exercise grandfather rights 
to permit overweight divisible loads has generally resulted in significant subsidization of 
the trucking industry.  The sizeable amount of uncompensated consumption of highway 
infrastructure assets attributable to overweight vehicles is a problem consistent with the 
classic issue referred to as the Tragedy of the Commons.   
In addition to the ongoing transportation tragedy of the commons, the current 
system of individual state regulations for oversize and overweight vehicles beyond the 
federal TS&W regulations has resulted in a non-optimal piecemeal network of 
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regulations.  Thus, for interstate commerce, trucking companies that are able to operate 
more efficiently using overweight divisible loads must choose between vehicles that are 
less productive because their configuration represents the least common denominator 
across different state regulations, or configure vehicles and purchase permits to meet the 
requirements of multiple jurisdictions.  In some cases, for the same load being 
transported, different vehicles are used in the different states along the route to take 
advantage of more efficient overweight operations.  Additionally, the requirements 
among “competing” jurisdictions are not optimal for asset preservation from a national 
standpoint when states use more favorable overweight practices to attract economic 
activity from neighboring states. 
The current study has explored four alternatives to the traditional overweight 
vehicle permits issued by individual states:  optimization of traditional vehicle permitting 
mechanisms, incentives for infrastructure-friendly vehicles, a quota system with auction 
allocation, and regional and national harmonization of overweight vehicle permitting 
practices.  These four alternatives are not mutually exclusive and can be combined to 
improve overweight vehicle permitting. 
 
6.1.1 Optimization of Traditional Permitting Mechanisms 
Highway agencies must balance the competing needs of preserving the taxpayer-
funded highway infrastructure and supporting continuing economic activity within their 
borders.  If the permit fees are too low compared to the cost of consumption, the rate of 
highway infrastructure deterioration is exacerbated.  In the long term, this has negative 
impacts on both the trucking companies and the general traveling public in terms of 
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vehicle operating costs and safety.  In contrast, a general argument from various 
industries against permit fees that recover the full cost of consumption (or advocating for 
exemptions and exceptions to existing permits) is that the high costs of permit acquisition 
raises the cost of doing business in those industries.  Industries indicate that the increases 
would necessarily be passed through the economy to consumers.  In one instance in 
Virginia, construction industry representatives indicated that if exemptions were not 
issued, or if permit fees were increased, the added cost would be passed back to the state 
through higher construction costs (VTRC, 2008).  Similar sentiments from other 
industries were detailed in other state TS&W and overweight vehicle studies. 
 Although these conflicting objectives have been identified and addressed 
separately in previous research, limited quantitative analysis has been completed to 
optimize permit fees.  The present study established a general framework that 
appropriately models the agency’s goals with respect to both asset preservation and ease 
of trade and commerce, then applied that general framework to Indiana using Indiana 
specific parameter estimates.  In contrast to existing literature, the present study used the 
permit fee as the decision variable in the multiobjective optimization formulation because 
the agency has direct control over the permit fee.  Additionally, the general 
multiobjective optimization framework herein is the first to accurately capture carrier 
decision making by using the total logistics cost savings in the agency’s objective to 
facilitate economic activity. 
The general multiobjective optimization formulation developed in the current study 
minimizes the uncompensated consumption cost and maximizes the total logistics cost 
savings.  The first objective, to minimize uncompensated compensation, protects 
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highway assets from excessive damage above the fees collected through the sale of 
permits.  The second objective, to maximize total logistics cost savings, reflects the 
substantial cost savings companies can achieve through overweight vehicle operations.  
The total logistics cost savings reflects all costs savings, both transportation costs and 
inventory costs, minus any permit expenses.  The multiobjective optimization 
formulation developed in this study also accounts for the additional demand for 
overweight vehicle permits when the cost of permits is low (and thus the total logistics 
cost savings are at their highest). 
Parameters for the general multiobjective optimization formulation were estimated 
for the case study of Indiana overweight commodity permits.  Indiana overweight 
commodity permits are a new type of permit for overweight divisible loads in Indiana up 
to 97,000 lbs for agricultural goods and 120,000 lbs for metal goods.  Parameters were 
estimated using data relevant to Indiana. 
In multiobjective optimization, a single optimal solution typically does not exist 
because the objectives conflict.  Instead, there are many (often infinite) Pareto optimal 
points where the value of one objective function cannot be improved without a loss in at 
least one other objective function.  For the Indiana overweight commodity permits, the 
Pareto frontier of Pareto optimal solutions was found and graphed for a range of prices in 
dollars per ESAL-mile.  Every point on the Pareto frontier corresponds to the 
uncompensated consumption cost and total logistics cost savings associated with a 
particular fee (in $/ESAL-mile). 
In addition to the Pareto frontier, tradeoffs can be established from the multiple 
optimal solutions of multiobjective optimization problems.  The tradeoff between 
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uncompensated consumption cost and total logistics cost savings were calculated for 
discrete levels of the permit fee for the Indiana case study. 
Both the Pareto optimal frontier and the tradeoff analysis provide data that are 
helpful to INDOT in choosing an appropriate fee structure for overweight commodity 
permits.  INDOT can compare the current uncompensated consumption (approximately 
$32 million) and total logistics cost savings ($103.7 million) with a permit fee of $0.07 
per ESAL-mile to the uncompensated consumption and total logistics cost savings at a 
different fee per ESAL-mile.  Based on INDOT’s preferences, a higher or lower fee may 
be appropriate to decrease the uncompensated consumption or increase savings, 
respectively.  The general form of the multiobjective optimization problem can be used 
by other states with modifications to the estimated parameters to reflect the actual cost of 
consumption and total logistics cost savings in those states under different permit fee 
schedules. 
 
6.1.2 Incentives for Infrastructure-Friendly Vehicle Usage 
The second alternative considered in the present research is incentives or mandates 
for vehicles that are less damaging to highway infrastructure assets.  Infrastructure-
friendly vehicles represent a win-win situation because they consume less of the common 
highway infrastructure but can still be loaded to carry goods more productively which 
benefits carriers. 
The Turner proposal, first voiced by Francis Turner in 1984, advocated for a 
decrease in the federal axle load limits but an increase in the federal total GVW and 
length limits.  The lower axle load limits result in less damage to pavements.  Michigan’s 
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unique TS&W regulations adhere to the spirit of the Turner proposal—lower individual 
axle weight limits with higher overall GVW limits.  Michigan’s TS&W limits are 
mandated rather than incentivized for all vehicles above the federal GVW limit of 80,000 
lbs.  Indiana has incentivized infrastructure-friendly vehicle operations through annual, 
multi-trip overweight commodity permits introduced in the Emergency Rules for 
overweight commodity permits.  Vehicles that are loaded and configured to be 2.40 
ESALs or less may operate in Indiana for an annual fee of $20 in contrast to the 
thousands of dollars in single-permit fees a company might pay for several trips made by 
vehicles above 2.40 ESALs. 
A stated preference survey was conducted to elicit information about individual 
trucking companies’ willingness to invest in infrastructure-friendly vehicles.  When 
monetary amounts were not included, the vast majority of respondents indicated 
willingness to invest in equipment that is less damaging to infrastructure; however, less 
than a third were willing to do so in a contingent valuation analysis which included 
monetary amounts.  The mean willingness to pay for investment in infrastructure-friendly 
vehicles was estimated to be less than $4,000 in the state of Indiana. 
 
6.1.3 Overweight Vehicle Quota with Auction Allocation 
The framework for an overweight vehicle quota and auction was established to 
allocate a maximum amount of infrastructure consumption that can be accommodated 
without additional funds or reconfiguration of vehicles.  Quotas give the transportation 
agency direct control over the amount of infrastructure consumption allowable by 
overweight vehicles.  After establishing an initial quota, the state DOT can control the 
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growth of overweight vehicles, and thus the growth in consumption attributable to those 
vehicles.  This can prevent an exponential growth in uncompensated loadings from 
overweight vehicles. 
The auction allocation mechanism specifically provides an indication of the value 
of overweight vehicle permits through the market clearing price.  Although many 
industries advocate for lower permit prices or exemptions from permit regulations, the 
fact that many companies continue to purchase permits indicates that the permits are 
worth at least as much as the current fees.  The results of an auction would help to 
quantify the amount trucking companies are willing to spend to acquire permits for 
overweight vehicles.  Several auction formats were considered and the open English 
auction format was recommended.  Other allocation mechanisms, such as a cap and trade 
system, could be implemented but may not give as much information about the value 
carriers’ place on overweight vehicle permits. 
Various auction parameters were defined for Indiana.  The measure for the quota is 
blocks of 500 ESAL-miles of travel.  ESAL-mile blocks are a useful measure because 
individual trucking companies can choose to modify either the ESALs of the vehicles or 
the miles traveled to maximize use of any single block.  Based on current demand for 
overweight commodity permits, the initial supply, or annual quota, is estimated to be 
96,000 blocks of 500 ESAL-miles annually, or 8,000 blocks each month. 
In addition to the infrastructure-friendly vehicle questions, the stated preference 
survey elicited information about how many blocks of 500 ESAL-miles of travel a 
company would request and how much the company would pay.  These data were used to 
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estimate a preliminary valuation of overweight vehicle permits in dollars per ESAL-mile 
of travel. 
 
6.1.4 Regional or National Harmonization of TS&W Limits 
Finally, recommendations were made to mitigate the current inefficiencies in the 
network of TS&W and oversize/overweight regulations in the United States through 
national, or at least regional, cooperation.  The piecemeal network of state TS&W limits 
and oversize/overweight regulations has undermined the official federal TS&W limits.  
Although most long-haul and interstate truck freight is carried in 5-axle, 80,000lbs 
vehicles, overweight vehicles could be more efficient for trucking companies than the 
lighter vehicles that meet federal requirements.  Individual states have increasingly 
exercised grandfather rights to permit overweight divisible loads in direct response to the 
more permissive regulations of neighboring states.  This has ratcheted up oversize and 
overweight practices.  At the same time, the discrepancies that continue to exist between 
neighboring states is a burden on trucking companies that operate in more than one 
jurisdiction. 
Regional harmonization among multiple states has several potential benefits.  First, 
states can focus more on preserving infrastructure than on competing with one another 
through ever more permissive overweight programs to attract industries to the individual 
state.  Coalitions of states can focus on industries that benefit the entire region to find 
trucking solutions that are beneficial to both those industries and the transportation 
agencies of each state.  Additionally, enforcement efforts can be simplified if there is a 
single overweight vehicle regime.  Trucking companies will be more likely to use the 
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vehicles that are permitted in multiple states to comply with a single set of overweight 
regulations than attempt to meet as many or all of a number of different limits.  Finally, if 
there is a mechanism similar to the IRP and IFTA, which collect and distribute 
registration and fuel taxes, respectively, in place for overweight vehicle permit fees, 
individual states will not need to collect from all users separately and trucking companies 
can make payments through a single base state.  These mechanisms simplify the process 
of applying and paying for multiple overweight vehicle permits in multiple locations. 
 
6.2 Future Research Directions 
The following sections outline improvements and extensions that can be made in 
the area of overweight vehicle permitting. 
 
6.2.1 Refinements to Overweight Vehicle Permit Optimization 
The general framework for optimizing traditional overweight vehicle permits 
considered only the agency’s goals to preserve highway assets and facilitate trade and 
commerce.  The agency is also concerned with safety and mobility.  Previous research 
has not conclusively quantified the impacts of overweight vehicles on safety and mobility.  
Additional research in this area should inform future multiobjective optimization analysis 
of overweight vehicle permits.  Additional objectives should include maximizing or 
minimizing the benefits or negative impacts, respectively, with respect to safety and 
mobility.  Additionally, future research should consider different model forms for the 




6.2.2 Rationality of Operator Decision Making 
The curves representing the willingness to pay for infrastructure-friendly vehicles 
presented in Chapter 3 do not meet with expectations that trucking companies will 
typically be risk averse.  A willingness to pay curve roughly corresponds to a utility curve.  
Utility curves are convex for risk lovers, linear for risk neutral individuals, and concave 
for risk adverse individuals.  Therefore, under the assumption that the trucking industry, 
as a whole, would be risk averse, the expected shape of all estimated willingness to pay 
curves should be concave.  Concave utility curves correspond to decreasing marginal 
utility, or in this case, decreasing marginal willingness to pay for investment. 
The raw data elicited in the stated choice survey, depicted in Figure 3.7, in Chapter 
3, is approximately linear indicating relatively risk neutral behavior; however, the data 
calibrated to remove hypothetical bias are convex, indicated risk taking behavior.  Most 
of the estimated willingness to pay for investment curves are convex.  The willingness to 
pay curve estimated for companies broadly interested in annual permits with an average 
number of employees is concave from approximately $0 to $7,500 in investment, then 
convex for values above $7,500.  The inflection point indicates that companies with these 
characteristics are risk averse at low amounts but risk taking at higher amounts.  At first 
glance, these conclusions do not seem consistent with expectation.  The discrepancy 
between the expected and the estimated willingness to pay curves suggests that 
respondents to the survey potentially were not making rational decisions based on the 
present value of purchasing permits compared to investing in infrastructure-friendly 
vehicles.  Future research should explore this behavior. 
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One possible explanation is that the responding companies are generally unwilling 
to invest, given uncertainties about future permitting mechanisms.  The overweight 
commodity permits introduced in Indiana are new and subject to changes through 
INDOT’s final rulemaking.  At industry forums, and in the survey comments, interested 
trucking company representatives indicated that they might be more willing and able to 
make decisions about investment if the fee structures were known.  Contracts between 
trucking companies and shippers are often agreed to in advance.  Additionally, vehicles 
in the fleet are replaced after several years of use.  Many survey comments indicated that 
companies would not invest much in the fleet while Emergency Rules are in place for 
fear that the fee schedules could change and investment could be wasted.  The 
willingness to pay curves may change in the future once trucking companies have more 
information about the permitting fee schedule for overweight commodity permits and 
their costs for permit acquisition.  Additionally, companies may be more likely to invest 
in new equipment to replace vehicles that are nearing the end of their service life. 
 
6.2.3 Experimental Economics Methods 
The available survey data are not sufficient to simulate the auction framework 
developed in this study.  Unfortunately, many trucking companies have not or cannot 
quantify what their private value is for holding overweight vehicle permits.  Future 
research should consider the equilibrium market clearing price for overweight vehicle 
permits. 
Experimental economics methods are laboratory methods used to study economic 
questions that are difficult to observe or solve analytically.  Given sufficient reliable data, 
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bid vectors could be calibrated and estimated for many participants in a simulated 
overweight vehicle auction.  Monte Carlo simulations could be used to estimate the 
market clearing price.  A large amount of data would be necessary for this undertaking.  
In contrast, experimental economics methods could be used to create an auction 
environment to observe the bidding behaviors of participating trucking company 
representatives.  The bidding behavior and subsequent market clearing price would 
indicate not only the value of holding overweight vehicle permits, but also any irrational 
behavior from participants. 
The challenge in using experimental economics methods to further study the 
auction framework developed herein is ensuring the auction experiment sufficiently 
replicates the auction process that would be put in place.  Similar to the cheap talk script 
used at the beginning of the surveys, setting up the auction similar to the actual 
mechanism that would be implemented creates consequentiality.  Additionally, the 
participants must be individuals who make investment decisions for trucking 
companies—CEOs, CFOs, independent owners, etc.—because the general public likely 
would behave differently than individuals making decisions on behalf of their 
organization who are knowledgeable about the trucking industry. 
 
6.2.4 Performance-based TS&W Limit Regulation 
Finally, additional research into performance-based TS&W limit regulation could 
help further the goal of regional and national harmonization.  One of the biggest 
disadvantages of individual states exercising grandfather rights is that the piecemeal 
network of state TS&W limits and oversize/overweight regulations are prescriptive.  As 
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long as carriers use vehicles that are within limits, they are in compliance with the laws, 
even though some vehicles that are within limits are more efficient, safer, or consume 
less highway infrastructure than others also within those limits.  A performance-based 
approach transitions from prescriptive limits to defined measures that must be met, 
regardless of vehicle size and weight.  The performance-based approach also has the 
potential to yield more optimal vehicle configurations. 
Performance-based TS&W limits and oversize/overweight permit programs would 
also help address the competing needs of preserving infrastructure and supporting 
economic activity.  Trucking companies would be able to use the most productive 
equipment that meets performance standards, such as the number of ESALs, braking 
distance, or handling measures.  At the same time, state agencies would have metrics in 
place to ensure vehicles in use are safe and protect infrastructure from undue 
deterioration. 
Future research in the area of performance-based TS&W regulation among the 
individual states may include the performance measures that should be used, standard 
values for those measures, and the relationship between different vehicle configurations 
or dimensions that influence the value of important performance measures. 
 
6.3 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
This study considered multiple options for addressing the consumption of highway 
infrastructure by overweight vehicles which collectively add to the discussion of 
overweight vehicle permitting.  The research makes four major contributions.  First, the 
general multiobjective optimization formulation contained herein is an improvement on 
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previous research because the new formulation more appropriately models choices made 
by relevant decision makers.  Second, the analysis quantified carriers’ willingness to pay 
for infrastructure-friendly vehicles in Indiana.  Third, the framework for an overweight 
vehicle quota and auction allocation has not previously been applied to overweight 
vehicles.  Finally, a qualitative framework was developed to incrementally achieve 
harmonization by first instituting a one-stop shopping tool for permit administration then 
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Appendix A Summary of ITIC Results for Different ESAL-mile Based Permit Fees 
This Appendix presents the summary tables for each successive model run of the 
Intermodal Transportation and Inventory Cost (ITIC) model software.  For each run, the 






Table A.1 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.01/ESAL-mile 
0.01 
















50 1 205 122 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




6827.5875 121.6495 10793108.57 2831081.83 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 198673.809 2878.774488 144396334.5 30805700.02 29150640.67 0 204554227.8 -70835037.69 
 Logistics 











Table A.2 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.02/ESAL-mile 
0.02 
















51 1 205 121 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




7352.098 121.6495 10793108.57 2830557.32 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 209696.2062 2878.774488 144396334.5 30799153.1 29150640.67 0 204558703.3 -70830562.22 
 Logistics 
















Table A.3 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.05/ESAL-mile 
0.05 
















51 2 204 121 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




7352.098 234.179 10792996.04 2830557.32 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 209696.2062 5889.070603 144393640.2 30799153.1 29150640.67 0 204559019.2 -70830246.3 
 Logistics 











Table A.4 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.07/ESAL-mile 
0.07 
















52 2 204 120 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




7776.599 234.179 10792996.04 2830132.819 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 220715.9365 5889.070603 144393640.2 30792607.75 29150640.67 0 204563493.6 -70825771.91 
 Logistics 
















Table A.5 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.10/ESAL-mile 
0.10 
















53 3 203 119 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




8176.403 399.849 10792830.37 2829733.015 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 232577.2102 9298.198926 144390588.8 30785562.56 29150640.67 0 204568667.4 -70820598.05 
 Logistics 











Table A.6 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.25/ESAL-mile 
0.25 
















55 6 200 117 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




9295.592 1068.648 10792161.57 2828613.826 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 262045.8317 23641.45403 144377750.8 30768059.2 29150640.67 0 204582138 -70807127.51 
 Logistics 














Table A.7 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.40/ESAL-mile 
0.40 
















67 16 190 105 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




24269.191 5426.2755 10787803.94 2813640.227 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 538636.8207 113991.631 144296882.7 30603773.58 29150640.67 0 204703925.4 -70685340.15 
 Logistics 









Table A.8 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.50/ESAL-mile 
0.50 
















79 55 151 93 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




54190.021 540726.344 10252503.88 2783719.397 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 1076452.14 10192429.52 135276148 30284329.6 29150640.67 0 205979999.9 -69409265.58 
 Logistics 
















Table A.9 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $0.75/ESAL-mile 
0.75 
















172 132 74 0 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




2837909.418 9012122.869 1781107.351 0 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 52063096.31 112712678.7 43515105.69 0 29150640.67 0 237441521.4 -37947744.1 
 Logistics 











Table A.10 Summary of ITIC Results for Introduction of Overweight Commodity Permits at $1.00/ESAL-mile 
1.00 
















172 142 64 0 65 0 443 0 
Tons 




2837909.418 10709747.22 83483 0 61870 0 13693009.64 12841772.64 
Truck 
VMT 52063096.31 128432716.6 29444840.88 0 29150640.67 0 239091294.4 -36297971.09 
 Logistics 














Appendix B GAMS Output for Multiobjective Optimization 
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     MODEL   mod_payoff          OBJECTIVE  obj 
     TYPE    NLP                 DIRECTION  MAXIMIZE 
     SOLVER  CONOPT              FROM LINE  163 
 
**** SOLVER STATUS     1 NORMAL COMPLETION          
**** MODEL STATUS      2 LOCALLY OPTIMAL            
**** OBJECTIVE VALUE                0.0000 
 
 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT          0.023      1000.000 
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT         4         10000 
 EVALUATION ERRORS              0             0 
  
  
    C O N O P T 3   version 3.14S 
    Copyright (C)   ARKI Consulting and Development A/S 
                    Bagsvaerdvej 246 A 
                    DK-2880 Bagsvaerd, Denmark 
  
 Using default options. 
  
  
    The model has 5 variables and 6 constraints 
    with 11 Jacobian elements, 5 of which are nonlinear. 
    The Hessian of the Lagrangian has 1 elements on the diagonal, 
    1 elements below the diagonal, and 2 nonlinear variables. 
  
 ** Optimal solution. There are no superbasic variables. 
  
  
 CONOPT time Total                            0.004 seconds 
   of which: Function evaluations             0.000 =  0.0% 
             1st Derivative evaluations       0.000 =  0.0% 
  




    Estimate         =     0.03 Mbytes 
    Max used         =     0.01 Mbytes 
 
 
**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT 
                             0 INFEASIBLE 
                             0  UNBOUNDED 
                             0     ERRORS 
GAMS Rev 230  WEX-VIS 23.0.2 x86/MS Windows             10/03/14 
18:26:06 Page 6 
eps-Constraint Method for Multiobjective Optimization (EPSCM,SEQ=319) 
E x e c u t i o n 
 
 
----    171 no optimal solution for mod_payoff 
**** Exec Error at line 171: Execution halted:  
 
 




USER: GAMS Development Corporation, Washington, DC   G871201/0000CA-ANY 
      Free Demo,  202-342-0180,  sales@gams.com,  www.gams.com   DC0000 
 
 
**** FILE SUMMARY 
 
Input      \\myhome.itap.purdue.edu\myhome\severet\My 
Documents\gamsdir\projdir\ 
           epscm_permitfee3.gms 
Output     \\myhome.itap.purdue.edu\myhome\severet\My 
Documents\gamsdir\projdir\ 
           epscm_permitfee3.lst 
 
















































Stephanie R. Everett was born in Tampa, Florida on March 23, 1988 to Janet and Larry 
Everett.  She received her Bachelor of Science in Engineering in May 2010 from Duke 
University, where she studied Civil and Environmental Engineering and completed a 
minor in Religion.  Stephanie followed in her mother’s footsteps (BSCE ’76, MSCE ’78) 
when she arrived at Purdue University in August 2010.  As a Ross Fellow in the 
Transportation Engineering and Infrastructure Systems group within the School of Civil 
Engineering, Stephanie completed her Master of Science in Civil Engineering degree in 
May 2012.  She has conducted research in a variety of areas including performance based 
programming, ex-post facto program evaluation, lane-use management, and overweight 
vehicle operations.  Stephanie’s current interests are focused on transportation funding, 
investment decision making, and systems evaluation.  Stephanie has served as a Young 
Member on the Transportation Research Board’s Standing Committee on Transportation 
Programming and Investment Decision-Making (ADA50); she is currently the 








Everett, S., Y. Xiong, K. C. Sinha, and J. D. Fricker. Ex Post Facto Evaluation of 
Indiana’s Highway Investment Program: Lessons Learned. Transportation Research 
Record 2345, 24 – 30.  2013. 
 
Everett, S. R., Y. Xiong, J. D. Fricker, and K. C. Sinha. Measurement and Monitoring of 
the Performance of Highway Investment. Publication FHWA/IN/JTRP-2013/16. Joint 
Transportation Research Program, Indiana Department of Transportation and Purdue 
University, West Lafayette, Indiana, 2013. doi: 10.5703/1288284315218. 
 
Everett, S. Driver Behavior at Freeway Interchanges with Horizontal Signing.  
Compendium of Student Papers:  2009 Undergraduate Transportation Scholars Program.  
Southwest Region University Transportation Center.  Report No. SWUTC/09/476660-
00003-2.  October 2009. 
<http://swutc.tamu.edu/publications/technicalreports/compendiums/476660-00003-
2.pdf> 
